United States v. Ines Herrera Martinez, United States of America v. Alfonso Cortez-Gomez

354 F.3d 932

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: March 1, 2004
• Docket: 03-1229, 03-1233
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Ines Herrara Martinez and Alfonso Cortez-Gomez guilty of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and further found Martinez guilty of illegal reentry after deportation. On appeal, Martinez and Cortez-Gomez contend the district court

* erroneously denied their suppression motions because the initial traffic stop and the continued detention which resulted in the discovery and seizure of drugs were both illegal. Cortez-Gomez additionally challenges the district court’s refusal to admit into evidence at trial a purported confession by Martinez. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On April 8, 2002, Martinez and Cortez-Gomez were traveling eastbound on a South Dakota interstate in a 1988 Dodge Ram, while Trooper Matt Oxner was traveling westbound with a drug dog in his car. Oxner observed defendants’ vehicle, noticed at least one Hispanic occupant and a California license plate, and turned around to follow the vehicle. Oxner observed the right tires of the vehicle cross the fog line, activated a video camera, ran a registration cheek, discovered the vehicle was registered to one Sandoval Crescencio from California, observed no traffic violations other than the single fog-line crossing during this time, and proceeded to stop the vehicle for the line-crossing incident. Ox-ner approached the vehicle and told Martinez, the driver, Oxner had stopped him because Ms vehicle crossed the fog line, and Martinez acknowledged he had done so. Martinez produced his driver’s license, registration, and insurance information. Martinez, whose driver’s license was from Washington, D.C., followed Oxner back to the patrol ear, told Oxner he had just purchased the vehicle in Los Angeles, and he and Cortez-Gomez were traveling to Chicago to look for work. Oxner told Martinez Oxner was going to issue a warning ticket for the traffic violation and walk his drug dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted, and Oxner searched the vehicle, observing certain suspicious things such as areas where screws had been removed and replaced, but finding no controlled substances. In the interim, Oxner had questioned Martinez about his nationality and immigration status, and had called Border Patrol. The vehicle was ultimately impounded, Martinez and Cortez-Gomez were taken into custody, and packages containing 4,931.9 grams of cocaine were found inside the back seat of the vehicle.

Martinez and Cortez-Gomez argue the traffic stop was pretextual, despite Oxner’s testimony that he believed a single incident of crossing the fog line was a violation of a South Dakota statute requiring the driver to stay “as nearly as practicable” within one traffic lane. Martinez and Cortez-Gomez contend Oxner’s testimony he believed Hispanics were often used to transport drugs supports their contention that he stopped them solely based on their nationality. Further, even if the initial traffic stop was lawful, they also argue Oxner’s continued detention of them— questioning them about their citizenship, calling Border Patrol, and pursuing a search — was illegal, because Martinez appeared to have a valid driver’s license and responded reasonably to Oxner’s questions.

Although a pretextual traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment, any traffic violation provides a police officer with probable cause to stop a vehicle. See United States v. Pereira-Munoz, 59 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir.1995). We agree with the district court’s determinations the stop in this case was supported by probable cause, and defendants did not show discriminatory enforcement of the traffic laws by challenging Oxner’s motivation in their case. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (individual officer’s motivation is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes when there is probable cause for a stop, but selective enforcement of laws may violate Equal Protection Clause); United States v. Pulliam, 265 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.2001) (finding probable cause existed to stop vehicle that crossed fog line twice); Pereira-Munoz, 59 F.3d at 791 (“[s]o long as the officer is doing nothing more than he is legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, his actual state of mind is irrelevant” for purposes of determining stop’s lawfulness). We also find the continued detention was justified by the events which transpired after the vehicle was stopped. See United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 719-21 (8th Cir.2002) (officer making traffic stop does not violate Fourth Amendment by asking driver for his destination and purpose, checking license and registration, or requesting driver to step over to patrol car; nor does short detention for dog sniff after completion of traffic stop violate Fourth Amendment). In our view, the district court correctly denied the motions to suppress. See id. at 720 (standard of review).

Turning to Cortez-Gomez’s argument about Martinez’s statement made during a police interview, during which Martinez purportedly admitted he knew there were drugs in the car to explore the possibility of cooperating, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to admit this evidence. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 602-03, 114 S.Ct. , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (concerning admission of statements against penal interest as hearsay exception under Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(3); statement must be truly self-inculpatory rather than attempt to curry favor); United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1351 (8th Cir.1996) (standard of review).

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.