United States v. Imperial Oil, Ltd.

287 F. 400, 1922 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1070
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 29, 1922
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 287 F. 400 (United States v. Imperial Oil, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Imperial Oil, Ltd., 287 F. 400, 1922 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).

Opinion

WARD, Circuit Judge.

This libel was filed by the United States on its own behalf, as owner of the Steamship Western Hope, as well as on behalf of her officers and crew, to recover compensation for salvage services rendered to the Canadian oil tanker steamer Impoco in ballast between March 27 and April 3, 1920. The master, chief engineer, and ten members of the crew subsequently intervened separately.

The Western Hope, owned by the United States and used as an army transport, was operated by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, which appointed Harris, Magill & Co., Inc., as its agents for operation and management. On the voyage in question from Barry, Wales, to the port of New York, the Western Hope was carrying for the War Department a cargo of army supplies, consigned to various army officers, consisting of ordnance, aviation, mechanical, and engineering equipment supplies, and material. The freight was paid by the Treasurer of the United States upon an account rendered to the United States by the United States Shipping Board, Harris, Magill & Co., incorporated agents, as to which a major of the Quartermaster Corps certified that all the “services were rendered as stated and that they were necessary to the public service.” The claimant, admitting the right of the officers and crew of the Western Hope to recover, denies that the United States, as owner, has any right to do so.

The United States relies, in the first instance, on section 9 of the Shipping Act of September 7; 1916, 39 Stat. 728 (Comp. St. § 8146e), which provides:

“Sec. 9, * * * Every vessel purchased, chartered,” or leased from the board sháll, unless otherwise authorized by the board, be operated only under such registry or enrollment and license. Such vessels while employed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all laws, regulations, and liabilities governing merchant vessels, whether the United States be interested therein as owner, in whole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or other interest therein, * * *»

—and on section 10 of the Suits in Admiralty Act of March 9, 1920 (41 Stat. 528), which provides:

“Sec. 10. That the United States, and the crew of any merchant vessel owned or operated by the United States, or such corporation, shall have the right to collect and sue for salvage services rendered by such vessel and crew, and any moneys recovered therefrom by the United States for its own benefit, and not for the benefit of the crew, shall be covered into the United States Treasury to the credit of the department of the Government of the United States, or of the United States Shipping Board, or of such corporation, having control of the possession or operation of such vessel.”

I agree with the claimant that the Western Hope was not a merchant vessel under these acts. There was no more merchandising about her than there was about The Western Maid, U. S. v. Thompson, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L. Ed. 299, 257 U. S. 419, and the observa^ tion of Mr. Justice Holmes that carriage of a cargo of food in that case was as little a matter of merchandising as would be the transporting of a regiment of soldiers, is even more applicable to the Western Hope.

[402]*402Failing this, the United States relies upon its inherent right as an owner to recover compensation for salvage services in accordance with the ancient doctrine of the maritime law. Such services are voluntary, and they are just as voluntary in the case of men of war and public vessels generally as they are in the case of private vessels; i. e., it is no part of their duty to render such services. While I can see that a sovereign would and perhaps should consider it beneath his dignity to ask for compensation for services in saving property at sea, I can imagine no legal reason to prevent him from doing so. I know it was, and suppose it still is, the practice of the railroad companies never to ask compensation for salvage services rendered by their tugs in the harbor of New York. This was not because of any lack of right to do so, but out of a sense of propriety, which is an even more appropriate reason for the same practice pursued by the United States in case of its vessels. _ -

_ The claimant relies upon certain acts of Congress which do show the long practice of the United States not to'ask- for salvage compensation, but which, I think, in no respect affect its right to do so. While Congress may .restrict the inherent right of the United States to claim salvage, that right remains as usual until it is restricted. Legislation in England confirms this view in a striking manner. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, §§ 484 and 485, provide:

“484. In cases where salvage services are rendered by any ship belonging to her majesty or by the commander or crew thereof, no claim shall be made or allowed for any loss, damage, or risk thereby caused to such ship, or to the stores, tackle, or furniture thereof or for the use of any stores or other articles belonging to her Majesty supplied in order to effect such services, or for any other expense or loss sustained by her majesty by reason of such services.
“485. No claim whatever on account of any salvage services rendered to any ship or cargo or to any appurtenances of any ship by the commander or crew or part of the crew of any of her Majesty’s ships shall be Anally adjudicated upon unless the consent of the Admiralty has Brst been obtained, such consent to be signiBed by writing under the hand of the ¿Secretary to the Admiralty, and if any person who has originated proceedings in respect of any such claim fails to prove such consent to the satisfaction of the court, his suit shall stand dismissed and he shall pay all the costs of such proceedings: Provided that any document purporting to-give such consent and to be signed by the Secretary to the Admiralty shall be prima facie evidence of such consent having been given.”

The. United States may change its practice either by act of Congress or by executive authority, which, I must presume, directed this suit to be brought in its name, just as we presume in suits generally that the plaintiff has authorized suit. The acts relied upon are as follows:

The Act of March 3, 1800 (2 Stat. 16), now Act of June 30, 1864, c. 174, 13 Stat. 314, which regulated prize. It provided that, in case of recapture before any condemnation as prize, the courts should award salvage, no part of which should be decreed to the United States, but all should go to the captors and be distributed “as in the case of proceeds of property condemned as prize”; i. e., to the officers and crews of the public vessels of the United States concerned. U. S. Rev. Stat. [403]*403§ 4652 (Comp. St. § 8426). This is military salvage regulated by act of Congress and plainly recognized that but for the exception salvage would be distributed as usual.

The Act of December 22, 1837, U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1536 (Comp. St. § 2776), authorizes the President to employ public vessels adapted to the purpose to cruise along the coast in severe weather to afford aid to distressed navigators. Nothing is said about compensation and the United States has followed its usual practice in asking none from 'such vessels if, indeed, any could be claimed either by the United States or by the officers and crew, in view of the fact that the duty of rendering the services is imposed by law.

The Act of August 1, 1912, c. 268, 37 Stat. 242 (Comp.

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Bluebook (online)
287 F. 400, 1922 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1070, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-imperial-oil-ltd-nysd-1922.