United States v. Imani Franco

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: August 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-4528
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4528

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

IMANI JOVIANNA FRANCO, a/k/a Chula, a/k/a Jo,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:23-cr-00092-D-BM-2)

Submitted: August 21, 2025 Decided: August 25, 2025

Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: H. Justin Pace, H. JUSTIN PACE, PLLC, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Imani Jovianna Franco pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1594(c). The district court sentenced her to 144 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,

Franco’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Franco’s

plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Although notified of her right to do so, Franco

has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal

as barred by Franco’s waiver of the right to appeal included in the plea agreement. We

dismiss in part and affirm in part.

An appeal waiver does not prevent us from reviewing the validity of Franco’s guilty

plea. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018) (analyzing validity

of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing despite waiver). Because Franco did not move to withdraw

her plea or otherwise object to the plea hearing in the district court, we review the validity

of her plea for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014).

“Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error was

made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “In the Rule

11 context, this inquiry means that [Franco] must demonstrate a reasonable probability

that, but for the error, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty.” Sanya, 774 F.3d at 816

(citation modified).

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A guilty plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation

modified). “In evaluating the constitutional validity of a guilty plea, courts look to the

totality of the circumstances surrounding it, granting the defendant’s solemn declaration of

guilt a presumption of truthfulness.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th

Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must

conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines she

understands, the rights she is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which she is

pleading, and the maximum and any mandatory minimum penalties she faces. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result

of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2),

and that there is a factual basis for the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Any variance from

the requirements of Rule 11 “is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.” Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(h).

Our review of the record confirms that the magistrate judge fully complied with

Rule 11 and ensured that Franco’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an

adequate factual basis. We therefore conclude that Franco’s guilty plea is valid. Our

review further confirms that Franco knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her

right to appeal, such that the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable. See United States v.

Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “we will enforce [a] waiver”

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as to any issue within its scope if “the totality of the circumstances” reflect that the

defendant entered into the waiver “knowingly and intelligently”).

Franco did not waive her right to appeal claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

not known to her at the time of her guilty plea. However, “an ineffective assistance claim

will be addressed on direct appeal only when an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively

appears on the face of the record.” United States v. Kemp, 88 F.4th 539, 546 (4th Cir.

2023) (citation modified). The record here does not conclusively demonstrate that plea

counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Franco’s ineffective assistance

claims “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” Id. (citation modified).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no

meritorious grounds for appeal that fall outside the waiver’s scope. We therefore grant the

Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as to all issues covered by

the waiver. We otherwise affirm the criminal judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Franco, in writing, of the right to petition

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Franco requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Franco. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART