United States v. Ibn Abdullah

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-2597
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 23-2597 ________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

IBN ABDULLAH, a/k/a Askia Abdullah, a/k/a IBBN, a/k/a IB, Appellant _____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal No. 1-14-cr-00050-006) District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman ________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on April 12, 2024

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 4, 2024)

OPINION* ________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

Ibn Abdullah (“Abdullah”) appeals from the District Court’s order finding he

violated a condition of his supervised release by committing a state crime. Abdullah

argues the District Court erred in accepting his guilty plea and waiver of a revocation

hearing because, when providing a factual basis for the violation, Abdullah suggested he

had a justification defense. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court.

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background

of this case, we will recite only the facts pertinent to our disposition. After pleading

guilty to two drug offenses, on January 9, 2015, Abdullah was sentenced to serve eighty-

four months in federal prison and eight years of supervised release. [App. 33–36.] He

commenced his term of supervised release on July 19, 2019. [Appellant’s Br. 2;

Appellee’s Br. 2.]

Approximately one year later, in July 2020, the Probation Office filed an

Amended Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender under Supervision alleging that

Abdullah had violated the conditions of supervised release: (1) prohibiting him from

committing another federal, state, or local crime; (2) requiring him to refrain from the

illegal possession and use of drugs; and (3) requiring him to maintain employment. [App.

37–39.] In February 2022, the Probation Office filed a new Petition alleging two

additional violations: (4) Abdullah again violated the condition prohibiting him from

committing another crime; and (5) Abdullah violated the condition requiring him not to

leave the District of New Jersey without the Court’s or his Probation Officer’s

2 permission. [App. 42–43.] The fourth violation (“Violation No. 4”) stemmed from the

issuance of an arrest warrant charging Abdullah with attempted murder, aggravated

assault, and related offenses after he shot at an individual, A.W., in Atlantic City, New

Jersey. [App. 42.] The Probation Office determined that Violation No. 4 was categorized

as a Grade A violation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1). [App. 42.]

On September 14, 2021, the District Court conducted a hearing on Violations Nos.

1, 2, and 3. [See App. 44–47; Appellant’s Br. 6; Appellee’s Br. 3.] Abdullah was found

guilty of the first three counts by stipulation, but no sentence was imposed. [App. 44–47.]

On June 1, 2023, the parties appeared before the District Court once again and

asked the Court to accept a guilty plea on Violation No. 4 and to dismiss Violation No. 5.

[App. 48.] Prior to the District Court hearing, Abdullah had entered a guilty plea to

second-degree aggravated assault in New Jersey Superior Court. [App. 48–50.] The

guilty plea stemmed from the shooting incident in Atlantic City which gave rise to

Violation No. 4. Since the plea agreement in New Jersey Superior Court provided that the

state sentence would be served concurrently with any federal sentence, the State Court

had postponed sentencing to allow the District Court to impose the revocation sentence

first. [App. 49.] However, the District Court declined to impose the sentence until after

the state sentence was imposed, and so the District Court allowed Abdullah to withdraw

his revocation plea. [App. 49–53.]

After being sentenced in New Jersey Superior Court, Abdullah returned to District

Court on August 17, 2023, to resolve Violations Nos. 4 and 5. [See App. 18–32;

Appellant’s Br. 7; Appellee’s Br. 4.] Abdullah pleaded guilty to Violation No. 4, which

3 alleged that he violated the mandatory condition prohibiting him from committing

another “federal, state, or local crime.” App. 42. While setting fourth the factual basis for

the plea, Abdullah testified he had pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in New Jersey

Superior Court, but suggested he had a justification defense. [App. 19–21.] The District

Court asked Abdullah to clarify, stating: “You entered a plea to aggravated assault. You

admitted to aggravated assault. And here today you seem to hedge. . . . You seem to

retreat from the notion that you shot at somebody with the intent to do them harm. Did

you shoot at someone with the intent to do them harm?” App. 22–23. In response,

Abdullah stated: “I ain’t shoot at nobody with attempt to do harm, no.” App. 23. Thus,

the District Court called a break and instructed Abdullah to speak with defense counsel to

determine whether he still wished to plead guilty in federal court to Violation No. 4.

[App. 22–27.]

After the break, defense counsel advised the District Court that Abdullah wanted

to “admit [to] the violation of supervised release,” Abdullah would be “able to say that he

shot at the person who was shooting at him but that it was not self-defense,” and that

there “was not a self-defense claim in the case.” App. 30. Abdullah subsequently agreed

to go forward with his guilty plea, admitted to Violation No. 4, and disavowed any self-

defense claim associated with the charge. [App. 29–31, 59–60.]

Having adjudicated Abdullah guilty of four violations of his conditions of

supervised release, the District Court proceeded to sentence Abdullah. The District Court

revoked Abdullah’s previous term of supervised release, sentenced him to four

concurrent terms of thirty-six months in federal prison, and imposed an additional eight

4 years of supervised release. [App. 15.]

Abdullah subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. [App. 1.]

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). We have

jurisdiction to review the District Court’s revocation of supervised release under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

We review a district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of

discretion. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2001). But

because Abdullah did not contemporaneously object to any aspect of his conviction or

sentence, we review for plain error. See United States v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 425, 427

(3d Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58–59 (2002). Plain error

review requires Abdullah to establish: “(1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear or

obvious; (3) the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) the error affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Simmons, 69

F.4th 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2023).

III.

Pursuant to Section 3583(e)(3), a district court may revoke a term of supervised

release if the court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated

a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). “Revocation proceedings are

subject to ‘minimum requirements of due process.’” United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d

350, 356 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)). “These

requirements have been incorporated into Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

5 Procedure, which governs the revocation of supervised release.” Id.

Rule 32.1(b) provides that, before a district court may revoke supervised release,

the individual alleged to have violated the terms of release is entitled to a preliminary

hearing, followed by a revocation hearing at which the individual has the right to notice

and counsel, to question adverse witnesses, and to present evidence. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32.1(b). However, a defendant may waive the right to this hearing. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32.1(c)(2)(A).

When a defendant challenges a judgment revoking supervised release, the question

is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the Rule 32.1 waiver was knowing

and voluntary. See United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]n order

for due process to be satisfied in the context of a parole revocation hearing, the

defendant’s waiver of rights under Rule 32.1 must be knowing and voluntary under a

‘totality of the circumstances.’” (citation omitted)). “This standard does not require rigid

or specific colloquies with the district court. Rather, the district court, when confronted

with an attempted waiver, will advise the person on supervised release of both the rights

afforded him and the consequences of relinquishing those rights.” Id. (quotation marks,

citation, and alterations omitted). Thus, no “magic words” are required. Id. (quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Here, the District Court accepted Abdullah’s waiver of a revocation hearing on

Violation No. 4. [App. 56.] Abdullah claims the District Court erred by accepting the

waiver and guilty plea because, even though Abdullah and defense counsel admitted

“there was no self-defense claim,” the Court “should have elicited additional facts to

6 determine whether [Abdullah] reasonably believed” he was acting in self-defense.

Appellant’s Br. 10–11. According to Abdullah, the District Court’s “[f]ailure to do so

was plain error” since it deprived him of a hearing to determine whether Violation No. 4

“was actually defined and admitted.” Id. at 11. But this claim lacks merit for several

reasons.

First, the District Court had sufficient evidence to accept Abdullah’s guilty plea

and waiver of a revocation hearing on Violation No. 4. To revoke a term of supervised

release, a court must find by “a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated

a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). And we have previously noted

that “[a] court can revoke probation when it is reasonably satisfied that the probation

conditions have been violated, without the government being required to present proof

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged acts.” United States

v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In

this case, Abdullah did not contest the alleged violation before the District Court. Indeed,

he acknowledged that he had pleaded guilty and been convicted of new criminal conduct

in New Jersey State Court while on supervised release. [App. 20–21, 30–31.] And even if

Abdullah had not admitted to the violation, proof of the subsequent state court criminal

conviction was sufficient to establish a violation of his condition of supervised release.

See United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that an individual’s

guilty plea to a state charge of felon in possession was sufficient evidence to establish a

violation and thus justify revocation of supervised release).

Second, close examination of the record compels the conclusion that Abdullah’s

7 waiver of a revocation hearing was “knowing and voluntary,” and the revocation

proceedings complied with due process. See Manuel, 732 F.3d at 291. The District Court

confirmed that defense counsel reviewed the petition for revocation with Abdullah and

that Abdullah understood the charge against him and the underlying facts. [App. 25–31.]

The District Court explained to Abdullah that he was entitled to a revocation hearing, in

which the government would offer evidence to prove those charges. See App. 26

(“[During a hearing] the government would be put to its proofs to attempt to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence, which in this case may be relatively simple in light of

what I understand to have been a guilty plea in state court under oath.”). Abdullah

admitted he had pleaded guilty to the charges in state court, see App. 20–21, and

maintained his desire to waive the right to a revocation hearing even after the District

Court paused proceedings to allow Abdullah to discuss the self-defense claim with his

counsel, see App. 25–31. The totality of the circumstances demonstrates Abdullah’s

knowing and voluntary revocation hearing waiver and his admission that he violated his

conditions of supervised release. Thus, Abdullah cannot show “there was an error” in the

proceedings, as required by our plain error test. See Simmons, 69 F.4th at 94.

Abdullah claims Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure compels a

different conclusion because the Rule provides that, “[b]efore entering judgment on a

guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(b)(3); see also Appellant’s Br. 9.1 But Abdullah’s reliance on Rule 11 is

1 In his brief, Abdullah cites Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Appellant’s Br. 9. However, as the government points out, “the requirement that a district 8 misplaced. As a threshold matter, Rule 32.1, not Rule 11, “governs revocation or

modification of probation or supervised release.” United States v. Barnhart, 980 F.2d

219, 222 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir.

2014) (“The requirements for acceptance of guilty pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure Rule 11 do not apply at revocation hearings.”); United States v. Melton, 782

F.3d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that “several of our sister circuits have addressed

this same question and concluded that Rule 11 is not applicable to supervised release

revocation proceedings,” and collecting cases). And here, the revocation proceeding

complied with the requirements of Rule 32.1: Abdullah’s hearing was held within a

reasonable time following his state adjudication; he was provided with written notice of

the allegations of his violations in the form of the Probation Office’s Petition; evidence

against him was provided in the Petition and at the hearing; he appeared at the hearing

and was given the opportunity to offer evidence on his behalf (although, instead, he did

not contest the violations); he was represented by counsel; and the District Court

provided a statement of its reasoning for revoking Abdullah’s term of supervised release.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2); see also Maloney, 513 F.3d at 356 (listing the minimum

requirements for revocation proceedings under Rule 32.1 and due process). Therefore,

Abdullah’s argument relating to the adequacy of the proceedings lacks merit.

Finally, even if Abdullah could show error, he cannot demonstrate that “the error

affected his substantial rights.” Simmons, 69 F.4th at 94. “In order for an error to affect

court ensure an adequate factual basis for a guilty plea was moved to Rule 11(b)(3) in December 2002.” Appellee’s Br. 7 n.3 (emphasis omitted). 9 substantial rights, it must have been prejudicial; in other words, it must have affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 249 (3d

Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As previously noted, Abdullah’s guilty

plea to aggravated assault in New Jersey Superior Court was adequate proof that he

committed a new crime in violation of his conditions of supervised release. See

Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is well established that a

criminal defendant’s unconditional, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty waives all non-

jurisdictional issues.”). Thus, the state court guilty plea foreclosed Abdullah from

asserting a claim of self-defense before the District Court. See Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 344

(“[Defendant’s] firearm violation is supported by non-hearsay evidence (the [state court]

judgment and plea agreement) and is not in dispute. This violation suffices to justify

revocation of [defendant’s] supervised release . . . .”); see also App. 60 (“His lawyer

asked him in state court if he had fired a gun in the direction of [A.W.], and he said yes.

And then he asked him if in doing so he intended to cause serious bodily injury, and he

said yes.”). Because Abdullah’s claim of self-defense could not have had affected the

outcome of the proceedings, he fails to meet our plain error test.

In sum, the District Court here did not err by accepting Abdullah’s waiver of a

revocation hearing on Violation No. 4. Rather, Abdullah’s revocation proceedings

complied with both due process and Rule 32.1’s requirements.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.