United States v. Hunter
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
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v. )
) Criminal No. 11-039 (PLF)
RICARDO HUNTER, )
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Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before this Court is defendant Ricardo Hunter’s Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 162]. Mr. Hunter contends that he is at a high risk of contracting the novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”) and requests compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Motion for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Reply”) [Dkt. No. 176] at 1. The government opposes this motion. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release (“Gov’t Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 173-2]. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Mr. Hunter’s motion for compassionate release. 1
1 The Court has reviewed the following documents in connection with the pending motion: Statement of Offense and Memorandum in Support of Guilty Plea (“SOO”) [Dkt. No. 80]; Plea Agreement as to Ricardo Hunter (“Plea Agrmt.”) [Dkt. No. 81]; Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) [Dkt. No. 86]; Judgment as to Ricardo Hunter (“Judgment”) [Dkt. No. 96]; Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 162]; Sealed Document Exhibit G (“Sealed Ex. G”) [Dkt. No. 171]; United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release (“Gov’t Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 173-2]; Inmate Disciplinary Record (“Discip. Rec.”) [Dkt. No. 173-4]; Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Motion for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Reply”) [Dkt. No. 176]; and Supplement to Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release [Dkt. No 177].
I. BACKGROUND
On December 3, 2012, defendant Ricardo Hunter pled guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to: (1) two counts of Interference with Interstate Commerce by Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; (2) one count of Using, Carrying, and Possessing a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) one count of Attempted Armored Car Robbery While Armed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); and (4) a related forfeiture allegation. Plea Agrmt. ¶ 2. On March 1, 2013, Judge Richard Roberts sentenced Mr. Hunter pursuant to the binding plea agreement to 180 months of incarceration and a period of 60 months of supervised release. Judgment at 3-4.
Mr. Hunter, now 63 years old, is serving the remainder of his sentence at FCI Edgefield. Def.’s Mot. at 2. Mr. Hunter has already served approximately 73% of his fifteen- year sentence. Id. According to the defendant’s motion, there have been a number of COVID-19 infections at FCI Edgefield. Id. In addition to suffering from cervical spine myelopathy, peripheral neuropathy, herniated discs, detached retinas, and cataracts, Mr. Hunter has Type 2 diabetes, Stage 2 hypertension, and Hepatitis C, which make him particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. Id. Due to these circumstances, Mr. Hunter submitted a request for compassionate release to FCI Edgefield on April 10, 2020. Id. at 15-16. Although Mr. Hunter received notice on April 24, 2020 that his request had been received, he has not received any further response. Id. at 16. He now moves for a reduction of his sentence to time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See Def.’s Reply at 2.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed . . . but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One such exception is codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As modified by the First Step Act in 2018, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows courts to modify a sentence upon motion by a defendant once he has “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Mr. Hunter submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden on April 10, 2020 and more than 30 days have elapsed with no response; he therefore has exhausted his administrative remedies.
Once the exhaustion requirement has been met, a defendant must show that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” and that a sentence reduction is “consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission has stated that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist where the defendant is “suffering from a serious physical or mental condition” or “experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii)(I), (III). The Sentencing Commission has acknowledged, however, that there may be “[o]ther [r]easons” presenting “an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described” elsewhere in the commentary. United States v. Morris, Criminal No. 12-154, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91040, at *20 (D.D.C. May 24, 2020) (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D)). To that end, the COVID-19 pandemic falls under such an “other reason” that may present an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction. United States v. Morris, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91040, at *20.
The statute and the policy statement further instruct the Court to consider the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Court must consider these factors “with an eye toward whether it is necessary to maintain the prior term of imprisonment despite the extraordinary and compelling reasons to modify the defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Johnson, Criminal No. 15-125, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86309, at *13 (D.D.C. May 16, 2020).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Hunter’s underlying medical conditions, which increase his potential to contract COVID-19, are “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warranting a sentence reduction. At 63 years old, he is in a particularly vulnerable age group. In addition, Mr. Hunter’s individual circumstances are consistent with the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because he has served over 73% of his sentence and is unlikely to pose a threat to the public.
Mr. Hunter suffers from Type 2 diabetes, Stage 2 hypertension, and Hepatitis C.
Def.’s Mot. at 2. According to the CDC, each of these ailments could place him at a higher risk for contracting COVID-19. See Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, C ENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra- precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html. Mr. Hunter’s underlying medical conditions and the presence of COVID-19 at FCI Edgefield are therefore “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warranting a sentence reduction.
Reducing Mr. Hunter’s sentence would also be consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors. Mr. Hunter has served over 73% of his fifteen-year sentence and has a projected release date of December 21, 2023. Def.’s Mot. at 16. The substantial time served of his original sentence reflects the seriousness of his offenses and constitutes adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.
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