United States v. Horton

Opinion

22-1339-cr United States v. Horton

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of September, two thousand twenty-six.

Present:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

v. 22-1339-cr RONALD HORTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________

For Appellee: RAJIT S. DOSANJH, Assistant United States Attorney, for Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant: DONNA R. NEWMAN, Law Office of Donna R. Newman, PA., New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.).

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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Ronald Horton appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him on June 8, 2022, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.), based upon his guilty plea to sexual exploitation of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). On appeal, Horton challenges several conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court. He argues that the district court: (1) failed adequately to pronounce Conditions 1 through 15 at sentencing; (2) imposed Conditions 14 and 15 without the individualized assessment required for special conditions of supervised release; (3) abused its discretion by imposing Special Conditions 9, 10, and 11, relating to substance-abuse treatment and the use of alcohol and marijuana; and (4) abused its discretion by imposing Special Condition 6, which requires polygraph testing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we discuss here only as necessary to explain our decision to AFFIRM.

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“This Court generally reviews the imposition of supervised release conditions for abuse of discretion.” United States v. McAdam, 165 F.4th 688, 695 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298, 304 (2d Cir. 2024)). When a defendant has a meaningful opportunity to object to supervised release conditions at sentencing but does not do so, however, plain error review applies. Id. at 695–96; see also United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306, 310 (2d Cir. 2025) (en banc). We apply these principles to each of Horton’s challenges below.

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I. Oral Pronouncement of Conditions 1 through 15 Horton argues that the district court erred by failing to orally pronounce Conditions 1 through 15 at sentencing. We disagree.

“A sentencing court need not read the full text of every condition on the record.”

Maiorana, 153 F.4th at 314. It may “expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference particular conditions that have been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a notice adopted by the court.” Id. Here, the district court stated that, while on supervised release, Horton would be required to “comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this Court . . . .” App’x at 82. In United States v. Matos, we concluded that materially identical language sufficiently incorporated those conditions because the court’s “reference to General Order #23, a publicly accessible order, ‘provided [the defendant] adequate notice to either object to the standard conditions or to ask the district court to clarify which conditions it imposed upon him.’” United States v. Matos, No. 22-1561, 2026 WL 2339567, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (quoting United States v. Hayden, 102 F.4th 368, 374 (6th Cir. 2024)). Accordingly, the district court did not err.

II. Individualized Assessment of Conditions 14 and 15 Horton further argues that the district court erred by failing to make an individualized assessment as to Conditions 14 and 15.

“Because Conditions 14 and 15 are special conditions, the district court was required to make an individualized assessment when determining whether to impose those special conditions of supervised release, and to state on the record the reasons for imposing them; the failure to do so was error.” McAdam, 165 F.4th at 697 (citation modified). “We may nonetheless uphold a special

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condition if the district court’s reasoning is self-evident in the record, and the condition is reasonably related to the sentencing objectives.” Id. (citation modified).

As to Condition 14, which imposes financial disclosure requirements, we find that the justification for this condition is self-evident from the record. Horton was ordered to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and participate in mental health and substance abuse treatment programs, and he is required to contribute to the cost of these programs “in an amount to be determined by the probation officer based on [his] ability to pay . . . .” App’x at 84–88. Accordingly, “the financial disclosure condition is . . . necessary to allow the Probation Office to assess how much [Horton] can contribute toward treatment.” United States v. Ortiz, No. 24-261-cr, 2025 WL 816300, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2025) (summary order).

As to Condition 15, given the nature of the offense, Horton’s minimization of his conduct, and his risk of reoffending, we conclude that the reasons for imposing Condition 15, which authorizes searches based on reasonable suspicion, are self-evident. Horton denied remembering his offense conduct, denied being sexually attracted to children, and expressed doubt that the victim of abuse was harmed by his conduct—thus minimizing his wrongdoing. See McAdam, 165 F.4th at 698 (suggesting that reasons for search condition may be self-evident where the defendant “den[ies] the scope and wrongfulness of his actions after his arrest”). The court also expressed concern about Horton’s risk of reoffending based on the findings of his psychosexual evaluation. See App’x 79–80. Those circumstances bear directly on the need to monitor Horton’s compliance with the conditions of supervision, deter further misconduct, and protect the public.

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III. Special Conditions 9, 10 and 11 Horton next challenges Special Conditions 9, 10, and 11, which require him to participate in a substance-abuse treatment program and refrain from possessing or using marijuana. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing these conditions.

At sentencing, the district court explained that “[t]here is indication that [Horton had] used marijuana, both regular marijuana as well as synthetic marijuana, and that [he had] used some prescription opioids.” App’x at 87. The record thus gave the district court “reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled substances[,] or alcohol.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4) (2021 Manual). In such circumstances, the Guidelines recommend both participation in a substance-abuse treatment program and a condition prohibiting the use of alcohol. See id. The court’s findings therefore adequately supported Special Conditions 9 and 10. Although Horton points to his statements that he had recently abstained from substance use, those statements did not require the district court to disregard his history of marijuana, synthetic marijuana, and prescription opioid use. On this record, we identify no error in the court’s determination that these conditions were appropriate.

We likewise discern no error in the imposition of Special Condition 11. Addressing Horton directly at sentencing, the court stated: “I know you’ve said that marijuana helps calm you down, but right now, Mr. Horton, federally marijuana is a controlled substance. And when you are released unless the law has changed, you may not use it.” App’x at 87. The court sufficiently connected Horton’s admitted marijuana use to a legitimate sentencing objective, namely deterring future unlawful conduct. See United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2024). Nor is Special Condition 11 substantively unreasonable. In assessing substantive reasonableness, we first consider the cognizable liberty interest affected by the challenged condition. See id. at 124.

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Because federal law prohibits the possession and use of marijuana, a condition requiring Horton to refrain from that conduct does not impose an impermissible deprivation of liberty.

IV. Special Condition 6 Finally, Horton challenges Special Condition 6, which subjects him to polygraph testing as part of his supervision. He argues that the condition is impermissibly vague and procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and improperly delegates authority to the Probation Office. We reject each argument.

First, the condition is not unconstitutionally vague. A supervised-release condition must provide a defendant with sufficient notice of “what conduct will result in his being returned to prison.” United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2003)). Special Condition 6 satisfies that requirement. It informs Horton that he may be required to submit to polygraph testing and that, when tested, he “shall answer the questions posed during the examination, subject to [his] right to challenge in a court of law the use of such statements as violations of [his] Fifth Amendment rights.” App’x at 95.

We also reject Horton’s substantive reasonableness challenge. We have repeatedly recognized the legitimate role of polygraph testing in the supervision of sex offenders, including its “strong deterrent value,” and have explained that such conditions may “further sentencing objectives such as rehabilitation and deterrence, with reasonably small incremental deprivations of liberty.” United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 2006)).

As for Horton’s procedural reasonableness challenge, the government does not dispute that the district court failed to provide an individualized explanation for imposing the polygraph

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condition. However, here, the justification for the special condition is self-evident from the record. See McAdam, 165 F.4th at 697. Horton repeatedly minimized or denied aspects of his offense conduct. Horton’s statements reflect the type of resistance to candid self-assessment that can make verification testing reasonably useful in monitoring compliance with supervision and furthering rehabilitation and deterrence. See Johnson, 446 F.3d at 277–78 (recognizing the appropriateness of polygraph testing for an offender who “resisted honest self-assessment”). This case therefore differs from United States v. Wilson, where we concluded that the justification for polygraph testing was not self-evident in light of the defendant’s extensive cooperation with the Government and truthful testimony at two trials. No. 23-6082-CR, 2024 WL 2043054, at *2 (2d Cir. May 8, 2024). On the record before us, the rationale for Special Condition 6 is sufficiently self-evident from the record.

Finally, Special Condition 6 does not impermissibly delegate judicial authority to the Probation Office. “[W]e have explained, while a district court may delegate to Probation authority ‘over certain minor details of supervised release,’ it may not delegate ‘decisionmaking authority which would make a defendant’s liberty itself contingent on a probation officer’s exercise of discretion.’” United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748, 765 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Birkedahl, 973 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here, the district court itself imposed the requirement that Horton submit to verification testing. Probation’s authority to determine when such testing should occur and to administer the testing concerns the implementation of that judicially imposed condition, not the existence or nature of the restriction itself. See also United States v. Villafane- Lozada, 973 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2020) (rejecting a delegation challenge to a verification-testing condition that left to Probation the choice of testing technology). Accordingly, we affirm the imposition of Special Condition 6.

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We have considered Horton’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk