UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v. Crim. No. 25-292 (EGS)
JORDAN HOLLEY
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Jordan Holley’s
Motion for Bond Review (“Motion”). See Mot., ECF No. 33. 1 Mr.
Holley requests that the Court review his bond status and
release him to the High Intensity Supervision Program (“HISP”)
with the same conditions that were put in place by Magistrate
Judge Sharbaugh on September 15, 2025.
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, and
because in view of the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Holley
has failed to produce credible evidence to overcome the
presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure . . . the safety of the community” pursuant to
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed document.
1 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E), the Court DENIES Mr. Holley’s motion
and orders Mr. Holley detained pending trial.
I. Background
A. Procedural
Mr. Holley is charged with one count of Travel With Intent
to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b). At his arraignment on September 15, 2025, Magistrate
Judge Sharbaugh released him to HISP into the custody of his
mother and with robust conditions, including that he has no
access to computers or other Internet-connected electronic
devices. See Order, ECF No. 9. Three days later, Chief Judge
Boasberg reversed the decision after the government presented
evidence of additional online conversations Mr. Holley had with
perceived minors. See Minute Order (Sep. 18, 2025).
After the case was assigned to this Court, Mr. Holley filed
a Motion to Reinstate, seeking to be released into the custody
of his mother with the same conditions imposed by Magistrate
Judge Sharbaugh. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18. After a
hearing on October 28, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Holley’s
motion. See generally United States v. Holley, Crim. No. 25-252,
2025 WL 3507180 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2025). The Court concluded that
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of
evidence, and Mr. Holley’s history and characteristics weighed
in favor of detention; and that the nature and seriousness of
2 the danger that his release would pose could not be mitigated by
the concededly robust conditions imposed by Magistrate Judge
Sharbaugh because Mr. Holley’s parents could not monitor him
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. See generally id.
Mr. Holley is incarcerated at Northern Neck Regional Jail
(“Northern Neck”).
Mr. Holley filed the pending Motion for Bond Review on
February 5, 2026. See Mot., ECF No. 33. The government filed its
opposition on February 13, 2026. See Opp’n, ECF No. 34. The
Court held a status hearing on February 24, 2026, after which it
ordered Mr. Holley to submit an evaluation of his mental health
status to the Court, including steps taken to address recent
mental health crises during his pretrial confinement in this
case, and to provide information about current efforts to
provide him with appropriate mental health care. See Order, ECF
No. 37. On April 21, 2026, Mr. Holley submitted a Supplement to
his Motion for Bond Review with an attached Pre-Trial
Psychosexual Risk Assessment (“Risk Assessment”). See Suppl.,
ECF No. 38; Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1. The government filed
its reply on April 28, 2026. See Gov’t’s Reply, ECF No. 39. Mr.
Holley filed his reply to the government’s reply to his
supplement on May 5, 2026. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40.
3 B. Pre-Trial Psychosexual Risk Assessment
The Risk Assessment of Mr. Holley was prepared by Dr.
Hildembrand Forensic Psychology Consulting on April 6, 2026.
Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 1. The purpose of the Risk
Assessment is “to estimate the likelihood of future sexual or
violent offending based on empirically derived risk factors.
These tools compare an individual's score to groups of similar
offenders to determine the proportion who have reoffended over
time.” Id. at 20.
The Risk Assessment was based on the following information
and tests: (1) review of materials related to the criminal
charges against Mr. Holley; (2) review of mental health records
from Northern Neck and educational/developmental documentation
from the Kennedy Krieger Institute; (3) four interviews of Mr.
Holley totaling four hours; (4) an interview of Mr. Holley’s
parents; (5) a battery of psychological and psychosexual testing
designed to evaluate Mr. Holley’s personality structure,
emotional functioning, impulse control, and areas of potential
sexual deviance; (6) “[a]n actuarial risk assessment instrument
(Static-99R) and a structured professional judgment framework
informed by the SVR-20 . . . to estimate Mr. Holley's risk for
sexual recidivism”; and (7) ongoing clinical consultation with
Mr. Holley's treating sex-offender-specific therapist, Dr.
4 Hildembrand, to obtain additional information regarding treatment
engagement, progress, and risk management. Id. at 1-3.
Mr. Holley has been receiving “sex-offender—specific
treatment” from Dr. Hildembrand since December 17, 2025, by
attending weekly virtual sessions. Mot., ECF No. 33 at 2. The
Risk Assessment states that Mr. Holley is consistently engaged
in his treatment, is willing to examine his own behavior, and is
committed to changing his behavior. Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-
1 at 15. With regard to the progress of his treatment and his
current functioning, the Risk Assessment states as follows:
Overall, Mr. Holley is making early but meaningful progress in areas directly related to risk, including emotional regulation, coping, sexual self-control, and accountability. Continued treatment will be important to build on these gains and support their application in a less structured environment. These gains would likely be further supported in a structured, community- based setting, where he can continue to practice and reinforce these skills.
Id. at 16.
The Risk Assessment’s findings, conclusions, and estimates
most relevant to Mr. Holley’s danger to the community are
described below.
Findings from the Sexual Adjustment Inventory (“SAI”)
include that Mr. Holley has “significant difficulty with sexual
self-regulation, including elevated sexual preoccupation and
5 dissatisfaction.” Id. at 18. This test found “no evidence of
sexual interest in children” and his score for sexual assault
was in the “moderate range.” Id. The Risk Assessment concludes
that “the findings suggest that his sexual behavior is best
understood within a broader pattern of sexual dysregulation,
poor coping, and impulse control difficulties, rather than a
fixed deviant sexual interest pattern.” Id. at 19.
The Actuarial Risk Assessment (“ARA”) estimates relative
sexual recidivism risk based on several factors. Id. at 20. The
conclusion from this assessment is that “if [Mr. Holley]
maintains abstinence from pornography and substances and
continues in structured treatment,” he is most comparable with
persons who have been found to sexually recidivate at a rate of
approximately 4.6% to 9.6% over five years. Id. at 21.
The Structured Professional Judgment Framework noted that
although the charged “offense and related online behavior support
the presence of deviant sexual ideation involving minors, the
available data do not support a stable or preferential sexual
interest in children.” Id. at 21. Overall, the framework
“supports the conclusion that Mr. Holley's risk is best
understood as context-dependent, dynamic, and manageable with
appropriate treatment and supervision, rather than indicative of
a fixed or enduring pattern of sexual dangerousness.” Id.
6 The Dynamic Risk Factor Assessment (“DRFA”) looks at risk
factors that may be most relevant to re-offending. Id. at 22.
This assessment indicates that the following risk factors are
present with Mr. Holley: (1) sexual preoccupation based on his
difficulty with sexual self-regulation; (2) deviant sexual
interest (such as a preference for children) is “present, but
embedded within a broader pattern of compulsive and dysregulated
sexual behavior rather than a primary or exclusive deviant
orientation”; (3) lack of emotionally intimate relationships with
adults; (4) lifestyle impulsivity; (5) poor problem solving; and
(6) negative social influences. Id. at 22-26. This assessment
indicates that the following risk factors are not present: (1)
emotional congruence with children; (2) resistance to rules and
supervision; and (3) hostility/grievance. Id.
The Risk Assessment states that despite the evidence in
the criminal case,
the available evidence does not support a diagnosis of Pedophilic Disorder (F65.4), as there is insufficient evidence of a fixed, sustained, and preferential sexual interest in prepubescent children. Objective testing did not identify a stable pedophilic arousal pattern, and his broader history is more consistent with sexual dysregulation, compulsive sexual behavior, and use of sexual activity as a coping mechanism, rather than a primary attraction to children.
Id. at 26. However, the data does support a diagnosis of
7 Paraphilic Disorder—Non-consenting Persons based on his
“recurrent deviant sexual behavior involving non-consenting
others over time.” Id.
The Risk Assessment concludes that “[o]verall, Mr. Holley
presents as an individual whose risk is situational and
modifiable rather than fixed or predatory in nature. With
continued treatment, structured support, and ongoing monitoring,
his risk is expected to remain manageable over time.” Id. at 29.
The Risk Assessment contains the following treatment and risk
management recommendations: (1) individual and group sex-offender-
specific treatment; (2) a psychiatric evaluation and medication
management upon his release; (3) substance use treatment and
monitoring in view of his history of abuse of alcohol and
cannabis; (4) sexual behavior focused support such as Sex Addicts
Anonymous; (5) family counseling and psychoeducation; (6)
behavioral monitoring such as sexual history polygraph testing and
substance abuse testing; (7) supervision and environmental
controls including no unsupervised contact with minors, and
restrictions and monitoring related to Internet use and online
activity; and (8) ongoing clinical monitoring. Id. at 30-32.
II. Legal Standard
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The
8 “provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.” Id. The Act
provides that if a judicial officer finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required and the safety of any other person and the
community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of
the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The danger a
person poses to the community is a sufficient reason to order
pretrial detention. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55; United States
v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The government bears the burden of showing that no
condition or combination of conditions can mitigate danger to
the community based on clear and convincing evidence. See United
States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2021); 18
U.S.C. § 3412(f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence
standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . .
. the community”, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); courts consider four
factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3)
the history and characteristics of the person, and (4) the
nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
9 community that would be posed by the person's release.” Munchel,
991 F.3d at 1279 (internal quotations omitted). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”)
explains that “a defendant's detention based on dangerousness
accords with due process only insofar as [his] history,
characteristics, and alleged criminal conduct make clear that he
... poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety.” Id.
at 1280; see id. at 1282 (explaining that government must
demonstrate defendant's “identified and articulable threat to
the community”).
“When there is probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2), as here, there is a rebuttable presumption that ‘no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
... the safety of the community.’” United States v. Farina, No.
25-cr-232, 2025 WL 2651249, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2025) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)). “Once the rebuttable presumption is
triggered, ‘the defendant bears the burden of production to
offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory
presumption.’” Id. (citing United States v. Blanchard, No. 18-
MJ-101, 2018 WL 4964505, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018) (quoting
United States v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
“The defendant may carry this burden by coming forward with some
evidence that he will not ... endanger the community if
10 released.” Id. (quoting United States v. Garner, No. CR 24-533,
2025 WL 1575848, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025) (citation
omitted)). “If the defendant rebuts the presumption ‘the
presumption is not erased but rather remains in the case as an
evidentiary finding militating against release to be weighed
along with other evidence.’” Id. (internal citation omitted).
III. Analysis
There has been no change to: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense with which Mr. Holley is charged,
(2) the weight of the evidence against him, or (3) his history
and characteristics; and so the Court incorporates its prior
conclusions here. See generally Holley, 2025 WL 3507180. Rather,
Mr. Holley focuses on the nature and seriousness of the danger
to any person or the community that would be posed by his
release.
Specifically, Mr. Holley argues that he should be released
pending trial for two reasons. First, Dr. Hildembrand informed
defense counsel that “Mr. Holley’s rehabilitative efforts would
be optimized if he were in the community, meeting in person with
[her] and his peers as part of group therapy.” Mot., ECF No. 33
at 2–3. Mr. Holley states that his treatment requires him to be
“honest and open about his sexual sobriety, urges, and thoughts
around treatment,” but that “it is life-threatening to be open
about [these issues] while incarcerated.” See id. at 3. Second,
11 Mr. Holley states that he attempted suicide twice since being
incarcerated. Id. at 3.
Following the completion of the Risk Assessment, Mr. Holley
argues in his supplemental filing that granting him pre-trial
release to receive “outpatient treatment would not only
eliminate one of the two major stressors contributing to [his]
mental health crisis, i.e., incarceration and pending legal
sanctions, but also would provide the most effective means to
manage any risk that [he] poses to reoffend.” Suppl., ECF No. 38
at 3 (quoting Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 32).
A. Treatment and Risk Management
The treatment and risk management section of the Risk
Assessment indicates that Mr. Holley needs to employ a variety
of strategies to address what led to the actions that form the
factual basis of the charges against him and to reduce the risk
that he will engage in them again. See Risk Assessment, ECF No.
38-1 at 30-32. The Risk Assessment states that “outpatient
treatment . . . would provide the most effective means to
manage any risk that Mr. Holley poses to reoffend.” Id. at 32.
The Court acknowledges Mr. Holley’s position that outpatient
treatment would be more effective than the virtual treatment he
is receiving while detained. Suppl., ECF No. 38 at 3. The Court
also acknowledges that Mr. Holley’s detention results in him not
being able to participate in group therapy or participate in
12 activities such as Sex Addicts Anonymous. Id. at 3–4. The Court
is also mindful that Mr. Holley is unable to be “honest and
open” about his issues while incarcerated. For the reasons
explained below, however, the Risk Assessment does not rebut the
presumption of dangerousness.
First, the Risk Assessment emphasizes that Mr. Holley is in
the early stages of making progress to address his various
issues. Id. at 16. The Court commends Mr. Holley for his
progress so far, but the fact is that when the Risk Assessment
was issued, he had been receiving therapy for a little over
three months, as compared with many years of engaging in the
sexual behaviors and substance abuse described in the Risk
Assessment. Mr. Holley emphasizes that “while the Report does
not suggest that treatment in custody does not work, it does
highlight that further meaningful progress depends on a setting
where those skills can actually be practiced and monitored.”
Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40 at 4. The Court acknowledges this
distinction; however, the question before the Court is whether
the presumption of dangerousness has been rebutted. Despite the
progress Mr. Holley made between December 2025 and April 2026,
and treatment planned for him should he be released, he cannot
be monitored twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The
Court notes that the Risk Assessment indicates that “monitoring”
him is a critical piece of his treatment.
13 Second, the findings from the SAI indicate that Mr. Holley
has “significant difficulty with sexual self-regulation,
including elevated sexual preoccupation and dissatisfaction.”
Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 18. The Court noted in its
December 2025 Memorandum Opinion that is it not possible for Mr.
Holley to be monitored continuously. See Holley, 2025 WL
3507180, at *8. Accordingly, if Mr. Holley were released, he
could obtain the means to access the Internet, could obtain
pornography, and could obtain alcohol and cannabis; all of
which, according to the Risk Assessment, influence his inability
to sexually self-regulate. See generally Risk Assessment, ECF
No. 38-1. Similarly, the ARA, which estimates his chances of
sexually recidivating at 4.6% to 9.6% over five years, is
contingent upon his abstinence from pornography and substances.
Id. at 20–21. As noted above, the Court cannot be assured of his
abstinence from pornography and substances since he cannot be
monitored twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
Third, although the Risk Assessment concludes that there is
insufficient evidence of a fixed, sustained, and preferential
sexual interest in prepubescent children, id. at 26; the record
in this case demonstrates otherwise. Mr. Holley emphasizes that
“Dr. Hildembrand concludes that Mr. Holley’s behavior is much
more consistent with sexual compulsivity, disinhibition, and
impaired judgment, rather than a fixed arousal preference. That
14 distinction matters because it directly informs how risk is
understood and throughout the Report Mr. Holley’s risk is framed
as dynamic and responsive to treatment.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No.
40 at 3. The Court concludes, however, that even if Mr. Holley’s
risk is “dynamic and responsive to treatment,” this does not
provide evidence to rebut the presumption of dangerousness
because Mr. Holley cannot be monitored twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week. Furthermore, the record in this case
demonstrates that Mr. Holley does have an interest in engaging
in sexual activity with children, specifically, there is
evidence of multiple online conversations about engaging in
sexual activity with children culminating in travel to the
District of Columbia to engage in sexual activity with a child.
Fourth, the DRFA, which the Risk Assessment states are risk
factors that may be most relevant to re-offending, id. at 22;
indicates that six of the nine risk factors are present with Mr.
Holley. Specifically, the Risk Assessment identifies the
following risk factors as being present: (1) sexual
preoccupation based on his difficulty with sexual self-
regulation; (2) deviant sexual interest (such as a preference
for children) is “present, but embedded within a broader pattern
of compulsive and dysregulated sexual behavior rather than a
primary or exclusive deviant orientation;” (3) lack of
emotionally intimate relationships with adults; (4) lifestyle
15 impulsivity; (5) poor problem solving; and (6) negative social
influences. Id. at 22-26. Mr. Holley concedes that while the Risk
Assessment
acknowledges meaningful risk factors, it consistently frames Mr. Holley’s risk as something that is modifiable and manageable with the right structure and oversight. In plain terms, despite Mr. Holley’s risk factors, Dr. Hildembrand believes that he remains a good candidate for community-based treatment because he has shown a positive response so far, with real progress in urge control, self-monitoring, accountability, and an understanding of victim impact. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40. Again, the Court commends Mr. Holley
for the progress he has made in the four months leading up to
the issuance of the Risk Assessment. However, and as he
concedes, the Risk Assessment “acknowledges meaningful risk
factors.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40 at 4. Although the Risk
Assessment maintains that these factors can be managed with
structure and oversight, because Mr. Holley cannot be monitored
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the Risk Assessment
does not provide evidence to rebut the presumption of
dangerousness.
16 B. Mental Health Issues
The Risk Assessment states that Mr. Holley is “not actively
suicidal though he continue[s] to endorse passive suicidal
ideation (no plan).” Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 12. That
said, “[h]is current risk level remains high due to his recent
attempt and ongoing stressors of being incarcerated and pending
legal sanctions.” Id.
The Court is mindful that releasing Mr. Holley could
eliminate the mental health stress that is contributing to his
suicide risk level. However, Mr. Holley can continue weekly
therapy sessions with Dr. Hildembrand virtually. The record here
demonstrates that these sessions have a positive influence on
him. Id. at 4 (noting that Northern Neck mental health
documentation states that Mr. Holley met with Dr. Hildembrand on
December 26, 2025, and afterwards “report[ed] he discussed with
his therapist today how he ended up on suicide watch and feels
positive after talking about his concerns that lead to suicide
watch”).
Furthermore, the information provided by defense counsel
demonstrates that Northern Neck has been responsive to his
mental health needs. Specifically, he has been placed on the
“mental health acute list for monitoring of his mental health
needs.” Suppl., ECF No. 38 at 3. He met with a mental health
provider three times in December 2025, and as a result of the
17 last meeting in December, he was placed on suicide watch. Id.
Three days after being placed on suicide watch, he reported no
suicidal ideation. Id. Northern Neck secured a telemedicine
psychiatric consultation for Mr. Holley on December 29, 2025,
resulting in him being prescribed an antidepressant, although it
is unclear the extent to which he has been able to take the
medication. Id. at 4.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Holley’s mental
health needs are being addressed at Northern Neck and through
virtual therapy with Dr. Hildembrand.
IV. Conclusion
The Court commends Mr. Holley for his engagement with his
treatment and sincerely hopes this continues; however, for all
the reasons discussed above, the Risk Assessment does not
provide evidence that rebuts the presumption that he is a danger
to the community. The government has therefore shown by clear
and convincing evidence that no conditions can reasonably assure
the safety of the community. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge June 5, 2026