UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal Action No. 25-292 (EGS) JORDAN HOLLEY
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Jordan Holley’s (“Mr.
Holley”) Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support of
Pretrial Release (“Mot. to Reinstate”). See Mot. to Reinstate,
ECF No. 18. Mr. Holley is charged with one count of Travel With
Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2423(b). The government sought pretrial detention, but
on September 15, 2025, Magistrate Judge Matthew Sharbaugh denied
the request and released Mr. Holley to the High Intensity
Supervision Program with Home Incarceration. See Order, ECF No.
9 at 2. The government moved for review and appeal of the
release order, see Mot. for Review and Appeal of Release Order,
ECF No. 8; and Chief Judge James Boasberg granted the
government’s motion, ordering Mr. Holley detained. See Minute
Entry (Sept. 18, 2025). Thereafter, Mr. Holley filed the pending
1 Motion to Reinstate. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18. The
government opposed the motion and also filed a Supplement of
Additional Facts. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20; Gov’t Suppl., ECF
No. 24. Mr. Holley filed a Reply, in response to which the
government filed a Surreply. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26; Gov’t
Surreply, ECF No. 28. The Court held a Detention Hearing
(“Hearing”) on Mr. Holley’s motion on October 28, 2025, at the
conclusion of which it informed the parties that it would take
the matter under advisement.
Upon careful consideration of Mr. Holley’s motion, the
government’s opposition and supplement thereto, the reply, the
surreply, the magistrate judge and Chief Judge detention
decisions, the parties’ arguments at the Hearing, the entire
record, and for the reasons discussed in this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court DENIES the motion and orders Mr. Holley
detained pending trial.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On August 28, 2025, Mr. Holley initiated a private chat
with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Task Force
Officer in an undercover capacity (“the UC”) on a fetish
website. See Aff. in Supp. of Criminal Compl., ECF No. 2-1 at 3. 1
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of
2 The following is an excerpt from the exchange between Mr. Holley
(“FeetAddict202”) and the UC, in which the two refer to the
purported nine-year-old daughter of the UC:
FeetAddict202: If you ever want to teach her about BBC2 2 or cock in general, use me as a stunt cock for her practice.
UC: lol i think we might be liked minded
FeetAddict202: When I saw your post I figured we would be. Too many bulls scared to doit but im not. If you’re going to introduce your daughter to the world of BBC and cock, why not have a real one for her to use as practice
FeetAddict202: I am Brutus, and ill be your BBC you have your daughter practice with as you watch. How’s that for kinky fun? (wink emoji)
UC: where else do you like to chat I like where this is going
FeetAddict202: “Kik, telegram, my number, even email. Pick any. I’m serious about this. Live action porn in your own home. Me and her. Our secret fun time.”
UC: whats your number
FeetAddict202: 443-834-8508
The conversation then moved to text:
UC: Yes not fantasy right
HOLLEY: Correct. Real life. I have experience with daughters and fathers, you found the right bull for the job
UC: Ok any age limits before we discuss my girl not trying to get caught up
HOLLEY: No sir. Only a number for me
the filed document. 2 According to the government, “BBC” is commonly used to refer to
“Big Black Cock.” Aff. in Supp. of Criminal Compl., ECF No. 2-1. at 3.
3 UC: Fuck yeah we are very like minded
HOLLEY: Perfect. I understand wanting to be careful. Most wouldn't do this but I am a special bull. 1 for families. Even when divorced. A father deserves to know how his daughter handles cock
UC: Well to be honest she plays with mine and had an old college buddy in town about six months ago and loved watching her sucking his cock
HOLLEY: That's real hot. A true good daughter. Is she a virgin or has that been taken care of?
Id. at 3-5. Mr. Holley and the UC described in graphic detail
plans for Mr. Holley to have sex with the UC’s purported nine-
year-old daughter. See id. at 5. The UC sent a picture of his
purported daughter to Mr. Holley, to which he responded “Oh wow,
thats perfect honestly. I am built just right for her,” and sent
a photo of his erect penis. Id.
Mr. Holley and the UC arranged a time and place to meet at
the UC’s purported residence in Washington, D.C. (“D.C.”) for
Mr. Holley to engage in vaginal intercourse with the UC’s
purported child. See id. On September 10, 2025, Mr. Holley met
with the UC, confirmed his online name, and the UC subsequently
placed him under arrest. Id. at 6. Following his arrest, Mr.
Holley waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement. Id. Mr.
Holley stated that he had traveled to D.C. to find out more
about the UC “but that he planned to call law enforcement and
not go through with it.” Id. at 7. A mask, sex toys, and
lubricant were recovered in Mr. Holley’s vehicle. Id.
4 Following Mr. Holley’s arrest, the FBI began searching Mr.
Holley’s electronic devices. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 9.
Between September 30, 2023 and February 27, 2024, Mr. Holley
exchanged texts with a woman, S-1, and claimed in various texts
that he had had sex with children ages 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16.
See id. at 9-10. Between February 5, 2025 and February 14, 2025,
Mr. Holley exchanged texts with a woman, S-2, and described in
graphic and violent terms how he would rape her seven-year-old
daughter. See id. at 10. He also told S-2 that he had had sex
with a nine-year-old child. See id. at 11.
On October 6, 2025, the FBI notified the government that it
had completed its review of the devices. See Gov’t Suppl., ECF
No. 24 at 1. The government states that “[n]o material that was
clearly child sexual abuse material was discovered on the
phone.” Id. However, in several chats, Mr. Holley discussed the
sexual abuse of children. For example, between November 8, 2024
and February 7, 2025, Mr. Holley communicated with a woman, S-3,
and the two discussed having children together and having Mr.
Holley sexually abuse children starting at age eight. See id. at
1. Between September 2024 and December 2024, Mr. Holley
communicated on multiple occasions with a man, S-6, who stated
he was interested in Mr. Holley coming to his home and having
sex with his wife and three minor children aged 16 (female), 14
(female), and 11 (male). Id. at 3. Mr. Holley described in
5 graphic and violent terms orally, vaginally, and anally raping
the children, and choking and slapping them. See id. at 3-4. Mr.
Holley also discussed recording the abuse while he and the
children wore ski masks. See id. at 4. S-6 stopped sending
messages to Mr. Holley on December 4, 2024, but Mr. Holley
continued to send him messages through August 13, 2025. Id. at
5.
The parties do not dispute the contents of the online
communications. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18; Gov’t Opp’n,
ECF No. 20; Gov’t Suppl., ECF No. 24; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26;
Gov’t Surreply, ECF No. 28.
B. Procedural History
Mr. Holley appeared before Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh on
September 11, 2025. See Minute Entry (Sept. 11, 2025). The
government sought pretrial detention, and Magistrate Judge
Sharbaugh released Mr. Holley on September 15, 2025 to home
incarceration under the supervision of his parents with the
following additional conditions: (1) the Defendant will be
referred for a Mental Health Assessment; (2) removal of desktop
computer from residence; (3) home visits by US Parole and
Probation for Maryland to the extent practicable; (4) the
Defendant may not have access to smart devices that can access
the Internet or use smart televisions alone; (5) all devices in
the residence must be password protected; (6) Defendant’s
6 parents’ cellphones must be on their person at all times or
locked in a safe; (7) the Defendant may not have access to any
electronic device; (8) electronic devices not in active use must
be locked in a safe; (9) an alarm system must be set to indicate
entry and exit from the residence; (10) custodians must conduct
random searches on the Defendant and his property at least twice
per week to determine that he does not have any electronic
devices; (11) the home WiFi password must be changed and not
shared with the Defendant; and (12) compliance with all rules
and regulations of supervising agency. See Order, ECF No. 9.
Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh entered the Order based on
information in the Criminal Complaint and Affidavit in Support
of a Criminal Complaint; he did not have the information in the
government’s supplemental filing. See Rough Transcript of Hr’g
(Oct. 28, 2025) (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 43:23-44:16.
The government filed a Motion for Review and Appeal of
Release Order on September 16, 2025. See Mot. for Review and
Appeal of Release Order, ECF No. 8. The parties appeared before
Chief Judge Boasberg on September 18, 2025, and Chief Judge
Boasberg ordered Mr. Holley detained. See Minute Entry (Sept.
18, 2025). When he made this decision, Chief Judge Boasberg had
before him additional online conversations set forth in the
government’s opposition, see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 9-11; he
7 did not have the information in the government’s supplemental
filing that is before this Court. See Hr’g Tr. at 44:17-18.
Mr. Holley was indicted on one count of Travel With Intent
to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2423(b) on September 19, 2025. See Indictment, ECF No. 12. On
September 29, 2025, Mr. Holley filed the Motion to Reinstate,
asking this Court to reinstate the original release conditions
imposed by Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh. See Mot. to Reinstate,
ECF No. 18. The government opposed and filed a supplement of
additional facts. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20; Gov’t Suppl., ECF
No. 24. Mr. Holley filed a reply, to which the government filed
a surreply. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26; Gov’t Surreply, ECF
No. 28.
The Court held a Detention Hearing on October 28, 2025,
which was attended by Mr. Holley, the government, and Pretrial
Services Agency (“Pretrial”) staff. The parties proceeded by
proffer and did not call any witnesses. Mr. Holley entered into
the record a letter from Dr. Hildembrand Forensic Psychology
Consulting, LLC stating that she had been retained by defense
counsel to complete a pretrial psychosexual risk assessment for
Mr. Holley, should he be released. Hr’g Tr. at 4:18-23. Mr.
Holley’s parents were also present, and at times counsel for Mr.
Holley conferred with Mr. Holley’s parents on matters related to
8 the proposed release conditions. At the conclusion of the
Hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.
II. Legal Standard
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The
“provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.” Id. The Act
provides that if a judicial officer finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required and the safety of any other person and the
community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of
the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), (f)(2)(g). The
danger a person poses to the community is a sufficient reason to
order pretrial detention. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55; United
States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The government bears the burden of showing that no
condition or combination of conditions can mitigate danger to
the community based on clear and convincing evidence. See United
States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2021); 18
U.S.C. § 3412(f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence
standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably
9 assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . .
. the community”, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); courts consider four
factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3)
the history and characteristics of the person, and (4) the
nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person's release.” Munchel,
991 F.3d at 1279 (internal quotations omitted). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”)
explains that “a defendant's detention based on dangerousness
accords with due process only insofar as [her] history,
characteristics, and alleged criminal conduct make clear that
... she poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety.”
Id. at 1280; see id. at 1282 (explaining that government must
demonstrate defendant's “identified and articulable threat to
the community”).
“When there is probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2), as here, there is a rebuttable presumption that ‘no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
... the safety of the community.’” United States v. Farina, No.
25-cr-232, 2025 WL 2651249, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2025)(quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)). “Once the rebuttable presumption is
triggered, ‘the defendant bears the burden of production to
10 offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory
presumption.’” Id. (citing United States v. Blanchard, No. 18-
MJ-101, 2018 WL 4964505, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018) (quoting
United States v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
“The defendant may carry this burden by coming forward with some
evidence that he will not ... endanger the community if
released.” Id. (quoting United States v. Garner, No. CR 24-533,
2025 WL 1575848, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025) (citation
omitted)). “If the defendant rebuts the presumption ‘the
presumption is not erased but rather remains in the case as an
evidentiary finding militating against release to be weighed
along with other evidence.’” Id.
At the detention hearing, “[t]he person shall be afforded
an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-
examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present
information by proffer or otherwise.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
Furthermore, the “rules concerning the admissibility of evidence
in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and
consideration of information at the hearing.” Id.
III. Analysis
Mr. Holley does not contest that the rebuttable presumption
in § 3142(e)(3)(E) applies here. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No.
18 at 4-6. Rather, he argues that the rigorous release
11 conditions Magistrate Sharbaugh imposed will reasonably ensure
the safety of the community. See id. at 6.
A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Weigh in Favor of Detention
The first factor directs the Court to consider “the nature
and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
offense ... involves a minor victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1).
The charged offense in this case is extremely serious—Mr. Holley
is charged with traveling from Maryland to D.C. to have vaginal
intercourse with a nine-year-old child.
The Court is aware of only one case in this District,
United States v. Oglesbee, where a defendant charged with the
same offense as Mr. Holley was released to the High Intensity
Supervision Program. See Minute Entry (July 31, 2020) in Case
No. 22-cr-177. The government argues that Mr. Holley’s case is
distinguishable because the defendant in Oglesbee had a medical
condition that placed him at a high risk for complications from
COVID-19, which is not at issue with Mr. Holley. See Gov’t
Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 28-29. In all other cases in this District
of which the Court is aware, however, defendants charged with
the same offense have been detained. See id. at 15-16, 27
(citing United States v. Breeden, No. 15-MJ-0506, 2015 WL
13310427, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2015); United States v.
Beauchamp-Perez, 822 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2011); United
12 States v. Johnston, No. 17-MJ-0046, 2017 WL 4326390, at *4
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017); United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-cr-
133 (Moss, J.); United States v. Scott, No. 24-cr-287, 2024 WL
3887394 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2024).
The nature and circumstances of the offenses in these cases
are similar to the one before the Court. For example, similar to
the defendant in Breeden, in addition to discussing his interest
in sex with children online, Mr. Holley “took the affirmative,
unequivocal step of driving his vehicle into the District of
Columbia to arrive at the appointed time and place,” and “but
for the fact that defendant was communicating with an undercover
officer, defendant could have come fact-to face with a minor and
a willing parent.” Id. at 15 (quoting Breeden, 2015 WL 13310427
at * 7). Additionally, Mr. Holley described in detail and
boasted about purported past encounters with minors, and he did
not “equivocate or hesitate or express any apprehension about
the upcoming meeting.” Id.
In Scott, the court denied release to a defendant charged
with nearly identical conduct. Scott, 2024 WL 3887394, at *7.
The defendant in Scott similarly engaged in chat discussions
with the UC online, described how he wanted to sexually abuse a
minor girl, and traveled from Maryland to D.C. to meet with the
UC. Id.; see also Beauchamp-Perez, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 10
(defendant traveled to meet a 12-year-old girl); Johnston, 2017
13 WL 4326390, at *4 (defendant planned to meet with UC’s purported
nine-year-old daughter and admitted to past sexual encounters
with children); United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-cr-133
(defendant planned to meet with fictitious child via online
chat).
Mr. Holley argues that despite the graphic descriptions of
his past encounters, these conversations are merely common
sexual fantasies in online environments. See Def.’s Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 14-23. However, the Court notes that when asked by the
UC if the proposed plan was “not fantasy right,” Mr. Holley
responded “Correct. Real life. I have experience with daughters
and fathers, you found the right bull for the job.” Aff. in
Supp. of Criminal Compl., ECF No. 2-1 at 4. Mr. Holley also told
the UC that the “[b]est part is we can make it a regular thing.
And train her for life as a slut.” Id. at 5.
In addition to the conversation between Mr. Holley and the
UC, the records from Mr. Holley’s electronic devices provide
examples of Mr. Holley and other individuals discussing sexually
abusing children. See generally Gov’t Suppl., ECF No 24. In a
conversation with S-6, Mr. Holley describes in graphic detail
over the course of 225 pages of records how he will sexually
abuse S-6’s children, including wearing a mask while the two
film child pornography. Id. at 3-4. Mr. Holley and S-6 exchange
real-life photos of what S-6 says is his daughter’s genitalia
14 and a video of what Mr. Holley claims to be “the son of a
friend” performing oral sex on him, though the government cannot
discern the age of the individuals in the images. Id. at 4-5.
In his messages with S-6, Mr. Holley became more aggressive
and demanding of in-person contact, but S-6 stopped responding.
See id. Mr. Holley continued to send S-6 text and voice messages
demanding their address so that he could rape S-6’s wife and
children. See id. Mr. Holley argues that his reactions in this
online exchange “need not indicate an intention to pursue the
interaction in real life” and can be attributed to his
frustration with a long-term online conversation ending. See
Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 23.
While it is possible that some of Mr. Holley’s descriptions
of past encounters are fantasy or empty boasting, the Court
agrees with the government’s point that “the conversation he had
with the UC and his subsequent actions were reality,” and that
he “discussed abusing a child and then traveled into Washington,
D.C. with that intent, bringing with him lubricant, condoms, and
a mask to wear while filming the abuse.” Gov’t Surreply, ECF No.
28 at 4. Mr. Holley therefore escalated those fantasies into
what, but for the intervention of law enforcement, would have
been the sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl. This reflects a
transition from fantasy to concrete action. See Gov’t Surreply,
ECF No. 28 at 4-5.
15 The nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor
of detention. Mr. Holley’s conduct was not limited to graphic
and violent online conversations about sexually abusing minor
children, but rather, he acted upon these conversations by
traveling to actually meet with the purported child and parent,
bringing with him sex toys, condoms, and a mask to hide his face
during the intended filming of the abuse.
B. The Weight of the Evidence Against Mr. Holley Weighs in Favor of Detention
The second factor directs the Court to consider “the weight
of the evidence” against the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
The evidence proffered against Mr. Holley is strong. In addition
to the conversations with the UC in which he discussed sexually
abusing a fictitious child, Mr. Holley executed a plan to meet
the UC in person, bringing with him a variety items to use
during the encounter, including lubricant, sex toys, and a mask
to wear during in the interaction so that the two could film
child pornography. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 17. The
evidence also includes text conversations between Mr. Holley and
other individuals in which he claims that he had had sex with
children ages 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16. See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20
at 9-10.
Mr. Holley argues that the Court should consider the lack
of additional evidence in this case in weighing the evidence
16 against him. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 9. He
specifically points to the fact that there were no child
pornographic images exchanged, nor was there an “identifiable
victim,” i.e., a real child he had direct contact with, as was
the case in United States v. Willis, No. 22-MJ-122
(Merriweather, J.) (Howell, J.), where the court released the
defendant. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 3.
But other courts in this District have noted that it is
uncertain that a “lack of more incriminating evidence
constitutes ‘evidence’ that rebuts the presumption arising from
the undisputed facts of the case.” Breeden, 2015 WL 13310427, at
*7. Furthermore, in cases where courts denied release, there
were also no pornographic images exchanged and the child was
similarly fictitious. E.g., id.; Scott, 2024 WL 3887394, at *7;
United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-cr-133. Therefore, the Court
will rely only on the proffered facts, rather than the absence
of other facts, in assessing the weight of evidence against Mr.
Holley.
The weight of the evidence favors detention. The
government’s case is supported by the communications between Mr.
Holley and the UC, his actual in-person meeting with the UC, and
the physical evidence seized from his car, which tends to
corroborate his intent to sexually abuse the UC’s purported
nine-year-old daughter. The government also supports its case
17 with evidence of Mr. Holley’s activity on the fetish website for
at least two years.
C. The History and Characteristics of Mr. Holley Weigh In Favor of Detention
The third factor directs the Court to consider “the history
and characteristics” of the defendant, including the defendant's
“community ties,” “family ties,” “history relating to drug or
alcohol abuse,” “criminal history,” and “record concerning
appearance at court proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).
Mr. Holley states that he has “strong ties to the community
and has a strong supportive network. He has no history of drug
or alcohol use. He has no record of failing to appear at court
proceedings.” Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 10. Mr. Holley
provides no elaboration on these assertions, nor does he provide
any documents pertaining to his history or characteristics. See
generally id.; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26.
The government acknowledges that Mr. Holley does not have a
criminal history but argues that “there is reason to believe
that he has engaged in criminal activity prior to his conduct in
this case.” Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 19. The government points
to Mr. Holley’s statement to the UC that he had sexually abused
a ten-year-old girl, that he had “experience” with fathers and
daughters, that he told two women that he had experience
sexually abusing children, and that he sent a photograph of a
18 clothed prepubescent child whom he claimed was a prior victim.
Id. The government also points to Mr. Holley’s “use of common
language and knowledge of information associated with
individuals who sexually abuse children” and the fact that he
brought condoms, lubricant and multiple sex toys to the meeting
with the UC. Id.
Mr. Holley does not specifically respond to this argument,
but in the context of arguing that his online conversations do
not prove that he poses a danger to the community, he argues
that the conversations are mere fantasy. See Reply, ECF No. 26
at 14-21.
Mr. Holley’s lack of criminal history weighs in his favor.
However, “the absence of criminal history alone cannot rebut the
statutory presumption of dangerousness where the surrounding
circumstances are so indicative of culpability.” Scott, 2024 WL
3887394, * 5 (citing Breeden, 2015 WL 13310427, at *7 (defendant
with no criminal history detained for dangerousness); Beauchamp-
Perez, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (same)). Even if some of Mr.
Holley’s online communications were “mere fantasy,” in other
online communications he stated that he had sexually abused
children in the past and sought to do so in the future. His
descriptions of what he said that he had done in the past and
what he would like to do in the future are graphic and violent.
And although the support of his mother, asserted lack of alcohol
19 or drug abuse, and his appearance at a single hearing—the
September 18, 2025 hearing before Chief Judge Boasberg
(following his release by Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh on
September 15, 2025)—along with the lack of criminal history—
weigh in his favor, he has not provided any elaboration on his
asserted “strong ties to the community and . . . strong
supportive network.” Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 10. He has
not provided any information about his education or employment.
Other than the support of his parents, he has not provided any
elaboration of or letters of support attesting to his community
ties and supportive network. Furthermore, during his custodial
interview, he claimed that he had traveled to D.C. to find out
more about the UC to report him to law enforcement, a claim
contradicted by the condoms, lubricant, and sex toys found in
his car and therefore shows a readiness to be deceitful.
The Court credits Mr. Holley’s parents’ willingness to
serve as his custodians. However, on balance, the Court finds
that Mr. Holley’s history and characteristics weigh in favor of
detention.
D. The Nature and Seriousness of Danger Release Would Pose to Any Person Cannot be Reasonably Mitigated by the Proposed Conditions
The final factor directs the Court to consider “the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community
that would be posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. §
20 142(g)(4). The danger Mr. Holley poses to the community is
presumed under the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E); and
he must present “credible evidence that he does not pose a
danger to the community.” Breeden, 2015 WL 13310427, at *7.
Mr. Holley argues that “[t]he Court should reinstate the
release Order because its strict conditions adequately protect
against any threat to the community.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26
at 2. Mr. Holley points to other cases in this District where
release was ordered despite a greater risk of future
dangerousness, see id. at 2-7; and argues that the cases relied
on by the government where detention was ordered are
distinguishable, see id. at 8-14. Finally, and as mentioned
above, Mr. Holley argues that the online conversations the
government points to as evidence of the danger he poses to the
community are “non-dangerous online fantasy discussions of
various uncommon sexual (“fetish”) interests.” Id. at 14-23.
The Court credits Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh’s careful
crafting of strict conditions designed to mitigate the risk.
However, as explained above, he did not have before him the
online conversations that were later found on Mr. Holley’s
devices.
The Court is not convinced that the strict conditions
imposed adequately protect the community for several reasons.
The Court does not doubt the sincerity of Mr. Holley’s parents
21 nor their ability to comply with the conditions that require
their cooperation and commends them for their willingness to
serve as his custodians. He is fortunate to have supportive
parents willing to make significant sacrifices for him in the
hope that the Court will release him. However, and as other
courts have noted, there are “practical reasons” that release to
third party custodians cannot always reasonably assure the
mitigation of those risks. See United States v. Cunningham,
Order, ECF No. 54 in Case No. 23-CR-7 at 9 (denying release
despite family members’ willingness to serve as custodians
because it is “unrealistic” to expect proposed custodian to
conduct around the clock supervision). It is simply not possible
for Mr. Holley’s parents to supervise him 24 hours a day, seven
days a week.
The conditions imposed by Magistrate Judge Sharbaugh
included, among other things, an alarm system that sets off
alerts when one enters or exits the home and required Mr. Holley
submit to GPS location monitoring. See Order, ECF No. 9 at 3.
Regarding the home alarm system, counsel for Mr. Holley
explained at the Hearing that if Mr. Holley were to leave the
home, his parents would receive an alert, and they would then
need to contact law enforcement. See Hr’g Tr. at 26:2-14. As to
the GPS monitoring, Pretrial informed the Court at the Hearing
that if Mr. Holley were to cut off the GPS after business hours
22 or over the weekend, they would not become aware of it until the
next business day. See id. at 27:10-28:16. Were that to occur,
Pretrial would request a warrant from a judge, and upon the
issuance of the warrant, a warrant squad would begin to search
for him, id. at 29:11-14; all of which could take “a couple of
hours,” id. at 30:6-7. Given this lag time, it is possible that
Mr. Holley could leave the home, obtain an Internet-connected
device, hide it in the home, and use it while his parents are
asleep or otherwise not observing him. Pretrial confirmed at the
Hearing that home searches are “cursory”; they are not warrant
searches where law enforcement, for example, opens drawers and
other containers. Id. at 42:14-24. Mr. Holley could therefore
obtain and conceal a new Internet-connected device despite the
conditions. The Court also notes that Mr. Holley’s parents
reside within walking distance from both an elementary and
middle school. Id. at 17:15-24. The information provided at the
Hearing indicates that if Mr. Holley were to cut off the GPS and
leave the home overnight or in the early morning, he could walk
to the schools before any steps were taken to apprehend him.
Mr. Holley points to other cases where release was ordered
despite what Mr. Holley contends was a greater risk of future
dangerousness due to the defendants being charged with more
serious charges. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 2-7. Mr. Holley
first cites United States v. Willis, No. 22-MJ-122. See id. at
23 3. Mr. Willis, an adult male, was alleged to have sent Snapchat
messages to the 14-year-old minor victim, who sent him
photographs in exchange for money. See Statement of Facts, ECF
No. 1-1 in Case No. 22-MJ-122 at 1-2. Mr. Willis sent explicit
photos of himself, and videos of himself masturbating. Id. at 2.
However, unlike Mr. Holley, who traveled to D.C. to sexually
abuse a 9-year-old child, Mr. Willis did not take any
affirmative steps to travel to D.C. See generally id.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Mr. Holley’s argument that Mr.
Willis posed a greater risk of future dangerousness.
Next Mr. Holley cites United States v. Taylor, No. 21-mj-
00699 (Merriweather, J.), and United States v. Ali, No. 24-cr-43
(Alikhan, J.). In both, however, release was predicated on
underlying health issues. Mr. Taylor suffered from an
intellectual disability and was released to home incarceration
with the D.C. Department of Disability Services working with a
Medicaid-eligible provider to provide habilitation, care, and
treatment to him. See Taylor, Order, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 21-
mj-00699 at 5. Mr. Ali was diagnosed with Stage IV cancer and
was undergoing radiation treatment five times per week. See Ali,
Mot. for Release from Custody, ECF No. 8 in Case No. 24-cr-43 at
1. Mr. Holley has no comparable medical issue. Furthermore,
neither Mr. Taylor nor Mr. Ali were alleged to have attempted to
meet with their victims. See Taylor, Statement of Facts, ECF No.
24 1-1 in Case No. 21-mj-00699; see generally Dkt. in Ali, Case No.
24-cr-43.
Finally, Mr. Holley argues that the cases relied on by the
government where a defendant was charged with a travel offense
and detention was ordered are distinguishable. Def.’s Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 8-14. The Court rejects each of Mr. Holley’s
arguments.
The Court agrees that the distinction Mr. Holley makes with
the release order in Scott exists—specifically that Mr. Scott’s
mother and proposed custodian would have had to stop working and
rent a home 50 miles from D.C. to supervise him, see Scott, 2024
WL 3887394, at * 6; is not present here since Mrs. Holley is
retired and Mr. Holley’s incarceration would take place at their
home. Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18 at 9. However, the court’s
decision in Scott was largely based on its “question[ing] the
ability of any third-party custodian to provide the round-the-
clock monitoring necessary to ensure absence of ‘small[internet-
accessible] devices in [the] residence.’” Scott, 2024 WL
3887394, at *6 (quoting Hoppe, 2024 WL 1990452, at *6). This is
the same concern this Court has articulated. The Court also
appreciates that while Mr. Scott’s family could not finance a
psychosexual review and therapy, id.; Mr. Holley’s family has
already retained a professional to provide an evaluation, see
Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10. The Court credits the Holleys for
25 taking this step, but it remains the case that Mr. Holley could
leave the home as explained above.
Mr. Holley contends that Breeden is distinguishable because
Mr. Breeden’s mother would have been his sole third-party
custodian, but she was employed and so would have had to work
from home using an Internet-connected computer, see Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 9 (citing Breeden, 2015 WL 13310427, at *6); whereas
Mr. Holley’s mother is retired and does not need to have an
Internet-connected computer in the home and so Mr. Holley would
not have access to such a computer, see id. While the Court
appreciates this distinction, it remains the case that, as
explained above, Mr. Holley could leave the home, obtain an
internet-connected device, and then return home and hide it from
his parent’s and Pretrial’s view. And the point the Court made
above about psychosexual review and treatment applies here as
well.
Mr. Holley points to cases where release was denied
because, among things, the evidence demonstrated the defendant’s
willingness and technical ability to hide their online activity.
See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 8 (citing United States v.
Hoppe, No. 23-CR-102, 2024 WL 1990452 (D.D.C. May 6, 2024)); id.
at 10 (citing United States v. White, Order, ECF No. 6 in Case
No. 24-cr-340 (Friedrich, J.)). While it is true that no such
evidence has been introduced in this case, Mr. Holley has been
26 hiding his on-line activity from his parents, with whom he lived
while engaging in the activity. See Hr’g Tr. at 12:24-13:4. Mr.
Holley briefly points to cases where release was denied where
the proposed release conditions were far less robust than those
proposed here. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10 (citing United
States v. Martinez, No. 22-cr-78 (Jackson, J.)); id. at 12-13
(citing United States v. Vides, No. 24-cr-216 (Howell, J.)); id.
at 13 (citing United States v. Blythe, No. 25-cr-253 (Friedrich,
J.)); id. (citing United States v. Brockerman, No. 25-mj-72
(Merriweather, J.)). The Court has previously acknowledged the
robust proposed conditions. However, the Court has also pointed
out that Mr. Holley could leave the home, obtain an Internet-
connected device, and return and hide it with little difficulty.
Finally, Mr. Holley distinguishes United States v. James
Carroll, No. 24-cr-544 (Mehta, J.), where release was denied to
a defendant with a “30+ year record of . . . dangerous
compulsivity.” Reply, ECF No. 12 at 12. The Court notes,
however, that Mr. Holley stated that he is an addict to sex, see
Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 20 at 10, 24; and his counsel acknowledged
at the Hearing the possibility of Mr. Holley going to extreme
lengths to leave the home to obtain another device, see Hr’g Tr.
at 32:13-21.
Finally, he argues that “the chats in which Mr. Holley
engaged reveals non-dangerous online fantasy discussions of
27 various uncommon sexual (‘fetish’) interests.” Def.’s Reply, ECF
No. 26 at 14. As an example of “fantasy talk common to fetish
sites,” he states that “[i]f in fact the parents of a 10 year
old girl held her legs apart while urging an 18 year old ‘bull’
to keep raping her while she cried, there is absolutely no way
that ‘6 strokes in’ such a poor child was giggling, laughing,
and ‘loving’ that experience.” Reply, ECF No. 26 at 19. Mr.
Holley’s support for his argument consists of his counsel’s
analysis of the discussions; he provides no authoritative
support for conclusions such as “the conversation is fairly
obviously the type of fantasy talk common to fetish sites,” id.;
or “as seems common in the online world of illicit contact, Mr.
Holley often ‘ramped up’ the fetish lingo according to the
particular interests of the person with whom he was at the
moment engaged,” id. at 22; or “[i]t is not uncommon for people,
having become accustomed to one form of pornography, to require
more and more ‘extreme’ forms of the object of their arousal in
order to achieve the same arousal which, when the same object
was new, could be achieved with less extreme forms,” id.
The government acknowledges that some of the messages
appear to be sexual fantasy, but points to evidence that Mr.
Holley’s interest in sexually abusing children goes beyond
fantasy. See Gov’t Surreply, ECF No. 28 at 3. For example, the
government points to S-1’s statement that her discussion of
28 sexually abusing a child was fantasy, to which Mr. Holley
responded that he would make any fantasies she wanted “to come
true, I will make come true.” Id. at 3-4. Furthermore, Mr.
Holley sent repeated voice memos to S-6 asking for S-6’s address
so Mr. Holley could have sex with S-6’s wife and children. Id.
at 4.
Even if some of Mr. Holley’s online communications were
“mere fantasy,” in other online communications he stated that he
had sexually abused children in the past and sought to do so in
the future. Specifically, Mr. Holley he claims that he had had
sex with children ages 8, 10, 11, 13, and 16, see Gov’t Opp’n,
ECF No. 20 at 9-10; and describes in graphic and violent terms
that he would like to rape an individual’s seven-year-old
daughter, id. at 10. It includes text conversations with another
individual in which Mr. Holley described in graphic and violent
terms that he sought to orally, vaginally and anally rape female
and male children ages 16, 14, and 11, and choke and slap them.
See Gov’t Suppl., ECF No. 24 at 3-4.
For these reasons, Mr. Holley presents a serious danger to
the community, particularly to children. And the proposed
conditions cannot mitigate that danger since it is not possible
for Mr. Holley’s parents to observe him 24 hours a day, seven
29 IV. Conclusion
Mr. Holley has failed to rebut the presumption of
dangerousness. The evidence he points to are the rigorous
release conditions combined with his argument that the online
communications are “non-dangerous online fantasy discussions.”
The Court has explained above why the proposed conditions cannot
mitigate the danger posed by release to the community. And even
if some of Mr. Holley’s online discussions were fantasy, his
descriptions of past violent encounters with children and
statements that he seeks to violently rape young children and
teenagers demonstrate his dangerousness. The government has
therefore shown by clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions can reasonably assure the safety of the community. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge December 2, 2025