United States v. Hill

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 23-6093
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 23, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 23-6093 (D.C. No. 5:22-CR-00077-JD-1) PAULINE RONNIESHA HILL, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Pauline Hill, a felon, appeals both her jury conviction and her sentence for one

count of possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). She

challenges her jury conviction on the ground that a search warrant affidavit omitted

material information related to her alibi, and that her post-search confession was thus

“fruit of the poisonous tree.” She also challenges her sentence, arguing that the

district court erred in counting her Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 state convictions in her

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 2

sentencing calculation because § 645 is not a categorical crime of violence under the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). This is so, she argues,

because § 645 includes within its scope the assault and battery of an unborn victim,

and, under our precedent, the term “crime of violence” does not include any crime

against unborn persons. See United States v. Adams, 40 F.4th 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.

2022). While we disagree with Hill that the district court erred in declining to

suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant, we agree that § 645

criminalizes the assault and battery of an unborn person with a dangerous weapon,

and that § 645 is thus not a categorical crime of violence. Accordingly, we reverse

and remand for a new sentencing consistent with this opinion.

I.

A drive-by shooting occurred in northeast Oklahoma City on the evening of

December 3, 2021, at around 7:35 p.m. Following the shooting, Oklahoma City

police interviewed the victims: two adults and a child. The victims could not

identify the shooter, but the police learned that the assailant’s car was white, and the

child reported that the car belonged to someone called “Sweets.” The police learned

that “Sweets” was Hill’s nickname, and that one of the victims was in an ongoing

violent dispute with Hill.

Based on this information, the police visited Hill’s home. Spotting a car

leaving her home, the police stopped it to interview the occupants. Those occupants,

Shida Tamrat (Hill’s cousin) and Rickey Taylor (Hill’s brother), told the officers that

Hill was with Tamrat and Taylor at the time of the shooting, and that Hill thus could

2 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 3

not have been involved. Tamrat and Taylor also told the police that Hill had called

them earlier in the evening and asked for a ride to a mechanic. They said they picked

her up from the mechanic at around 7:15 p.m. and stayed with her at a hotel after

that.

Police visited the mechanic shop that Tamrat and Taylor had mentioned and

found Hill’s vehicle: a white two-door Nissan Altima with a sunroof. Police also

obtained surveillance footage from near the crime scene. That footage showed a

white two-door sedan with a sunroof, like Hill’s, following the victims’ car.

Continuing their investigation, police obtained a search warrant for records from

Hill’s cell phone service provider. Hill’s cell records indicated that she was in the

same part of the city as the shooting at the time it occurred, although the police could

not determine her precise location.

Armed with that information, police obtained a warrant to search Hill’s

residence for firearms and ammunition. The affidavit for the warrant detailed the

foregoing information. Based on that affidavit, a judge found that there was probable

cause to search Hill’s home.

While executing the search warrant, police found a 9mm pistol. Accordingly,

police arrested Hill for possession of a firearm as a felon. Hill later admitted that the

pistol was hers, and that, as a felon, she knew that she was not supposed to have a

gun.

The United States charged Hill with possession of a firearm after a felony

conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Hill moved to suppress the firearm

3 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 4

and her confession on the ground that the search warrant affidavit omitted material

information related to her alibi, and that her confession was thus “fruit of the

poisonous tree.” The government argued, among other things, that no material

information was omitted from the affidavit, and that the search was thus lawful. The

district court denied Hill’s motions to suppress, concluding that none of the

information Hill identified was material because it would not have affected the

probable cause assessment.

A jury then convicted her at trial.

After trial, a United States Probation Officer prepared a Presentence

Investigation Report for Hill (the “PSR”). Among Hill’s criminal history was a

conviction in Oklahoma County District Court for the felony of assault and battery

with a dangerous weapon. The PSR concluded that such a felony conviction was a

“crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A),

and thus calculated her base offense level to be 20 under the Guidelines. That base

offense level, in combination with other factors detailed in the PSR, produced a

guideline imprisonment range of forty-one to fifty-one months.

Before sentencing, the district court directed the parties to brief whether the

Oklahoma state crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Okla.

Stat. tit. 21, § 645 is a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. Hill argued that

such a crime applies to unborn persons under Oklahoma law, and thus is not

categorically a crime of violence. Hill argued that the district court was bound by

United States v. Adams, which employed similar reasoning to hold that a Kansas state

4 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 5

crime applied to unborn victims, and thus was not categorically a crime of violence

under the Guidelines.

At sentencing, the district court determined that it was bound by United States

v. Taylor, 843 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2016), a case in which we concluded that the

Oklahoma state crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under § 645 is

categorically a crime of violence within the meaning of the Guidelines. The district

court reasoned that Oklahoma law is inconclusive regarding the status of unborn

victims under § 645. Absent a clearly superseding decision from the Oklahoma state

courts, the district court declined to depart from Taylor, and consequently ruled that

§ 645 was a crime of violence for sentencing purposes.

Accordingly, the district court accepted the base offense level and guidelines

imprisonment range calculated by the Hill PSR. The district court sentenced Hill to

forty-one months’ imprisonment.

Hill filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings

for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d

1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005). Whether a warrant is supported by probable cause is a

question of law. Id.

A.

A search warrant is void and its fruits must be suppressed if (1) “the affiant

knowingly or recklessly . . . omitted material information from an affidavit in support

5 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 6

of the search warrant,” and (2) an affidavit correcting “such material omissions”

would “not support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Garcia-Zambrano,

530 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008). A fact is material if its inclusion in the

affidavit “would vitiate probable cause.” Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th

Cir. 2015).

“[P]robable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1220 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571

U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). It requires only a “fair probability” that the suspect has

committed a crime. Id. (quotation omitted). For that reason, probable cause requires

some evidence that a crime has been committed, but “does not require the fine

resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance

standard demands.” Id. (quotation omitted). That is why, “in considering whether

the government has shown probable cause to indict, grand juries need not hear the

defendant’s side of the argument,” nor “any exculpatory evidence.” Id. Even if some

exculpatory evidence exists, probable cause does not dissipate unless the evidence

demonstrates that “the suspicion (probable cause) . . . is unfounded.” Id. at 1221

(quotation omitted).

B.

The omitted facts that Hill identifies are not material because, although they

weighed against probable cause, their inclusion would not have completely vitiated a

finding of probable cause. The judge who issued the warrant was presented with an

affidavit that contained enough specific facts linking Hill to the shooting that there

6 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 7

was a fair probability that she committed a crime. The affidavit stated that the

victims identified the color of the shooter’s car as white; that one of them recognized

the car as belonging to “Sweets,” Hill’s nickname; that security footage near the

scene showed a white, two door car with a sunroof following the victims’ car; that

Hill owned such a car; and that Hill’s cellphone was located in the general area

where the shooting occurred.

Moreover, the affidavit did not omit Hill’s alibi. The affidavit explained that

Tamrat and Taylor had told the police that Hill was at a mechanic shop on the

evening of the shooting, that they picked her up from that shop at 7:15 p.m., that they

stayed with her at a hotel, and that there was “no way [ ] Hill could do the shooting

as alleged.” Id. at 52. In short, the affidavit offered competing evidence: the

circumstantial evidence placing Hill at the scene, and the testimonial evidence

placing her at a hotel. However, the relevant question when issuing a warrant is

whether the evidence as a whole can satisfy probable cause’s “not [ ] high bar.”

Hinkle, 962 F.3d at 1220. And that “does not require the fine resolution of

conflicting evidence.” Id. Given the significant circumstantial evidence implicating

Hill in the shooting, we hold that there was enough evidence to establish probable

cause, and that the warrant, therefore, was valid.

Hill resists this conclusion, arguing that the affidavit’s omission of additional

potentially exculpatory evidence renders it invalid. She states that the affidavit

“failed to add corroborating details” for Tamrat’s and Taylor’s claims that Hill “had

been with them that evening,” such as “the time of the phone call from [ ] Hill (6:00

7 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 8

p.m.) while she was at the south side auto shop.” Aplt. Br. at 13–14. Next, Hill

claims that the affidavit omitted information from two witnesses at the mechanic

shop that Hill “had brought her car to their shop on the evening of December 3

around 7:00 p.m., that [she] got a ride from the shop, and that her car remained there

on the evening and night of December 3.” Id. at 12. Hill also claims that the

affidavit omitted the information that police found her car at the mechanic shop on

the night of the shooting. Id.

The mere existence of corroborating evidence is not, in this context, material.

The question is not whether omitted evidence “would have placed a different light on

things,” Aplt. Br. at 14, but is instead whether the additional evidence demonstrates

that the suspicion underlying the probable cause was “unfounded.” Hinkle, 962 F.3d

at 1221. Here, the affidavit already acknowledged that Hill had multiple alibi

witnesses who say she absolutely could not have committed the shooting. The alibi

provided by the witnesses included specific claims about when they picked Hill up

from the mechanic shop (twenty minutes before the shooting), and specific details

about where they claimed to have gone. That additional evidence only bolsters the

evidence already contained in the affidavit. It does not disprove the substantial

evidence—like Hill’s cell phone location—that placed her at the crime scene. As

such, the additional omitted information, like a 6:00 p.m. phone call, does not

demonstrate that the police’s suspicion of Hill was “unfounded” in light of the

countervailing evidence. And, because the additional evidence would not dissipate

8 Appellate Case: 23-6093 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2026 Page: 9

probable cause, it is not material, and its omission does not render the search warrant

void. See Puller, 781 F.3d at 1197.

III.

With regard to Hill’s challenge to her sentence, the relevant question of law is

shared with a companion case, United States v. Singer, No. 23-6120, slip op. (Jan. 23,

2026). What we said there applies with equal force here. Thus, without repeating

our analysis from that opinion, we hold that the district court erred in calculating

Hill’s sentence to the extent it increased her sentence by classifying her § 645

convictions as crimes of violence.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Hill’s conviction, but we REVERSE

the district court’s sentencing calculation and REMAND for resentencing consistent

with this opinion.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge