F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS May 18, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker __________________________ Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-6276 v. (D.Ct. No. 06-CR-9-R) (W .D. Okla.) JAM ES LYNN HILL,
Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BROR BY, Senior Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
A jury convicted Appellant James Lynn Hill of one count of being a felon
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He now appeals
his conviction and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence supports his
conviction; the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is
unconstitutional; and his 120-month sentence is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm M r. H ill’s conviction and sentence.
I. Factual Background
On April 27, 2004, a police officer in downtown Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, stopped a car for failing to have a tag light. The occupants included
the driver, as well as M r. Hill, who was the front seat passenger, and M r. Hill’s
girlfriend, who occupied the back seat. After receiving each occupant’s
identification, the officer got into his patrol car to run a background check. At
that time M r. Hill jumped out of the car and ran away carrying a backpack. The
officer followed on foot until M r. Hill rounded a corner and the officer lost track
of him. At that corner the patrol officer stopped and searched the area, including
a large trash can, where he found the backpack. The backpack contained a loaded
revolver, drug paraphernalia, 1 and M r. Hill’s tax return documents, together w ith
some of his girlfriend’s papers.
1 The drug paraphernalia included two glass pipes with white drug residue, a set of electronic scales, and several empty zip-lock bags.
-2- At trial, a federal agent testified that based on his training and research the
firearm, stamped w ith the words “Arms Co., Nashville, Tennessee,” was
manufactured in Nashville, Tennessee, sometime between 1968 and 1978 and
previously crossed state lines into Oklahoma. Prior to testifying, M r. Hill
stipulated he had previously been convicted in Oklahoma state court of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. M r. Hill also testified
at trial, claiming his girlfriend put the backpack in the car and he only took it
when he ran because she asked him to take it. W hile he stated he had never seen
the gun inside the backpack, M r. Hill admitted he knew the backpack contained
drug paraphernalia and that is why he put it in the trash can. Following his
testimony, M r. Hill’s girlfriend testified she saw M r. Hill with a similar or the
same firearm one or two days before the incident and denied she told him to take
the backpack before he ran off.
At the conclusion of the evidence and arguments, M r. Hill generally moved
for judgment of acquittal, which the district court overruled. Following
deliberations, a jury found M r. Hill guilty of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
-3- II. Procedural Background
Prior to sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence report
calculating M r. Hill’s sentence under the applicable United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). The probation officer set his base
offense level at twenty-four pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) because M r. Hill
comm itted the instant offense subsequent to sustaining two felony convictions for
controlled substance offenses. The probation officer then increased M r. Hill’s
base level four levels pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5) because he possessed the firearm
in connection with the felony offense of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, resulting in a total offense level of twenty-eight. The
presentence report also set M r. Hill’s criminal history category at VI, which,
together with an offense level of twenty-eight, resulted in an advisory Guidelines
sentencing range of 140 to 175 months imprisonment. However, as the probation
officer pointed out, the maximum term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2), for violation of § 922(g)(1), was ten years, or 120 months, which is
less than the advisory Guidelines range.
M r. Hill filed a sentencing memorandum in which he claimed he should
receive a sentence of only five years probation based on the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). In support, he provided a discussion of his history and characteristics,
-4- including a general discussion of his family history. 2 He also acknowledged the
seriousness of his offense and that he must be punished, noted his intention to be
law-abiding in the future, admitted to prior serious substance abuse problems, and
indicated he would benefit from substance and mental health counseling and
educational and vocational training. At the sentencing hearing, M r. Hill also
acknowledged any future criminal conduct by him would have detrimental
consequences and asked for leniency based on his completion of a drug program,
positive attitude toward the future, desire to return to society, and new-found
respect for the law.
After hearing and considering the parties’ arguments, the district court
stated it had reviewed the presentence report and considered the testimony, the
parties’ arguments, and M r. Hill’s statement and submission. It further stated it
had considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and that while it
2 In the memorandum M r. Hill generally recounts: 1) his father died when he was ten years old; 2) he relocated to another school where he did not fit in due to his rural accent and lack of “cool” clothes, experienced suspensions and expulsions due to his conduct, and associated with misfits; 3) his mother remarried, causing him to move and enter another school where he began using drugs, his grades dropped, and he got into trouble, including arrest and incarceration through a Department of Corrections program; 4) he began using cocaine and methamphetamine at the age of nineteen; 5) his grandfather passed away, causing him to go on a drug binge and get arrested; 6) he obtained various jobs, but due to intervening drug-related arrests he lost those jobs and was incarcerated; and 7) he has received mental health care and drug abuse counseling and takes prescription medication to help with his mental health issues.
-5- understood the Guidelines are advisory, it believed they were appropriate in the
instant case. The district court further stated M r. Hill was obviously an
intelligent and articulate person, but that it could not be sympathetic to his
requests because he had at least nine prior arrests. It also indicated that such a
background and record reflected the need for his incarceration to keep him off the
streets. The district court further stated it hoped M r. Hill would someday become
a productive member of society, but pointed out that his instant offense w as a
dangerous one involving drugs and weapons. It then sentenced M r. Hill to 120
months in prison.
III. Discussion
On appeal, M r. Hill raises three issues. First, relying on his motion for
acquittal, he contends insufficient evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict and
his subsequent conviction because the evidence did not prove he knowingly
possessed the firearm in the backpack or that the firearm was “in or affecting
comm erce.” Second, he suggests the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional, although he admits he did not raise this
claim before the district court and acknowledges his argument is foreclosed by
this court’s decision in United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000).
However, he suggests three Supreme Court cases, Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. M orrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and United
-6- States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), when considered together, “signal[]
discomfort with the expansion of federal criminal statutes into the province of
what has traditionally been state police power,” thereby rendering 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) unconstitutional. Lastly, M r. Hill argues his 120-month sentence is
unreasonable and greater than necessary to comply with the directives in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). In making this argument, he generally contends his history and
characteristics make his 120-month sentence excessive and simply refers this
court to his sentencing memorandum filed in the district court.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Conviction
Our standard of review on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction is set forth in United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir.
2007):
W e review de novo whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction. In so doing, we view the facts in evidence in the light most favorable to the government. W e will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury. Rather, our role is limited to determining whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Id. at 1235 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
To establish M r. Hill violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to
-7- prove: 1) he had previously been convicted of a felony; 2) he thereafter
knowingly possessed a firearm; and 3) such possession was in or affected
interstate commerce by crossing state lines. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United
States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2007). Of these three
elem ents, M r. Hill disputes whether the government proved he knowingly
possessed a firearm and that it affected interstate commerce.
W e have repeatedly held that “possession can be actual or constructive.”
Id. at 1209. “Actual possession exists when a person has direct physical control
over a firearm at a given time,” while “[c]onstructive possession exists when a
person ‘knowingly holds the power and ability to exercise dominion and control
over a firearm.’” Id. (citations and alteration omitted). M oreover, a defendant’s
possession of a firearm need not be lengthy for conviction under § 922(g);
instead, know ing possession “for a mere second or two” is sufficient to impose
criminal liability. See U nited States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 178 (2005). To the extent M r. Hill is claiming this was a
joint occupancy situation, we have said knowledge, dominion, and control may
not be inferred simply by proximity to the firearm. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
Instead, the government must prove either actual possession or constructive
possession through evidence showing some connection or nexus between the
defendant and the firearm. Id.
-8- In this case, when M r. Hill ran from the car, he physically took the
backpack containing the loaded revolver. Even if we view this as a joint
occupancy situation, M r. Hill took actual possession of the firearm when he fled
with the backpack, and an obvious nexus exists, as demonstrated by M r. Hill’s tax
return documents being in the same backpack with the loaded firearm. Under
these facts, it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude he knowingly
possessed the gun.
In addition, the jury obviously credited his girlfriend’s testimony she saw
him with a similar or the same firearm just a day or two before the instant
offense. W hile M r. Hill testified he took the backpack at his girlfriend’s request,
we will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the factfinding decisions
of the jury, which clearly credited her contrary testimony and discredited his
testimony, despite the fact the backpack also contained some papers belonging to
her. Under the circumstances presented, we cannot say it was unreasonable for
the jury to conclude M r. Hill knowingly possessed the firearm.
W e next turn to M r. Hill’s claim insufficient evidence proved the requisite
interstate commerce element. As w e have explained before, the interstate
commerce requirement is satisfied by proof the firearm possessed had previously
traveled in interstate commerce. See W illiams, 403 F.3d at 1195. In this case, the
-9- government’s expert witness testified the firearm, stamped with the words “Arms
Co., Nashville, Tennessee,” was manufactured in Nashville, Tennessee, sometime
between 1968 and 1978 and previously crossed state lines into Oklahoma. Proof
the firearm was manufactured in Tennessee and possessed by M r. Hill in
Oklahoma is sufficient to establish the required nexus with interstate commerce.
Id. Thus, such evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude the
firearm crossed state lines. For these reasons, M r. Hill has not established
insufficient evidence supports his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
B. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
M r. Hill next argues the federal felon-in-possession statute is
unconstitutional – an issue he raises to preserve on appeal, even though he admits
he did not raise this claim before the district court and acknowledges his
argument is foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Dorris.
Generally, we do not address arguments presented for the first time on appeal and
find no reason to deviate from that general rule in this appeal. See United States
v. M ora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002). Even if we considered M r. Hill’s
argument, it is the same argument patently rejected by our decision in Dorris, in
which we held the same Supreme Court cases relied on by M r. Hill did not render
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional or require this court to overturn prior
precedent. See Dorris, 236 F.3d at 584-86 (discussing Jones v. United States,
-10- United States v. M orrison, and United States v. Lopez).
C. Reasonableness of Sentence
Finally, M r. Hill contends his 120-month sentence is unreasonable and
greater than necessary to comply with the directives in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 3
based on his history and characteristics. In his submission, M r. Hill summarizes
his life, describing his family circumstances and criminal and drug history,
including: 1) the death of his father when he was ten; 2) his relocation to two
different schools where he did not fit in, associated with a bad crowd, received
bad grades, began using drugs, and got into trouble w ith authorities; 3) his
problem s w ith drugs as an adult and his drug-related arrests which caused him to
3 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides, in part, that the court shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; ... (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
-11- lose various jobs; and 4) his mental health and drug treatment, including his use
of prescription medication to help with mental health issues.
W e begin by pointing out M r. Hill’s 120-month sentence is the maximum
statutory term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which is less than
the advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 140 to 175 months imprisonment.
Because “the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum
... applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence ... [is]
the guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).
W e review for reasonableness the sentence’s length, as guided by the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053
(10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). These factors “include the nature of the offense
and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need for the sentence to reflect
the seriousness of the crime, to provide adequate deterrence, to protect the public,
and to provide the defendant with needed training or treatment ....” Id. W e have
determined a presumption of reasonableness attaches to a sentence which is
within the correctly calculated Guidelines range. See id. at 1053-54. W e require
reasonableness in two respects – “the length of the sentence, as well as the
method by which the sentence was calculated.” Id. at 1055 (emphasis omitted).
If the district court “properly considers the relevant Guidelines range and
-12- sentences the defendant within that range, the sentence is presumptively
reasonable.” Id. “This is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the
government may rebut by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when
viewed against the other factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Id. at 1054. In
determining whether the district court properly considered the applicable
Guidelines range, we review its legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings
for clear error. See id.
W e have held “[t]here is no question that, in addition to guiding our
reasonableness review on appeal, the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) must be considered by the district court itself when imposing a
sentence.” United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir.
2006).
[W ]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has expressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from the record that the sentencing judge did not rest on the guidelines alone, but considered whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors.
Id. at 1117 (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
Because the district court in this case sentenced M r. Hill at the Guidelines
range, his sentence is presumptively reasonable and he must rebut this
-13- presumption by demonstrating the sentence is unreasonable in light of the
sentencing factors in § 3553(a). In attempting to rebut this presumption, M r. Hill
generally argues his sentence is unreasonable based on his history and
characteristics. However, a review of the record establishes the district court
considered M r. Hill’s history and characteristics during sentencing but
determined, based on other § 3553(a) factors, a sentence of 120 months was
appropriate.
M ore specifically, the district court indicated it had considered the parties’
arguments and M r. Hill’s statement and submission – all of which discussed his
history and characteristics. W hile the district court considered M r. Hill’s
arguments regarding his history and characteristics, it indicated a 120-month
sentence was appropriate based on the other § 3553(a) factors, including his prior
nine arrests, the seriousness of the instant offense, which involved drugs and a
weapon, and the need to incarcerate him to get him off the streets for the purpose
of protecting the public. Given M r. Hill’s extensive criminal history and the
serious nature of his instant offense, we cannot say he has shown his history and
characteristics, when viewed in light of the other § 3553(a) factors, are
sufficiently compelling for the purpose of making his sentence unreasonable.
-14- IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we A FFIRM M r. H ill’s conviction and sentence.
Entered by the C ourt:
W ADE BRO RBY United States Circuit Judge
-15-