United States v. Herrick

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-1753
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1753 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:18-cr-00084-WHO-1 v. MEMORANDUM* ADAM HERRICK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 3, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Adam Herrick appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Herrick’s

motion for compassionate release. The district court acknowledged the Bureau of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Prisons’ (“BOP”) delay in diagnosing and treating Herrick’s prostate cancer but

found that he failed to demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling reasons”

warranting a sentence reduction. See § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court

reasoned that Herrick’s “subjective fears about his current and future medical

treatment are not matched by the objective record as it exists today.” In particular,

the district court noted that Herrick had been transferred to a specialized medical

facility capable of managing his condition. This conclusion was not illogical or

based on “a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” United States v. Aruda,

993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021).

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in rejecting Herrick’s argument

that the fertility loss associated with prostate cancer treatment constitutes an

extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. The record

does not support Herrick’s assertion that the BOP “categorical[ly] refus[ed] to

provide any fertility-preservation options.” While Herrick was informed that any

treatment he received would result in a loss of fertility and that sperm banking was

not an option within the BOP, the record reflects that the BOP outsources certain

treatment options for prostate cancer to outside facilities. Although it appears the

BOP does not provide sperm banking onsite, it is not clear from the record that the

BOP will deny Herrick access to any fertility-preservation options. Permanent

infertility is almost certainly a “serious deterioration in health,” but we cannot say

2 24-1753 on this record that the “specialized medical care” necessary to preserve Herrick’s

ability to conceive is unavailable to him while in BOP custody. See U.S. Sent’g

Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023).1

2. The district court did not err by failing to explicitly consider a

sentence reduction less than time served. The record demonstrates that the district

court adequately responded to the request Herrick raised in his motion—“an order

for his immediate release from custody.” The district court granted the parties’

stipulated request to reduce Herrick’s sentence by nine months pursuant to §

3582(c)(2), and Herrick did not present any alternative arguments supporting a

further sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court’s focus on the

arguments actually presented by Herrick does not mean that it misunderstood its

authority under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in addressing Herrick’s compassionate release

motion. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (“Trial judges are

presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.”), overruled

on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).

AFFIRMED.

1 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Herrick had not established extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting relief, we need not address whether the court abused its discretion in its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

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