United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 24-1534
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1534

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DINELSON HERNANDEZ-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Lipez, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.

Jonathan Shapiro, with whom Mia Teitelbaum and Shapiro & Teitelbaum LLP were on brief, for appellant.

Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Joshua S. Levy, U.S. Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

August 11, 2025 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Dinelson Hernandez-Rodriguez was

traveling southbound on Interstate 95 when the vehicle he was

driving was stopped by a Connecticut state trooper. Unbeknownst

to Hernandez-Rodriguez, that vehicle was being tracked by the Drug

Enforcement Administration ("DEA") as part of a months-long

drug-trafficking investigation. When DEA agents searched the

vehicle -- without first obtaining a warrant -- they discovered

$240,240 in a hidden compartment. Hernandez-Rodriguez was

subsequently charged with conspiring to distribute controlled

substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and, shortly before his

scheduled trial, moved to suppress the evidence seized from the

vehicle as the fruit of an illegal search. The district court

denied the motion to suppress, determining that the warrantless

search was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth

Amendment's warrant requirement. Following a jury trial,

Hernandez-Rodriguez was convicted of the charged drug violation

and sentenced to sixty-eight months' imprisonment. He now appeals

the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I.

We briefly set forth the relevant "facts as supportably

found by the district court following an evidentiary hearing" on

Hernandez-Rodriguez's motion to suppress. United States v.

Simpkins, 978 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2020). "When necessary, we flesh

- 2 - out these findings with uncontested facts drawn from the record."

Id.

In late 2019, the DEA, investigating a suspected

drug-trafficking operation, focused on a Boston-based individual

named Fidel Llaveria. Controlled purchases of fentanyl and court-

approved Title III wiretaps led the DEA to identify Waner Baez as

one of Llaveria's suspected suppliers. Subsequent surveillance

revealed that Baez was an intermediary who supplied Llaveria with

cocaine obtained from a New York-based supplier named Juan Carlos

Espinal. Specifically, the DEA concluded that Espinal and his

associates would drive large quantities of cocaine from New York

to Boston via Interstate 95, delivering them to Baez's residence

on Hyde Park Avenue. Once the cocaine was distributed, Espinal

and his associates would return to New York with the proceeds,

again via Interstate 95.

On August 6, 2020, the DEA learned through intercepted

communications that Baez had received a shipment of cocaine at his

Boston residence. Surveilling the residence, the DEA agents

discovered two out-of-state vehicles parked nearby -- a silver

Ford Explorer registered to Espinal and a white Honda Pilot

registered to a third party in New York. Information obtained

- 3 - from license plate readers1 showed that the Honda Pilot had left

the New York area that morning, and the Ford Explorer had traveled

from New York City to Boston the day before. The DEA applied for

and received warrants to affix GPS tracking devices on the

vehicles.

Over the next five days, while surveilling Baez's

residence and the surrounding area, DEA agents observed Espinal

and another individual -- later identified as

Hernandez-Rodriguez -- interacting with Baez and his associates,

accessing Baez's residence, and driving both the Ford Explorer and

the Honda Pilot. Simultaneously, the DEA intercepted

communications indicating that Llaveria, whom agents also observed

in and around Baez's residence, was communicating with potential

customers regarding cocaine for sale.

On August 11, DEA agents observed the Honda Pilot pull

into Baez's driveway. A short while later, Hernandez-Rodriguez

was seen leaning into the driver's seat area from outside the Pilot

and, after several minutes, walking away from the vehicle carrying

a screwdriver. Hernandez-Rodriguez then returned and got into the

Pilot, backed out of Baez's driveway, and left the area. The GPS

tracker affixed to the vehicle showed it moving southbound on

1License plate readers are camera systems that capture time-stamped photos of vehicles' license plates when those vehicle pass by the cameras.

- 4 - Interstate 95, eventually crossing through Rhode Island into

Connecticut.

Believing that the Honda Pilot was being used to

transport proceeds to New York from the distribution of the cocaine

received at Baez's residence earlier that week, the DEA contacted

the Connecticut State Police and asked them to conduct a "wall-off

stop" of the vehicle (i.e., making it appear as though

Hernandez-Rodriguez was being apprehended for a traffic

violation). A DEA agent spoke directly with the Connecticut state

trooper who would ultimately conduct the stop, informing him that

there was reason to believe the Honda Pilot "was transporting

narcotics proceeds." Using GPS coordinates provided by the DEA

agent, the state trooper located and began following the Honda

Pilot in a marked cruiser. Almost immediately, the Pilot left

Interstate 95 via an exit ramp and took the next entrance ramp

back onto the interstate -- a maneuver that, according to the DEA

agent, suggested Hernandez-Rodriguez was attempting to "lose the

trooper." The trooper resumed tailing the Honda Pilot once it

reentered the interstate. He testified that, after about fifteen

to twenty minutes, he observed the Pilot commit a lane violation.

The trooper then pulled the vehicle over ostensibly for that

reason.

The subsequent interaction between the trooper and

Hernandez-Rodriguez, captured by the trooper's body camera, lasted

- 5 - around two hours, attributable, in part, to a substantial language

barrier between the individuals, with the trooper primarily

speaking English and Hernandez-Rodriguez primarily speaking

Spanish. Eventually pulling up a translation app on his phone,

the trooper asked repeatedly where Hernandez-Rodriguez was coming

from, to which Hernandez-Rodriguez responded that he was traveling

from Stamford, Connecticut. The trooper found this answer

improbable because Hernandez-Rodriguez had been driving toward,

not away from, Stamford.

Hernandez-Rodriguez did not have his driver's license

with him, and the trooper could not determine

Hernandez-Rodriguez's name for some time.2 Eventually identifying

him, the trooper found that Hernandez-Rodriguez was subject to an

extraditable New Jersey warrant. Hernandez-Rodriguez was told to

step out of the vehicle, frisked, and placed in handcuffs.3 While

Hernandez-Rodriguez was handcuffed on the side of the interstate,

the trooper searched the Honda Pilot and found approximately $3,000

in cash in the front seat.4 Minutes later, a K-9 unit arrived and

The district court could not determine from the body camera 2

footage whether this difficulty was because Hernandez‑Rodriguez intentionally provided false names or because of the legitimate language barrier. Hernandez-Rodriguez was not read his rights under Miranda 3

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), until he arrived at the police station several hours later. Although the government maintains that Hernandez-Rodriguez 4

consented to this search, the district court explained that it had

- 6 - inspected the vehicle, and the K-9 alerted twice to the center

console. Hernandez-Rodriguez was taken to a local police station,

and DEA agents searched the Honda Pilot again. Upon removing the

cup holder from the center console, the agents found a hidden

compartment containing $240,240 in cash.

Hernandez-Rodriguez was charged with conspiring to

distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl and

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Because Hernandez-

Rodriguez was alleged to have been involved mainly in the cocaine

side of the conspiracy, the government agreed to limit its trial

proof to cocaine-related conduct. Two weeks before trial,

Hernandez-Rodriguez moved to suppress the $240,240 cash seized

from the Honda Pilot, arguing, inter alia, that the Fourth

Amendment's warrant requirement applied because there was no

probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of

a crime.

Following a suppression hearing and a careful review of

the record, which included several exhibits in addition to the

testimony presented by two government witnesses, the district

court denied Hernandez-Rodriguez's motion to suppress. Upon

finding that probable cause existed, the court held that the Honda

"doubts" about whether the government had met its burden to show valid consent. However, the district court determined that it did not need to decide that issue because it concluded that there was probable cause for the vehicle search.

- 7 - Pilot was permissibly searched without a warrant under the long-

established carveout to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement

known as the "automobile exception."5 Following a seven-day trial,

Hernandez-Rodriguez was convicted of conspiring to distribute

cocaine and sentenced to sixty-eight months' imprisonment. This

timely appeal followed.

II.

We review the district court's denial of

Hernandez-Rodriguez's motion to suppress using "a two-tiered

inquiry." United States v. White, 804 F.3d 132, 136 (1st Cir.

2015). That is, "[w]e review the district court's factual findings

for clear error, and we review its legal conclusions de novo."

Id. "In the absence of legal error, 'we will uphold a refusal to

suppress evidence as long as the refusal is supported by some

reasonable view of the record.'" Simpkins, 978 F.3d at 6 (quoting

United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 2014)).

A. Legal Framework

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free

from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Although, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement

officer "ordinarily" must obtain a warrant before conducting a

5About a month after the trial concluded, the district court memorialized its oral ruling at the suppression hearing in a written order.

- 8 - search, there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement.

United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010). One is

the "automobile exception," which permits "a warrantless search of

an automobile [to] proceed so long as the authorities have probable

cause to believe that contraband is within the particular vehicle."

Simpkins, 978 F.3d at 6; see also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559,

563–64 (1999) ("[W]hen federal officers have probable cause to

believe that an automobile contains contraband, the Fourth

Amendment does not require them to obtain a warrant prior to

searching the car for and seizing the contraband.").

"Probable cause exists when 'the facts and circumstances

as to which police have reasonably trustworthy information are

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief

that evidence of a crime will be found.'" United States v. Silva,

742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d

25, 32 (1st Cir. 2013)). This "standard is satisfied when the

totality of the circumstances create[s] 'a fair probability that

. . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'"

Id. (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Hicks, 575

F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2009)). The probable cause inquiry is

objective, requiring a court to consider the facts available to a

law enforcement officer and not the officer's state of mind or

subjective belief about whether those facts amount to probable

cause. See Sanchez, 612 F.3d at 6.

- 9 - To assess whether probable cause exists, "we look to the

collective information known to the law enforcement officers

participating in the investigation rather than isolat[ing] the

information known by the individual [acting] officer." United

States v. Balser, 70 F.4th 613, 619 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United

States v. Azor, 881 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2017)). This is known as

the "collective knowledge doctrine." Id. "[W]hen a law

enforcement officer with information amounting to probable cause

directs an officer who lacks the knowledge to" act, we refer to

that as a "vertical collective knowledge" case. Id. (alteration

in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Meade,

110 F.3d 190, 193 (1st Cir. 1997)). In such a case, "we 'impute'

to the [acting] officer the directing officer's knowledge." Id.

(quoting Meade, 110 F.3d at 193); see also id. at 620 (noting that

"[r]eliance upon vertical collective knowledge has sparked little

controversy" (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Privette, 204 N.E.3d 967, 976 (Mass. 2023))).

B. Analysis

We agree with the district court that "[t]his case . . .

presents a relatively straightforward example of the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement," United States v.

Hernandez-Rodriguez, No. 21-10298, slip op. at 5 (D. Mass. Mar.

18, 2024), involving a months-long DEA investigation into the drug

distribution operation described above, which included intensive

- 10 - surveillance of Baez's Hyde Park Avenue residence in the days just

before the search. As the district court summarized:

DEA agents had been investigating Llaveria, Baez, and Espinal's activities for months. The wiretap led them to believe that Espinal was transporting drugs to the Hyde Park Avenue residence and the proceeds back to New York. Hernandez-Rodriguez was seen entering and exiting the Hyde Park Avenue residence, entering and exiting the vehicles, and at the time of his stop was driving the white Honda Pilot back toward New York.

Id. at 6. Thus, "[g]iven the DEA's understanding that the

conspiracy involved moving drugs from New York to Boston and

proceeds of the sale of those drugs from Boston to New York, the

surveillance officers' observations of Hernandez-Rodriguez

interacting with his co-defendants" as well as leaning into the

Honda Pilot for several minutes and emerging with a screwdriver

shortly before departing from Baez's residence, and the "GPS

tracking data showing the [Honda Pilot] leaving Boston in the

direction of New York," we agree with the district court that

"there was probable cause to believe the [Pilot] contained

contraband." Id.

Under the vertical collective knowledge doctrine, we

impute the DEA agents' knowledge to the Connecticut state trooper

with whom the DEA communicated. See Balser, 70 F.4th at 619-20.

Based on that imputed knowledge, the trooper had the requisite

- 11 - reasonable suspicion to stop,6 and probable cause to search, the

Honda Pilot under the automobile exception. See United States v.

Dion, 859 F.3d 114, 124 (1st Cir. 2017) (explaining that an officer

must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to make an

investigatory traffic stop and noting that "reasonable suspicion

is . . . less than probable cause" (quoting United States v.

McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 821 (1st Cir. 2011))). To be sure, the

additional facts known to the trooper, such as the evasive driving

by Hernandez-Rodriguez and the implausible insistence that he was

coming from Stamford, certainly may have added to the "totality of

the circumstances" that amounted to probable cause. Silva, 742

F.3d at 7. We agree with the government, however, that the DEA

agents' imputed knowledge provided an adequate basis to search the

Pilot, even absent those facts.

Resisting this seemingly inescapable conclusion,

Hernandez-Rodriguez argues that the search of the Honda Pilot was

improper "because it was based solely upon the 'hunch' of a DEA

agent." In support, he points out that a DEA agent who testified

at the suppression hearing responded, "Sure," when asked by defense

6 In fact, the observed lane violation on its own constituted adequate grounds for the initial traffic stop of the Honda Pilot. See United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 14 F.4th 32, 44 (1st Cir. 2021) ("[A]n officer can stop a car if he sees a driver commit a traffic offense, even if the stop is just an excuse to investigate something else." (quoting United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 820 (1st Cir. 2011))).

- 12 - counsel, "It's fair to say you had a hunch?" While Hernandez-

Rodriguez is correct that an "'unparticularized suspicion or

"hunch"' of criminal activity" alone cannot support a finding of

probable cause, United States v. Golab, 325 F.3d 63, 66 (1st Cir.

2003) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)), the extensive

information known to the authorities here amounted to far more

than a mere "hunch," as we have explained. Even if we were to

accept Hernandez-Rodriguez's argument that the testifying agent's

admission of a "hunch" amounted to a concession that she believed

probable cause was wanting, that would not change the outcome here.

Because "the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify" the

search of the Pilot, the agent's subjective belief "is inapposite."

Sanchez, 612 F.3d at 6 (quoting United States v. Hadfield, 918

F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1990)).

In sum, we conclude that law enforcement had probable

cause to believe that the Honda Pilot driven by Hernandez-Rodriguez

would contain evidence of drug transactions. Accordingly, under

the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the

warrantless search of that vehicle did not contravene the Fourth

Amendment. The district court's denial of Hernandez-Rodriguez's

motion to suppress the $240,240 in cash obtained during that search

is therefore affirmed.

So ordered.

- 13 -