In the
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 20‐2974 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff‐Appellee, v.
HENRY E. WOOD, Defendant‐Appellant. ____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. No. 3:19‐cr‐00038 — Damon R. Leichty, Judge. ____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 14, 2021 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2021 ____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Henry Wood was arrested for vi‐ olating his parole. Midway through the arrest, parole agents found methamphetamine hidden underneath the back cover of his cellphone. An investigator later extracted the data from his cellphone, revealing child pornography. Wood moved to suppress the data, arguing the Fourth Amendment requires a 2 No. 20‐2974
warrant before such a search. We disagree and affirm the dis‐ trict court’s denial of Wood’s motion to suppress. I Henry Wood served time in Indiana state prison for meth‐ amphetamine‐related offenses. In 2018, he was released on parole under enumerated conditions. Any violation subjected him to “being taken into immediate custody.” Wood’s parole release agreement required him to “report to [his] assigned supervising officer” as instructed. Wood also affirmed the following: I understand that I am legally in the custody of the Department of Correction and that my per‐ son and residence or property under my control may be subject to reasonable search by my su‐ pervising officer or authorized official of the De‐ partment of Correction if the officer or official has reasonable cause to believe that the parolee is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition to remaining on parole. About three months after being released, Wood violated his parole by failing to report to his supervising officer. The Indiana Parole Board issued an arrest warrant, and parole agents arrested Wood at his home in North Judson. One of the agents, Agent Gentry, secured Wood with wrist restraints and conducted a frisk search. During the frisk, Gentry noticed Wood repeatedly turning toward his cellphone, which was lying on a “junk pile.” Gentry picked up the cellphone and handed it to Agent Rains. This upset Wood. He demanded that his cellphone be turned off and he began to physically resist Gentry. With the help of another agent, Gentry No. 20‐2974 3
restrained Wood against a nearby wall, and Wood “calmed down immediately.” Meanwhile, Rains felt something “lumpy” on the back of Wood’s cellphone, so he removed the back cover and found a packet of a substance which Rains believed to be metham‐ phetamine. Wood eventually admitted the substance was, in fact, methamphetamine. A later search of the home revealed syringes and other drug paraphernalia. Based on these find‐ ings, Wood was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and parole agents seized his cellphone as evidence. Seven days after Wood’s arrest, an investigator for the In‐ diana Department of Correction performed a warrantless search of Wood’s cellphone by extracting its stored data. This search revealed child pornography. The investigator forwarded this information to a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who obtained a search‐and‐seizure warrant for Wood’s cellphone and its contents. A federal grand jury indicted Wood for both receiving and possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B). Before the district court, Wood moved to suppress the data extracted from his cellphone. He argued principally that the state investigator’s warrantless search of his cellphone violated Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). The district court disagreed, holding that the search of Wood’s cellphone complied with the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Wood, 426 F. Supp. 3d 560, 575 (N.D. Ind. 2019). Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Wood en‐ tered a conditional guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). He pleaded guilty to the receiving charge in Count 1 of the indict‐ ment—Count 2 was dismissed—and he reserved the right to 4 No. 20‐2974
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. This appeal followed. II “When reviewing a district court’s decision denying a mo‐ tion to suppress evidence, we review the court’s legal conclu‐ sions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. McGill, 8 F.4th 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2021). The district court rejected Wood’s argument that Riley v. California required law enforcement to obtain a search war‐ rant before searching his cellphone. Instead, the court used the totality of the circumstances approach articulated in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), and Samson v. Cal‐ ifornia, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), to conclude that the search of Wood’s cellphone was reasonable under the Fourth Amend‐ ment. We affirm in both respects. A Wood asks us to apply Riley v. California to parolees. The primary problem with this request is that Riley dealt with searches incident to a lawful arrest. The Supreme Court care‐ fully tailored its analysis to that context and expressly recog‐ nized that “other case‐specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–02. Under the Fourth Amendment, “what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). Given the context‐specific nature of the Fourth Amend‐ ment, Riley is not readily transferable to scenarios other than the one it addressed. Indeed, we have declined to apply Riley in two other contexts: consent searches and border searches. See United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 483–85 (7th Cir. No. 20‐2974 5
2019) (border search); United States v. Thurman, 889 F.3d 356, 366 n.9 (7th Cir. 2018) (consent search). To be sure, “the Supreme Court has recently granted heightened protection to cell phone data.” See Wanjiku, 919 F. 3d at 484. But neither our research nor the parties’ briefs re‐ veal any circuit court decision extending a Riley‐like rule to parolees—quite the opposite. See United States v. Pacheco, 884 F.3d 1031, 1043–44 & n.10 (10th Cir. 2018) (discussing Riley’s inapplicability in the parole context); United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1273–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Riley did not require parole agents to obtain a warrant before searching a parolee’s cellphone); United States v. Jackson, 866 F.3d 982, 985–86 (8th Cir. 2017) (same). Nevertheless, we take a fresh look. The Supreme Court’s “general Fourth Amendment ap‐ proach” is to “examine the totality of the circumstances to de‐ termine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (cleaned up). Whether a search is reasonable is determined “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an in‐ dividual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental inter‐ ests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). This balancing of interests sometimes generates categori‐ cal rules, like the search‐incident‐to‐arrest exception addressed in Riley. Under that doctrine, law enforcement gen‐ erally may conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s per‐ son without “additional justification.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 384 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). Two governmental interests support this rule: officer safety and evidence preservation. Id. On balance, these interests 6 No. 20‐2974
outweigh an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy, jus‐ tifying an exception to the rule that “reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” See id. at 382–84 (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). But the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” Riley, 573 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted), so technological advancements may alter the contours of Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001). Riley is illustrative. There, the Supreme Court held that cellphones fall outside the search‐incident‐to‐arrest exception because the government’s interests in officer safety and evidence preservation did not outweigh an arrestee’s particular privacy interest in his cellphone. Both sides of the balancing test were affected by a cellphone’s ability to store “vast quantities of personal infor‐ mation.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 386. Riley first noted that the expectation of privacy, though lowered by custodial arrest, was not eliminated. Id. at 392. Cellphones differed greatly, the Court observed, from physi‐ cal items, like a “cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse” because of their “immense storage capacity” which may contain “a re‐ vealing montage of the user’s life.” Id. at 393, 396. Therefore, an arrestee’s privacy interest in his cellphone garnered more protection than, say, the cigarette pack found on the arrestee in United States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. at 236. Regarding the government’s twin interests of officer safety and evidence preservation, the Court noted that “[d]ig‐ ital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the ar‐ restee’s escape.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 387. Officers retained the No. 20‐2974 7
ability to “examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon.” Id. And though potential destruction of evidence presented a stronger justification for warrantless cellphone searches, the Court reasoned that phys‐ ical possession of the phone, ability to turn off the device (or remove the battery), and the existence of signal‐blocking de‐ vices provided the government with reasonable alternatives to a warrantless search. Id. at 388–91. Riley’s net result, then, was a carveout for cellphones to the search‐incident‐to‐arrest exception, essentially reinstating the warrant requirement for searches targeting cellphone data. B The Supreme Court’s close attention to balancing interests means that Riley cannot be casually applied to other contexts. Instead, we must consider the privacy and governmental in‐ terests in the factual circumstances before us: a warrantless search of a parolee’s cellphone conducted under the terms of the parole agreement. We take into account, of course, the Su‐ preme Court’s general emphasis on cellphone privacy in the modern era—and for that purpose Riley is instructive—but we do not attempt a full‐scale doctrinal transplant. For searches of parolees and probationers, two Supreme Court decisions set the stage. In United States v. Knights, the Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home based on reasonable suspicion satisfied the Fourth Amend‐ ment. 534 U.S. at 122. But Knights reserved the question of whether a suspicionless search would also satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 120 n.6. In Samson v. California, the Court answered a variation of that question in the affirmative, hold‐ ing that a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 547 U.S. at 857. 8 No. 20‐2974
Under Knights and Samson, courts balance a parolee’s privacy expectations, as shaped by state law, against the state’s inter‐ ests in reducing recidivism and promoting reintegration. United States v. White, 781 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2015). For example, we recently applied Knights and Samson to Wisconsin’s equivalent of parole, extended supervision, in United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2020). Pursuant to state law, police officers searched the home of Caya, who was serving an extended supervision term. Id. at 500–01. Looking to Samson, this court concluded that an “offender on extended supervision has no greater expectation of privacy than a pa‐ rolee. And Wisconsin’s interest in rigorously monitoring of‐ fenders on extended supervision is just as compelling as the government’s parole‐supervision interests in Samson.” Id. at 503. So we held that the search was constitutional. Id. Though Caya involved a home in Wisconsin and this case concerns a cellphone in Indiana, we apply the same framework. Here, In‐ diana, rather than Wisconsin, law informs the analysis. See White, 781 at 861. Parolee status diminishes one’s privacy expectations, Samson, 547 U.S. at 852, and Indiana courts have affirmed this principle, State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 779 (Ind. 2015). Wood’s parole agreement, authorized by IND. CODE § 11‐13‐ 3‐4, reminded him that he was “legally in the custody of the Department of Correction” and explained that his “person and residence or property under [his] control may be subject to reasonable search[es].” Nothing in this provision indicates that a cellphone does not qualify as “property under [Wood’s] control,” and Wood does not make such an argument. Wood was unambiguously informed of his parole conditions, which permitted searches based on less than probable cause. So, any No. 20‐2974 9
privacy interest Wood retained in his cellphone was greatly diminished. See Samson 547 U.S. at 852. Turning to the state’s interests, we recognize that Indiana has an “overwhelming interest in supervising parolees.” Id. at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted). Its goals of “reducing recidivism” and “promoting reintegration … warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. The district court noted Indiana’s 34% recidivism rate for parolees within three years of release. Wood, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 574. It also highlighted the public safety concerns that accompany a high recidivism rate. Id. at 575 (discussing parole division operations discovering illegal firearms and large quantities of drugs). Indiana has a strong interest in supervising parolees, as did California in Samson. Despite cellphones’ ability to hold “vast quantities of per‐ sonal information,” Riley, 573 U.S. at 386, they do not, as a cat‐ egorical matter, receive heightened protection under Knights and Samson. Unlike the governmental interests discussed in Riley (officer safety and evidence preservation), Indiana’s governmental interests (reducing recidivism and promoting reintegration) apply equally to cellphone searches. As stated above, the interests in reducing recidivism and promoting re‐ integration are “overwhelming.” And “the Fourth Amend‐ ment does not render the States powerless to address these concerns effectively.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 854 (emphasis in orig‐ inal). First, parolees are “more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. The government’s interest in discov‐ ering criminal activity applies no less when the evidence is data in a cellphone. By contrast, the government’s interests in Riley—officer safety and evidence preservation—were less 10 No. 20‐2974
compelling when the target of the search was cellphone data. Not so here. Reducing recidivism is an independent goal of the parole system, exclusive from those discussed in Riley, and it would be frustrated by imposing a warrant require‐ ment because it would incentivize concealment of criminal ac‐ tivity. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120–22. Second, the government has an interest in “promoting re‐ integration and positive citizenship among probationers and parolees.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853. A supervisor must be able to obtain information about the supervisee. Transparency is key because “most parolees are ill prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration[,] [t]hus, most parolees require in‐ tense supervision.” Id. at 854. Requiring a warrant for a search of a parolee’s cellphone would hinder the state’s efforts to rehabilitate offenders and reintroduce them to society. Iden‐ tifying recalcitrance earlier rather than later is central to the parole system. This is why Knights and Samson permit war‐ rantless searches with less than probable cause for probation‐ ers and parolees alike; it makes “eminent sense.” Id. Given Wood’s diminished expectation of privacy and In‐ diana’s strong governmental interests, the search of Wood’s cellphone was reasonable. In reaching this decision, we align our law with that of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See Pacheco, 884 F.3d at 1044; Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1273; Jackson, 866 F.3d at 985. Resisting this conclusion, Wood relies on two other cases, United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2016). Both are distinguishable. Fletcher and Lara involved probationers, not parolees. This matters because “on the continuum of state‐im‐ posed punishments[,] … parolees have fewer expectations of No. 20‐2974 11
privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to im‐ prisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (internal quotation marks omitted). As an example, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend its holding in Lara to pa‐ rolees, explaining “[the defendant’s] parole status alone dis‐ tinguishes our case from Lara and Riley.” Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275. In addition to parolees differing from probationers,1 Fletcher and Lara do not control for other reasons. First, both Fletcher and Lara held that the operative proba‐ tion agreements did not clearly or unambiguously include cellphones as searchable items. Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019; Lara, 815 F.3d at 610. In Fletcher, the probation agreement’s search provision included the probationer’s “person, [his] motor ve‐ hicle or [his] place of residence.” Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019. In Lara, the probationer agreed to “submit [his] person and property, including any residence, premises, container or ve‐ hicle under [his] control to search and seizure.” Lara, 815 F.3d at 610. Certainly, Samson described as “salient” that parole conditions be “clearly expressed” to the parolee. 547 U.S. at 852. But clear expression does not require an exhaustive list. Probation agreements need not express, in granular detail, every item subject to a search. In this case, Wood’s parole agreement provided that his “person and residence or prop‐ erty under [his] control” could be searched with “reasonable cause” because he remained in the “custody of the
1Indiana applies Samson’s holding to probationers, in effect lowering a probationer’s privacy expectation to that of a parolee. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d at 779. To the extent Indiana treats probationers and parolees the same, that determination does not render Lara applicable to parolees. 12 No. 20‐2974
Department of Correction.” Only a strained and unreasonable reading of these provisions would exclude a parolee’s cell‐ phone. Second, Fletcher held that a state’s interest in supervising a probationer terminates abruptly once the phone is secured. Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019. This reasoning, imported from Riley, does not find support in Knights and Samson. The state’s inter‐ ests are different here and justify a post‐arrest, post‐seizure search of a parolee’s cellphone. Fletcher relied on Riley’s expla‐ nation that “once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.” Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 388). Fletcher also observed that a seized cellphone does not pose a safety risk. Id. But the twin interests of preventing evidence destruction and protecting officers are not the interests underpinning Knights and Samson. Rather, Knights and Samson support the state’s ongo‐ ing supervisory role over parolees. If such supervision ab‐ ruptly terminated once a parolee was arrested—whether for a failure‐to‐appear violation or a serious crime—the continu‐ ity of a state’s parole system would be severely impeded. The Fourth Amendment does not dictate this unreasonable result. C Several issues remain, each of which resolve in the gov‐ ernment’s favor. Waiver. In his opening brief, Wood argued that two other searches were unlawful: the search of his phone’s exterior (which revealed methamphetamine) and the subsequent search of his home. The government asserted Wood waived both arguments. No. 20‐2974 13
We begin with the arguments made in Wood’s motion to suppress. A defendant who moves to suppress evidence must “identify the grounds upon which he believes suppression is warranted.” United States v. Kirkland, 567 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 2009). When defense counsel fails to develop a suppres‐ sion argument, he deprives the government of “a meaningful opportunity to rebut [the defendant’s] claims” and does not “notify the district court that it needs to address them.” Id. Wood’s motion to suppress challenged only the state investi‐ gator’s data extraction—not the cellphone‐cover search, and not the home search. Thus, to start, he bypassed an oppor‐ tunity to challenge both searches, which, without good cause, would result in forfeiture. See id. While omissions may result in forfeiture, counsel may go one step further and expressly waive arguments. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). “[W]aiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, and it “precludes appellate review,” Flores, 929 F.3d at 447. Whether a right must be waived by the defendant or may be waived by counsel depends on the right at issue. Id. at 447–48 (citing New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000)). “[D]ecisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue[.] … Absent a demonstration of ineffec‐ tiveness, counsel’s word on such matters is the last.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he district court must be able to rely on the representations given by counsel.”). Assuming Wood could have preserved his two additional arguments at the suppression hearing, see Kirkland, 567 F.3d at 321, his trial counsel failed to do so. To the contrary, counsel 14 No. 20‐2974
waived Wood’s right to challenge the cellphone‐cover search and home search. When asked, “[I]s the motion to suppress strictly targeting whether this was a reasonable search of his cell phone?”, Wood’s trial counsel responded, “It depends on which search you’re talking about.” The colloquy continued: [Trial Counsel]: We’re not going to argue with them taking apart the back of the phone and finding the packet of methamphetamine. We’re not arguing – we’re not arguing about that be‐ cause that doesnʹt matter in this Court or on this issue. The Court: What about the search of the home? [Trial Counsel]: No issue with that, as well. … And they take the back off the phone and they find the methamphetamine. No, issue with that, as well. Wood contends his trial counsel later retracted this waiver, but the record does not show a change of position. In fact, trial counsel reiterated that Wood was not challenging the search of his phone’s exterior or the search of his home. The district court accepted trial counsel’s representations and analyzed only the state investigator’s search of Wood’s cell‐ phone data. Wood’s appeal is thus limited to that search. See Scott, 900 F.3d at 975 (finding that defense counsel affirma‐ tively waived argument at revocation hearing). Investigatory versus regulatory searches. Wood emphasizes the investigatory, rather than regulatory, purpose for the state investigator’s data extraction. But the government does not defend the search based on the special‐needs exception, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), where a distinction No. 20‐2974 15
between investigatory and regulatory searches is germane. Under Knights and Samson, it is of no moment that a parole agent’s purpose in conducting a search is investigatory. Caya, 956 F.3d at 501–03 (discussing Griffin, Knights, and Samson). So the investigatory‐versus‐regulatory distinction is not rele‐ vant here. Status. Because context matters under the Fourth Amend‐ ment, one’s status in the eyes of the government matters. Along these lines, Wood maintains his arrest rendered Samson inapplicable and instead triggered Riley. On its face, this seems plausible—Wood was arrested, making him an ar‐ restee, and Riley is about arrestees. But a parolee is on the “‘continuum’ of state‐imposed punishments,” one step removed from incarceration. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. A custodial arrest would not increase a parolee’s privacy expec‐ tations by placing him outside Samson’s reach. Upon arrest, Wood’s status was not transformed from parolee to arrestee, but from parolee to parolee‐arrestee, so Samson continued to apply. Cf. United States v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[The State’s] interests in preventing harm to the pro‐ bationer and to society are fully cognizable even when the probationer is in the State’s custody.”). Terms of the parole agreement. Finally, Wood argues the search of his cellphone violated the precise terms of his parole agreement, which authorized “reasonable searche[s]” only when an “official has reasonable cause to believe that the pa‐ rolee is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a con‐ dition to remaining on parole.” According to Wood, once he was arrested, he could no longer be “violating” or in “immi‐ nent danger of violating” a parole condition, eliminating the 16 No. 20‐2974
possibility of “reasonable cause.” There are a few problems with this argument. To begin, Indiana courts have not interpreted this provi‐ sion in the manner Wood suggests. For example, in State v. Harper, a parolee was arrested for violations of parole condi‐ tions. State v. Harper, 135 N.E.3d 962, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), transfer denied, 143 N.E.3d 950 (Ind. 2020). Thereafter, parole officers searched both his home and storage unit, with the lat‐ ter search revealing evidence of additional crimes. Id. The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that the warrantless search of the parolee’s storage unit did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the search “was predicated on the pa‐ role conditions and reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 972. Indeed, Wood’s reading, which requires an “ongoing pa‐ role violation”, would lead to absurd results. Taken to its log‐ ical end, the “ongoing parole violation” requirement would prevent parole agents from conducting a reasonable search even if they had reasonable cause to believe a parolee com‐ mitted a robbery the day before. Unless the robbery was “on‐ going,” parole agents would be unable to exercise authority under the parole agreement to conduct a reasonable search for evidence. This understanding of the parole agreement ren‐ ders its search provision virtually meaningless, a result “no reasonable person could approve.” See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 234 (2012). Finally, even if parole agents violated the parole agree‐ ment’s precise terms, such a violation would not, on its own, transgress the Fourth Amendment. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (noting “it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law”). The terms of the parole No. 20‐2974 17
agreement are “neither dispositive nor inconsequential in the constitutional analysis. Rather, [they are] one factor in consid‐ ering the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2009). Under the Supreme Court’s guidance, the parole agreement’s terms do not directly shape the contours of Fourth Amendment reasona‐ bleness. They merely elucidate the nature of the parolee’s pri‐ vacy expectations. III This case is controlled by Knights and Samson, not Riley. On balance, Indiana’s interests outweigh Wood’s privacy ex‐ pectation as a parolee whose person, residence, and property were subject to search. So the warrantless search of Wood’s cellphone was reasonable. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Wood’s motion to suppress.