United States v. Henry Steiger

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 1 of 9

[PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10742 ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus HENRY MARTIN STEIGER, a.k.a. Henry Matthew Steiger, a.k.a. H M Steiger, a.k.a. Robert Woods,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 2 of 9

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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00043-RV-2 ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and COOGLER,* District Judge. COOGLER, District Judge: This case returns to this panel on remand from the en banc Court with instructions to consider the Appellant’s additional ar- guments that we were not able to review in the first instance. See United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). After careful consideration, we conclude that the Appellant, Henry Martin Steiger, has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred in imposing a sentence of 20 years of imprisonment follow- ing the revocation of his probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3565. Accordingly, we affirm Steiger’s sentence. I. BACKGROUND We described the factual and procedural history of this case in our prior panel opinion, United States v. Steiger, 83 F.4th 932, 934– 36 (11th Cir. 2023), vacated, 86 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2023), and re- manded en banc, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024). To summarize, Stei- ger pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and three counts of wire fraud, and the district court sen- tenced him to three years of probation. Two months into his

* Honorable L. Scott Coogler, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 3 of 9

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probation sentence, Steiger murdered the mother of his infant child on the child’s first birthday. After he was convicted of second- degree murder in Florida state court, the district court held a hear- ing to revoke Steiger’s probation and to resentence him on the fed- eral conspiracy and wire fraud offenses. At the revocation hearing, the district court heard evidence that Steiger strangled his victim to death while she was holding his infant daughter and then stowed the victim’s body in a 55-gallon barrel. Law enforcement discovered her decomposing body six months later. Steiger’s business associate told law enforcement that Steiger planned the murder and that he helped Steiger move the barrel into a trailer and dispose of the woman’s iPad and iPod. Steiger admitted to hiding the body and lying to law enforcement when questioned about the woman’s dis- appearance initially, but he maintained that he did not commit murder. He claimed that the woman died by suicide and that he, fearful that he would lose custody of his daughter, attempted to “cover [his] tracks more like a guilty person.” The district court found that Steiger violated the terms of his probation and revoked it. The government argued that the Sen- tencing Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment grossly understated the egregiousness of Steiger’s conduct while on federal probation and emphasized that the district court could sentence Steiger to the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment on each of the four counts for a total of 80 years’ imprisonment. Steiger requested that he be sentenced to time served in light of his lifetime imprisonment sentence in the state case. The district court imposed a sentence of 20 years’ USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 4 of 9

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imprisonment on each count to run concurrently with each other and with the life sentence imposed by the Florida court in the sec- ond-degree murder case. When the district court asked whether Steiger had any objections to the sentence imposed, Steiger an- swered no. Steiger appealed, arguing that the district court’s sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We construed one of his procedural unreasonableness arguments to be that the district court failed to give a specific reason for imposing an upward vari- ance to the statutory maximum sentence, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), which requires the district court to “state in open court . . . the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence” when that sentence is outside the guidelines range. See Steiger, 83 F.4th at 937. Because this Court’s precedents required automatic reversal for any § 3553(c) error, we were forced to reverse and re- mand to the district court for an explanation of why it chose 20 years. See id. at 938 (citing United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 2016)). This was so even though Steiger did not object to the district court’s failure to explain its reasons and even though we thought it obvious that the district court varied upward due to the horrific crime Steiger committed while on probation. See id. Chief Judge Pryor wrote separately, concurring in this panel’s application of this Court’s precedents but urging this Court to rehear this appeal en banc to reconsider United States v. Parks be- cause that case “requires a ‘per se rule of reversal for [section] 3553(c)(2) errors’ even when the defendant never objected to the USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 5 of 9

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explanation of his sentence in the district court.” Steiger, 83 F.4th at 938 (Pryor, C.J., concurring) (quoting Parks, 823 F.3d at 996–97). The Court reheard this appeal en banc and held that when a defendant does not object to a district court’s failure to explain its sentence in violation of § 3553(c), plain error review applies on ap- peal, not automatic reversal, thereby overruling Parks and other precedents to the extent they conflicted with the Court’s en banc holding. Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1324. The en banc Court further held that the district court did not commit plain error in failing to ex- plain the upward variance because its reasons were clear by exam- ining the record of the revocation proceeding. Id. at 1327. The en banc Court then remanded the case to this panel to consider Stei- ger’s additional arguments. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, this Court conducts a two-step inquiry. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, the Court considers whether the sentence is proce- durally reasonable, and if it is, the Court examines whether it is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circum- stances. Id. This Court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 41. But if a defendant fails to object at sentencing to the reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the district court, this Court reviews for plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, in order to prevail on appeal, a defendant must estab- lish “(1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error was ‘plain’; USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 6 of 9

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and (3) that the error ‘affect[ed his] substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 734 (1993)). If all three con- ditions are met, we then decide whether the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. III. DISCUSSION First, Steiger argues that his sentence is procedurally unrea- sonable because the district court did not properly consider the guidelines range of 12 to 18 months of imprisonment or the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He also contends that the court should have addressed his request for a time served sentence. Our review is for plain error because Steiger did not object below. See Vander- grift, 754 F.3d at 1307. A district court commits a “significant procedural error” in imposing a sentence if it fails to calculate the guidelines range, cal- culates the range incorrectly, or fails to consider the § 3553(a) fac- tors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. However, “the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omit- ted). Rather, it is “sufficient that the district court considers the de- fendant’s arguments at sentencing and states that it has taken the § 3553(a) factors into account.” Id. Similarly for the guidelines range, all that is required is that “there be some indication that the district court was aware of and considered the Guidelines, which requires the court to consider the sentencing range established USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 7 of 9

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under the Guidelines.” United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district judge stated that he had “fully considered all of the factors set out in Title 18, United States Code, Sec- tion 3553(a), as well as the applicable guidelines and policy state- ments from the United States Sentencing Commission and the de- cisions of the courts about sentencing under these circumstances.” The district judge also stated that he had carefully considered the issues presented in the underlying case, the evidence presented at the revocation hearing, and the statements Steiger made in his de- fense. The evidence presented at the revocation hearing obviously concerned “the nature and circumstances of the offense”—one of the § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And although the district judge did not specifically reiterate that the guidelines range was 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment, both parties referred to the range in their arguments at the hearing. Although Steiger re- quested that he be sentenced to time served, the government ar- gued that the guidelines sentence was inadequate considering the seriousness of Steiger’s probation violation. Thus, it is clear from the record and the district judge’s own statements that he was aware of and considered the guidelines range. This case is thus un- like Campbell, where this Court was unable to review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release because “the dis- trict court never explicitly mentioned Campbell’s advisory Guide- lines range during the revocation hearing” and in fact “never said the word ‘Guidelines’ during the entire hearing.” 473 F.3d at 1349. USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 8 of 9

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Nor was the district judge required to explain why he re- jected Steiger’s request for a time served sentence. “[T]he sentenc- ing judge need only set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 113 (2018) (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Just how much of an ex- planation” is required “depends . . . upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 116. Sometimes it is enough “that the judge simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the § 3553(a) factors, among others.” Id. In sum, Steiger has not demonstrated plain error with regard to the procedural reasonable- ness of the sentence. Next, Steiger argues that his sentence is substantively unrea- sonable. Again, our review is for plain error because Steiger did not object below. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307. This Court “consider[s] whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 618 (11th Cir. 2015). “Although there is no proportionality prin- ciple in sentencing, a major variance does require a more significant justification than a minor one—the requirement is that the justifi- cation be ‘sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the var- iance.’” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). But “[e]ven as to a substantial USCA11 Case: 22-10742 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 07/16/2024 Page: 9 of 9

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variance, [this Court] will not reverse a sentence unless [it is] left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court com- mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Johnson, 803 F.3d at 618– 19 (quotation omitted). Here, the district judge addressed the § 3553(a) factors and specifically mentioned that he had considered the evidence pre- sented at the revocation hearing, which would have included the nature and circumstances of the murder. Steiger murdered the mother of his child on the child’s first birthday and dumped her inside a barrel where her decomposing body remained for months in the heat. Steiger planned the murder beforehand and carried it out in the presence of his one-year-old child. Steiger lied when questioned by law enforcement. His actions a mere two months into his probation sentence obviously convinced the district judge that he deserved a much greater penalty than the guidelines sug- gested, and the upward departure itself is reasonable. The district court imposed a lighter sentence than the statutory maximum of 20 years per count, which would have resulted in a total of 80 years’ imprisonment. Steiger has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and imposing an above-guidelines sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Steiger’s sentence.