United States v. Henderson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-828
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 30 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-828 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:20-cr-00022-IM-1 v. MEMORANDUM*

DUSTIN LEE HENDERSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 22, 2024 Portland, Oregon

Before: WALLACH, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.**

Dustin Lee Henderson appeals his jury conviction for Interference with

Commerce by Threats or Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; Possession of

a Firearm in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. § 924(c)(1)(A); and Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount

them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henderson’s

three motions for substitute counsel. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563

F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We review the denial of a motion for substitution

of counsel for abuse of discretion.”). The district court conducted an adequate

inquiry into the cause of the communication breakdown between Henderson and

his court-appointed attorneys, and afforded them “an opportunity to explain the

cause of [Henderson’s] dissatisfaction” at three separate hearings. Miller v.

Blacketter, 525 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2008). The information gathered at the

hearings gave the court “a sufficient basis for reaching an informed decision.”

United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). The hearings revealed that the breakdown in

communication was Henderson’s voluntary choice. Henderson was not happy with

the suppression motion his lawyer filed, disagreed with counsel’s decision not to

file other motions, thought the case was progressing too fast, and maintained that

counsel did not have Henderson’s “side of the story.” He noted his family had

hired a civil attorney who had instructed him to cease all contact with defense

counsel. Henderson’s justification for new counsel thus arose out of a “general

2 23-828 unreasonableness or manufactured discontent.” United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d

758, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480, 484 (9th

Cir. 1990)). Because “the conflict was of [Henderson’s] own making, [and] arose

over decisions that are committed to the judgment of the attorney and not the

client,” Henderson “received what the Sixth Amendment required in the case of an

indigent defendant[.]” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000).

Given the court’s decisions to grant alternate counsel earlier in the case, as well as

the appointment of back-up counsel, Henderson was not effectively denied his

right to representation.

2. Because Henderson based his motion for a new trial on the breakdown in

the attorney-client relationship, we likewise conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying that motion. See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106,

1122 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new

trial for abuse of discretion.”). Even assuming that the motion was timely, we find

that the district court properly concluded that the breakdown in the attorney-client

relationship did not affect the fairness of Henderson’s trial. The record also

supports the district court’s conclusion that Henderson knowingly waived his right

to testify. When the district court informed Henderson that his attorney would ask

him open-ended questions but could not elicit false or prohibited testimony,

Henderson stated he understood and that it was “in [his] best interest” not to

3 23-828 testify.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the

government’s motions in limine to exclude some evidence of the officers’ use of

force during Henderson’s arrest. United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 351–52

(9th Cir. 2010) (“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion and its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence de novo.”). The

district court did not abuse its discretion in its Rule 401 and Rule 403 analysis

because it avoided a “mini trial” by limiting the evidence of the force used during

the arrest. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.

Reviewing the constitutional issue de novo, Waters, 627 F.3d at 352, we find

that the limitations on Henderson’s cross-examination of his arresting officers did

not violate the Confrontation Clause because they did not “limit[] relevant

testimony” or prejudice Henderson, and did not “den[y] the jury sufficient

information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.” United States

v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). Although he was

forced to present a diluted version of his particularly violent arrest, Henderson was

ultimately able to present sufficient evidence to the jury of his theory that the

police planted evidence in his home. In their testimony, officers admitted using

force despite Henderson’s calm demeanor, that it was possible Henderson could

sue the officers for their use of force, that there was no evidence of a crime in plain

4 23-828 sight, and that they had “no idea if other officers moved things, touched things, or

brought stuff into the home[.]” In his closing argument, Henderson was able to

explain his theory of the case to the jury, emphasizing that the “officers [were]

scared of a lawsuit” and obtained “evidence in a house that they ha[d] custody of

for hours.” “[T]he focus of the Confrontation Clause is on individual witnesses.”

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). “The jury would not have

‘received a significantly different impression of [the officers’] credibility’” had

Henderson been allowed to present evidence of the degree of force used during his

arrest. United States v. Alahmedalabdaloklah, 94 F.4th 782, 826 (9th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680), cert. pending, No. 24-125.

AFFIRMED.

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