United States v. Hector Ornelas

825 F.3d 548, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10130, 2016 WL 3126272
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 3, 2016
Docket15-10522
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 825 F.3d 548 (United States v. Hector Ornelas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hector Ornelas, 825 F.3d 548, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10130, 2016 WL 3126272 (9th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Hector Ornelas appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He argues that the district court erred in calculating the guideline range that applied to him at sentencing because it did not take into account a downward departure to his criminal history, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Had the court included this downward departure, Ornelas argues, he would have been eligible for a sentence reduction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo whether a district court has jurisdiction to resentence a defendant under § 3582. See United States v. Pleasant, 704 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2013). We hold that the district court was correct to calculate the guideline range that applied to Ornelas at sentencing without taking into account the § 4A1.3 downward departure, and we therefore affirm.

I

Before addressing the facts of this case, we explain the framework for analyzing Ornelas’s argument that the district court erred in declining to reduce his sentence.

“As a general matter, courts may not alter a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Congress has created an exception to this rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 1 Under this section, a court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment if (1) the defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission” by an amendment to the Guidelines 2 and (2) “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the *550 Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The “applicable policy statement” relevant here is § 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 809-10. Under this section, if “a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment” that is listed in § 1B1.10(d), 3 the court has the discretion to “reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment” consistent with § 1B1.10. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1).

In order to determine the defendant’s eligibility under this section, the court must determine “the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines” listed in § 1B1.10(d) “had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1). 4 In determining this amended guideline range, the court substitutes the new amendment “for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced,” but must “leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” Id. After the court calculates the amended guideline range, it must determine whether the defendant’^ term of imprisonment is greater or less than the minimum of this amended guideline range. Under § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), “[a] reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment” is not authorized if the new amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” Id. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). 5 Therefore, if the defendant’s term of imprisonment is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range, then the defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction.

Before 2011, the Guidelines did not provide guidance on how a court should determine the applicable guideline range under § 1B1.10. The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits agreed that at a minimum, the applicable guideline range included a reduction in a defendant’s criminal history category, as allowed under § 4A1.3 (2009) (“Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy Statement)”), if such a criminal history category “substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history,” id. § 4A1.3(b)(1). See United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 271-72 (3rd Cir. 2010); United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d *551 183, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225, 228-30 (2d Cir. 2009). These courts generally reasoned as follows: When a sentencing court follows the Guidelines’ seven steps for calculating a defendant’s applicable guideline range, § 1B1.1(a)-(g) (2009), the sentencing court must determine the defendant’s criminal history category at step six, § 1B1.1(f). 6 According to the Fourth Circuit, a sentencing court deciding to apply a departure under § 4A1.3 is merely determining the defendant’s correct criminal history category at step six, before calculating the guideline range that corresponds to the “offense level and criminal history category determined above” at step seven, § 1B1.1(g). See Munn, 595 F.3d at 192-93. Therefore, in determining whether a new amendment has lowered the guideline range applicable to the defendant, Munn explained, the sentencing court should look at the guideline range as calculated with the criminal history category that was determined after the § 4A1.3 departure. Id.; see also Flemming, 617 F.3d at 268-69 (noting a similar rationale for determining the guideline range applicable to a defendant for purposes of § 1B1.10(a)). The Third Circuit explained that to the extent the guidelines are ambiguous regarding how to determine the guideline range applicable to a defendant, a court must “apply the rule of lenity and resolve the conflict in the defendant’s favor.” Flemming, 617 F.3d at 269-72 & n. 26 (quoting Munn, 595 F.3d at 194); see also McGee, 553 F.3d at 229 (applying the rule of lenity in holding the same).

On the other side of this split, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits held that the guideline range applicable to a defendant is the range that the district court calculated before granting any departures, including the downward departure allowed by § 4A1.3.

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Bluebook (online)
825 F.3d 548, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10130, 2016 WL 3126272, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hector-ornelas-ca9-2016.