23-7106 United States v. Harry
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
August Term 2024 Argued: December 2, 2024 Decided: March 7, 2025
No. 23-7106
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. KENSTON HARRY, Defendant-Appellant. *
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
Before: LYNCH, LEE, AND PÉREZ, Circuit Judges.
On appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Arterton, J.).
Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry raises a question of first impression in this Circuit: whether the government’s warrantless use of a stationary pole camera situated outside an individual’s business for approximately 50 days qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search. Because we conclude that it does not, we hold that the district court was not required to exclude the pole-camera footage at Harry’s criminal trial for drug trafficking. Additionally, we determine that the district court properly concluded that Harry is not entitled to “safety-valve” relief under
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which provides that where specified criteria are met, a court is not required to impose any statutory minimum set forth in the Controlled Substances Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
CONOR M. REARDON (Patrick J. Doherty, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), of counsel, Assistant United States Attorney, New Haven, CT, for Vanessa Roberts Avery, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, for Appellee.
BRUCE S. HARVEY (Brandon A. Bullard, The Bullard Law Firm, Atlanta, GA, on the brief), Law Office of Bruce S. Harvey, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.
MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judge:
This appeal chiefly concerns the admissibility of pole-camera evidence
obtained without a warrant in a criminal proceeding, which raises a novel Fourth
Amendment question in this Circuit. Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry
appeals a judgment of conviction for possessing controlled substances with intent
to distribute and conspiracy to accomplish the same. We conclude that, in the
circumstances present here, law enforcement’s use of a stationary pole camera to
monitor the exterior of Harry’s business did not constitute a search requiring a
warrant.
2 Harry also appeals his sentence. Applying our precedent, we determine
that the district court did not err in finding that Harry had not met his burden of
showing he is entitled under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to “safety-valve” relief from his
ten-year mandatory minimum. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
BACKGROUND
The events relevant to this appeal center, in the main, on the Action Audio
Store (“Action Audio”), an automotive business in Hartford, Connecticut, that
Harry owned and operated. The exterior of Action Audio and its adjoining
parking lot are situated in a “triangle” bordered by two streets. Appellant’s App’x
57–64; Gov’t’s App’x 585–87. On one side of the parking lot, there is a low fence
with railings spaced far enough apart to view the parking lot clearly through them.
Id. In addition, that fence bore, at the time of the captured pole-camera footage,
colorful signs and advertisements. Id. These signs also did not visually obstruct
the view of the premises.
Around March 2020, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents
began investigating Harry’s co-defendant Tajh Wiley, who was the leader of the
drug-trafficking scheme. Nearly a year later, agents tracked Wiley to Action
3 Audio, where they observed him receiving boxes from a cargo van before traveling
to Harry’s residence in Bloomfield, Connecticut (“Bloomfield residence”). Later
that day, local law enforcement in Yonkers, New York, arrested Wiley after
stopping his car and finding a kilogram of cocaine. From jail, Wiley called Harry
and conveyed that the police “kn[e]w a lot” about their activities. Following
Wiley’s release from jail in Yonkers, federal investigators initiated a wiretap of
Wiley’s cell phone and captured incriminating conversations between him and
Harry, among others.
In April 2021, as part of their investigation, DEA agents affixed a video
surveillance camera to a utility pole on a lot across the street from Action Audio.
The camera was connected to the internet and fed footage to DEA investigators,
who could remotely tilt, pan, and zoom the camera. The camera recorded 24 hours
per day for approximately 50 days. Its feed captured Action Audio’s exterior, the
outdoor parking lot, and, occasionally, a slice of the interior of the business’s
garage bay whenever the garage door was raised. 1
1 For an overlapping period, the government also obtained warrants to collect real-time and historical cellular site location information (“CSLI”) from Harry’s cell phone. The CSLI collected is not at issue in this appeal.
4 In June 2021, Harry was arrested. Investigators searched Action Audio, the
Bloomfield residence, his vehicles, and his cell phone. 2 They found narcotics and
firearms in both Action Audio and the Bloomfield residence. 3 Specifically, at
Action Audio, agents uncovered more than 1.5 kilograms of marijuana, along with
a digital scale and powder residue. They also seized three loaded firearms near
the marijuana, in addition to a semi-automatic assault rifle with two loaded, large-
capacity magazines, a shotgun and corresponding boxes of ammunition, a
revolver, and other scattered ammunition. None of the firearms at Action Audio
were registered to Harry, and the assault rifle and related magazines were illegally
possessed in the state of Connecticut. At the Bloomfield residence, which Harry
shared with his brothers and cousin, agents found kilogram quantities of fentanyl,
cocaine, and marijuana. Near the narcotics, investigators also recovered a pistol
not registered to Harry, along with assorted ammunition.
I. Procedural History
The district court denied Harry’s motion to suppress the pole-camera
evidence. The government introduced 28 minutes’ worth of footage at trial, which
2 Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of these searches. 3Harry was arrested in his Bentley, where investigators found a pistol for which he possessed a valid permit and loaded ammunition magazines.
5 showed Wiley, Harry, and another co-defendant transferring bags of what the
government adduced to be controlled substances to their vehicles. A jury
convicted Harry of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, cocaine, and
marijuana, respectively; and of conspiracy to accomplish the same. 4
The district court sentenced Harry principally to ten years (120 months) on
the fentanyl- and cocaine-related charges, including conspiracy—the mandatory
minimum under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1); id. §
846. For the possession of marijuana count, it sentenced Harry to five years (60
months), to run concurrently. In so doing, it denied Harry safety-valve relief from
his ten-year sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and the Sentencing Guidelines § 5C1.2
provide for such relief; where certain criteria are met, the court is relieved of the
obligation to impose the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum. The district
court thereafter denied Harry’s motion to reconsider his eligibility for safety-valve
relief.
Harry timely appealed, raising (1) the admissibility of the pole-camera
footage at his trial; and (2) the applicability of the safety-valve provision to his
sentence.
4Harry had conceded guilt as to the marijuana count and as to the conspiracy charge insofar as marijuana was concerned.
6 STANDARD OF REVIEW
As to Harry’s claim involving the admission of pole-camera evidence, “this
Court reviews the district court’s factual findings” in connection with its denial of
a suppression motion “for clear error, and its application of law to fact de novo.”
United States v. Lewis, 62 F.4th 733, 740 (2d Cir. 2023). Provided there is error in
admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we evaluate
that error for harmlessness. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 660 (2d Cir. 2001).
As to Harry’s claim to safety-valve relief, we review the district court’s
underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 882, 883
(2d Cir. 1997). The district court commits clear error only if we are left “with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 577
(2024).
DISCUSSION
We consider for the first time in this Circuit whether the warrantless use of
a stationary pole camera located outside of a defendant’s business for
approximately 50 days violates the Fourth Amendment—and therefore whether
7 the evidence obtained from that endeavor must be excluded at a criminal trial. 5
Additionally, we examine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) entitles Harry to relief from
the statutory mandatory minimum for certain of his narcotics convictions. After
careful inquiry, we answer both questions in the negative.
I. The Pole-Camera Usage Did Not Constitute an Unreasonable Search
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see id. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). Warrantless
searches are ordinarily “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). In accordance with the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, “[c]ourts have . . . developed the ‘exclusionary rule’—
which requires trial courts to exclude unlawfully seized evidence from criminal
trials—as the ‘principal judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.’”
5We recently considered law-enforcement usage of cameras in a different Fourth Amendment context, in a case that concerned the use of an iPhone camera to view the interior of a defendant’s car through tinted windows. See United States v. Poller, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-75-cr, 2025 WL 555563 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2025). Our analysis is fully consistent with the analysis in Poller.
8 United States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223, 231 n.5 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Utah v. Strieff,
579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016)).
But not all law enforcement-initiated surveillance qualifies as a “search.”
Rather, a Fourth Amendment search occurs only if the target had a “‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in the area searched.” Lewis, 62 F.4th at 741 (quoting Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); accord Carpenter
v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 310 (2018). That standard, in turn, is defined by a
two-part, conjunctive test: “first, has the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?" McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 232
(citation omitted). Put differently, to benefit from the exclusionary rule, Harry had
to show that he maintained both a subjective and an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in Action Audio’s exterior and parking lot. See Lewis, 62
F.4th at 741 (explaining that “the proponent of the motion to suppress” carries the
“burden to establish that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights”).
Though many of our sister circuits have considered the issue of law
enforcement’s use of pole cameras in light of the Fourth Amendment, this question
is one of first impression in our Circuit. Nearly every circuit to have passed on the
9 question has held that pole cameras do not constitute a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 291 (4th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Dennis, 41 F.4th 732, 740–41 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 2616 (2023); United States v. May-Shaw, 955 F.3d 563, 567–69 (6th Cir.
2020); United States v. Tuggle, 4 F.4th 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Hay, 95 F.4th 1304, 1313–18 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-72, 2024 WL 4874676
(U.S. Nov. 25, 2024). The First Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the use of a pole
camera in a criminal case, with the panel evenly split on whether there was no
search at all or whether there was one that the Fourth Amendment’s good-faith
exception excused. Compare United States v. Moore-Bush, 36 F.4th 320, 328 (1st Cir.
2022) (Barron, J., concurring) (concluding “that the good-faith exception to the
warrant requirement” applied), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. United States, 143 S.
Ct. 2494 (2023), with id. at 363 (Lynch, J., concurring) (finding neither a subjective,
nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy).
We now hold that the use of a stationary pole camera, at least as deployed
here—to monitor the publicly visible exterior of a target’s business for a period of
50 days—does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. We so
10 conclude after examining, in turn, Harry’s subjective and objective expectations of
privacy in this context.
B. Harry’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy
We first ask whether Harry has “manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy” in the exterior of Action Audio and its parking lot. See California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). We have previously held that “what a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . does not receive Fourth Amendment protection, yet what
a person tries to keep private . . . may be entitled to constitutional protection.”
United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2003).
Harry made little to no effort to conceal the goings-on outside of Action
Audio. Here, only a very low fence borders one side of the Action Audio parking
lot. Through it, the parking lot and the exterior of Action Audio—and the
activities therein—remained clearly visible. See Appellant’s App’x 57–64; Gov’t’s
App’x 587. This is not the “10-foot fence” that the Ciraolo Court concluded clearly
demonstrated the defendant’s subjective expectation that passersby on foot would
be unable to see what was hidden behind. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
Additionally, when the business’s garage door was open, some of the garage’s
interior could be glimpsed from the street. Gov’t’s App’x 587–88. “[W]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public through an open door or window does 11 not receive Fourth Amendment protection.” Davis, 326 F.3d at 365. Moreover, it
would be incongruous for a proprietor of a business to claim a subjective privacy
interest in the publicly visible aspects of his business’s premises during work
hours. Harry has thus manifested no “subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search.” See McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 232.
C. The Objective Reasonableness of Any Purported Expectation of Privacy
We next consider whether an expectation of privacy in the comings and
goings outside of Harry’s business is one that “society [is] willing to recognize . . .
as reasonable.” Id. We turn first to instructive precedent.
We have articulated an “open fields doctrine,” under which individuals
“generally do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in open and accessible
areas that the public is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See United States v.
Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Katz,
389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); McKenzie, 13
F.4th at 232 (“[O]bservations of items in plain view (or plain hearing, smell, or
feel), and recoveries of abandoned property are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment under this test.”). So, for example, an individual enjoys no
12 objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in outdoor premises open to the
public, when a government inspector enters to examine smoke coming from the
owner’s chimney. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861,
862–65 (1974), Neither is one’s expectation of privacy objectively reasonable on a
property outsiders could enter at will or observe from the public highway, see Lace,
669 F.2d at 49–51; in an area that the government can observe by plane, see Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 239 (1986); or for a property visible
over a fence to individuals perched atop “a [hypothetical] truck or a two-level
bus,” see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
So, too, here. Action Audio’s parking lot and storefront were open—and
more importantly, visible—to the public. “Generally, the police are free to observe
whatever may be seen from a place where they are entitled to be.” United States v.
Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997). Neither is there any basis for us to treat the
occasionally open garage differently. “[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken
measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer’s
observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which
renders the activities clearly visible.” Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
13 And Harry is on especially infirm footing here, because the surveilled area
was his business, rather than his home. Privacy expectations are “most
heightened” in one’s home. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (quoting
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213). There may well be scenarios in which a person maintains
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in aspects of her business, but
here, given that the pole camera monitored only what was publicly visible, Harry
cannot clear this additional hurdle. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)
(“An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from,
and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.”); Dow Chem.
Co., 476 U.S. at 237 (noting that “the Government has ‘greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property’” (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594, 598 (1981))).
Finally, a trio of Supreme Court cases to which Harry points does not
contradict our conclusion. Harry tells us that these cases show that there is
something about the breadth and depth of the government’s activities here that
converts the pole-camera usage into a search. Specifically, he takes issue with the
camera’s “sleepless, unblinking” recording over 50 days, which he argues is
14 materially different from a DEA agent’s physical surveillance. Appellant’s Br. 30.
We are unpersuaded.
When modern technology enhances law enforcement’s traditional
surveillance capabilities, the Supreme Court has recognized a Fourth Amendment
search only when law enforcement uses particularly invasive forms of
technological surveillance—involving, for example, technology that is either not
widely accessible or particularly all-encompassing. First, in Kyllo v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the use of a “thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the
home” qualifies as a search requiring a warrant. 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001). It
reasoned that “the Government use[d] a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion.” Id. at 40. Second, in United States v. Jones, the Court concluded
that the government undertakes an unreasonable search when it attaches a GPS
tracking device to a person’s vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. 565 U.S.
400, 404–05 (2012). There, in determining that a search had occurred, the Court
relied on the law of trespass—explaining that the government “physically
occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id.; see also
15 id. at 417 n.* (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the GPS device was not
“stationary” and that “[a] car’s movements . . . are its owner’s movements”). 6 By
contrast, the pole camera used here constitutes neither a form of inaccessible
technology capturing details unknowable without physical intrusion, nor a
physically trespassory attachment to an object that moves along with the target.
Additionally, the camera’s tilting, panning, and zooming functionalities, and its
connection to the internet, are rudimentary in comparison to the thermal-imaging
technology employed in Kyllo.
Third, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter that retrospective cell-site
location information (“CSLI”) collected for a period of seven days from a target’s
phone constitutes a search. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 296, 300, 310 n.3. CSLI allows
the government to locate a surveilled individual’s movements with great
precision, because phones ordinarily tap into the wireless network of local cell
sites “several times a minute.” Id. at 300. The Carpenter Court therefore expressed
unique concern that CSLI “provides an all-encompassing record of the [cell phone]
holder’s whereabouts” and “an intimate window into a person’s life.” Id. at 311.
6We note that the Court warned that it “do[es] not make trespass the exclusive test”—rather, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject” to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (emphasis omitted).
16 A cell phone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’” and “tracks nearly exactly
the movements of its owner.” Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385
(2014)); see also id. at 312 (observing that CSLI data provides “near perfect
surveillance” of a “retrospective” nature).
But the Court also expressly cautioned that its ruling in Carpenter was “a
narrow one.” Id. at 316. Notably, it “d[id] not . . . call into question conventional
surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.” Id. (emphasis added).
Devices such as the pole camera at issue here are thus expressly excluded from
Carpenter’s holding. Additionally, the stationary pole camera trained only on
Action Audio’s exterior does not meaningfully resemble an all-encompassing
“feature of human anatomy” like one’s cell phone.
We conclude that here, the DEA’s warrantless collection of footage of
activities in public view at Harry’s business, for a period of 50 days, using a
stationary pole camera, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in admitting video from the camera’s feed at Harry’s trial.
II. Harry Was Not Eligible for Safety-Valve Relief from the Mandatory Minimum Imposed
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), a court will not apply the mandatory minimum
to a defendant convicted, like Harry, of fentanyl- or cocaine-related charges under
17 the Controlled Substances Act where five criteria are met. This safety-valve
provision, if applicable, would have relieved Harry of his statutorily mandated
ten-year sentence.
Before us, Harry contests only the district court’s determination as to one of
the provision’s five criteria—whether he “possess[ed] a firearm or other
dangerous weapon . . . in connection with the offense” of which he was convicted.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2). Under that provision, Harry bore the burden of proving at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not possess the firearms
found at Action Audio, the Bloomfield residence, and on his person “in
connection” with the drug-trafficking scheme. See id.; see also United States v.
Jimenez, 451 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110
(2d Cir. 1997).
The statute’s language requiring that the firearms have been used “in
connection” with the crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2), has been interpreted as
“equivalent to the ‘in relation to’ language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).” See United
States v. DeJesus, 219 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000). Section 924(c)(1), in turn, is a
sentencing enhancement that applies if the defendant uses or carries a firearm in
relation to or in furtherance of a specified crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
18 In our parallel § 924(c)(1) cases, we have explained that to find the requisite
nexus between the firearm and the crime, the weapon “at least must facilitate, or
have the potential of facilitating,” the crime. DeJesus, 219 F.3d at 122 (quoting
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)). Thus, “the ultimate question is
whether the firearm afforded some advantage (actual or potential, real or
contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug trafficking.” United States v. Snow,
462 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A
court “can consider relevant factors like the type of drug activity that is being
conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the gun is
loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under
which the gun is found.” Lewis, 62 F.4th at 746 (internal quotation marks omitted
and alterations adopted).
Applying this standard here, we hold that the district court did not clearly
err in concluding that Harry failed to carry his burden of demonstrating his
possession of myriad firearms lacked a connection to his drug-trafficking
activities. See Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 883 (setting forth the clear-error standard of review
for the district court’s factual findings at sentencing). The firearms at Action
Audio, the Bloomfield residence, and on Harry’s person were readily accessible
19 and stored near large quantities of narcotics. Harry admitted to personally
carrying a pistol at nearly all times. In addition, the district court credited evidence
of a loaded pistol and ammunition found in Harry’s bedroom at the Bloomfield
residence, near a Burberry box of fentanyl and cocaine. Nearby were also buckets
of cocaine and three kilograms of marijuana. Id. At Action Audio, the site that
served “as the hub to distribute drugs,” Harry kept additional guns and
ammunition, including an assault rifle and large-capacity magazines banned in
the state of Connecticut, again near large quantities of marijuana. Appellant’s
App’x 1372–73 (Sent’g Tr. 69–70). Thus, in two places “central” to Harry’s
participation in a large-scale narcotics trafficking operation, id. at 1374 (Sent’g Tr.
71), Harry stored numerous firearms in close “proximity to drugs or drug profits,”
see Lewis, 62 F.4th at 746. These are the same factors that we concluded in Lewis
and Snow were sufficient to support conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lewis, 62 F.4th at 745–46; Snow, 462 F.3d at 62–63. If facts such
as these are sufficient to support a jury’s finding that a gun was used in furtherance
of a drug crime beyond a reasonable doubt, they are also sufficient to justify the
district court’s finding that Harry did not prove the opposite by a preponderance
of the evidence.
20 Consequently, we are satisfied that the district court did not clearly err in its
factual findings supporting its determination that Harry was not eligible for
safety-valve relief. We affirm the sentence the court imposed.
CONCLUSION
The government’s use of a stationary pole camera for 50 days to capture
scenes from the exterior of the Defendant’s business that were readily visible to
the public did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The district court was
thus not required to exclude the pole-camera evidence at Harry’s criminal trial.
Furthermore, Harry did not meet his burden of showing that he is entitled to
safety-valve relief from his mandatory-minimum sentence under the Controlled
Substances Act.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.