Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 21, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-6181 (D.C. No. 5:19-CR-00049-G-1) NATALIE DAWN HALBERT, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Natalie Halbert challenges her 18-year sentence for child sex trafficking as
substantively unreasonable. She argues that her history, characteristics, and personal
circumstances warranted a lower sentence and that the district court inadequately
considered the disparity between her sentence and the sentences of similarly situated
offenders. We reject these arguments and affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 2
In 2016, Rolando Cifuentes-Lopez offered Halbert a trailer to live in. When
Halbert fell behind on rent, Cifuentes-Lopez suggested that she could make up the
difference by paying him in sex. Cifuentes-Lopez kept asking for sex and, after a few
months, he referred his two brothers and another man, Wilson Gramajo-Maldonado,
to Halbert for sex. This arrangement went on for years, but Cifuentes-Lopez never
told Halbert how much, exactly, he was discounting her rent; nor did he ever tell her
she had caught up. Halbert also eventually traded sex in exchange for money, food,
drugs, and favors. She later told investigators that she did not view her conduct as
commercial sex work but as a matter of survival, given her extreme poverty.
At some point, Cifuentes-Lopez asked to have sex with Halbert’s minor
daughters. Cifuentes-Lopez, his brothers, and Gramajo-Maldonado were the most
frequent buyers of sex with Halbert’s minor daughters, though there were other men
as well. For instance, Gramajo-Maldonado paid Halbert $40 a week to live in her
trailer and have sex with her 14-year-old daughter. Halbert knew that men were
having sex with her daughters; she provided her daughters with condoms, would
intervene when a customer wouldn’t pay, and would sometimes keep the money.
A grand jury charged Halbert with two counts of child sex trafficking. Halbert
pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to both counts.1 The presentence
1 The government indicted Cifuentes-Lopez, his brothers, and Gramajo- Maldonado separately from Halbert. Cifuentes-Lopez pleaded guilty to two counts of child sex trafficking and received a 292-month sentence. See United States v. Cifuentes-Lopez, 40 F.4th 1215, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2022) (affirming sentence). One of Cifuentes-Lopez’s brothers pleaded guilty to two counts of child sex trafficking and one count of unlawful reentry and also received a 292-month sentence. The other 2 Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 3
investigation report (PSR) documented Halbert’s personal history, which included
several extremely violent relationships and struggles with alcohol, methamphetamine,
and an opioid addiction that began after she suffered a miscarriage in 2005.
Psychological testing determined that Halbert has a composite IQ that falls in the
range of mild intellectual disability, causing the psychologist to question Halbert’s
ability to recognize the gravity of the harm caused to her daughters. Halbert also
suffers from severe anxiety and depression.
At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR and set Halbert’s sentencing
range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) at
life in prison, based on a total offense level of 43—the highest available under the
Guidelines.2 Halbert asked the district court to depart or vary downward from the
Guidelines and impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. See 18
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2). The government requested a downward departure to a sentence
of 10 to 15 years based on Halbert’s substantial assistance in the prosecution of the
men who victimized her and her daughters. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
The district court agreed that a downward departure and a downward variance
were appropriate. It determined that the Guidelines “overstate[d] the criminal
brother pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry and received a six-month sentence. Gramajo-Maldonado pleaded guilty to one count of child sex trafficking and received a 324-month sentence. 2 Halbert had only one criminal-history point, placing her in the lowest criminal-history category, but that did not impact her Guidelines range because an offense level of 43 always produces a Guidelines range of life in prison. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. 3 Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 4
culpability of the defendant in this atypical case,” emphasizing that Halbert’s conduct
resulted “not so much from malice . . . but [from] an absence of care and basic good
judgment.” Supp. R. vol. 2, 23. The district court also cited Halbert’s substantial
assistance to the government, her mild intellectual disability, and her drug and
alcohol addiction as reasons for a downward departure. See § 5K1.1; U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.3 (“Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted, if such conditions . . . are present to an unusual degree and
distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the [G]uidelines.”).
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Halbert’s conduct warranted
punishment because she “did not protect her children from being raped and
prostituted . . . and even, to some extent, facilitated or participated in the trafficking
of her daughters by supplying condoms and taking some of the money that they were
making.” Supp. R. vol. 2, 24–25. The district court thus concluded that a sentence of
18 years on each count, to run concurrently, was sufficient.
Halbert now appeals, asserting that this sentence is substantively unreasonable.
“Substantive review ‘involves whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given
all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).’”3 United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir.
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Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 21, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-6181 (D.C. No. 5:19-CR-00049-G-1) NATALIE DAWN HALBERT, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Natalie Halbert challenges her 18-year sentence for child sex trafficking as
substantively unreasonable. She argues that her history, characteristics, and personal
circumstances warranted a lower sentence and that the district court inadequately
considered the disparity between her sentence and the sentences of similarly situated
offenders. We reject these arguments and affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 2
In 2016, Rolando Cifuentes-Lopez offered Halbert a trailer to live in. When
Halbert fell behind on rent, Cifuentes-Lopez suggested that she could make up the
difference by paying him in sex. Cifuentes-Lopez kept asking for sex and, after a few
months, he referred his two brothers and another man, Wilson Gramajo-Maldonado,
to Halbert for sex. This arrangement went on for years, but Cifuentes-Lopez never
told Halbert how much, exactly, he was discounting her rent; nor did he ever tell her
she had caught up. Halbert also eventually traded sex in exchange for money, food,
drugs, and favors. She later told investigators that she did not view her conduct as
commercial sex work but as a matter of survival, given her extreme poverty.
At some point, Cifuentes-Lopez asked to have sex with Halbert’s minor
daughters. Cifuentes-Lopez, his brothers, and Gramajo-Maldonado were the most
frequent buyers of sex with Halbert’s minor daughters, though there were other men
as well. For instance, Gramajo-Maldonado paid Halbert $40 a week to live in her
trailer and have sex with her 14-year-old daughter. Halbert knew that men were
having sex with her daughters; she provided her daughters with condoms, would
intervene when a customer wouldn’t pay, and would sometimes keep the money.
A grand jury charged Halbert with two counts of child sex trafficking. Halbert
pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to both counts.1 The presentence
1 The government indicted Cifuentes-Lopez, his brothers, and Gramajo- Maldonado separately from Halbert. Cifuentes-Lopez pleaded guilty to two counts of child sex trafficking and received a 292-month sentence. See United States v. Cifuentes-Lopez, 40 F.4th 1215, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2022) (affirming sentence). One of Cifuentes-Lopez’s brothers pleaded guilty to two counts of child sex trafficking and one count of unlawful reentry and also received a 292-month sentence. The other 2 Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 3
investigation report (PSR) documented Halbert’s personal history, which included
several extremely violent relationships and struggles with alcohol, methamphetamine,
and an opioid addiction that began after she suffered a miscarriage in 2005.
Psychological testing determined that Halbert has a composite IQ that falls in the
range of mild intellectual disability, causing the psychologist to question Halbert’s
ability to recognize the gravity of the harm caused to her daughters. Halbert also
suffers from severe anxiety and depression.
At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR and set Halbert’s sentencing
range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) at
life in prison, based on a total offense level of 43—the highest available under the
Guidelines.2 Halbert asked the district court to depart or vary downward from the
Guidelines and impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. See 18
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2). The government requested a downward departure to a sentence
of 10 to 15 years based on Halbert’s substantial assistance in the prosecution of the
men who victimized her and her daughters. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
The district court agreed that a downward departure and a downward variance
were appropriate. It determined that the Guidelines “overstate[d] the criminal
brother pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry and received a six-month sentence. Gramajo-Maldonado pleaded guilty to one count of child sex trafficking and received a 324-month sentence. 2 Halbert had only one criminal-history point, placing her in the lowest criminal-history category, but that did not impact her Guidelines range because an offense level of 43 always produces a Guidelines range of life in prison. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. 3 Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 4
culpability of the defendant in this atypical case,” emphasizing that Halbert’s conduct
resulted “not so much from malice . . . but [from] an absence of care and basic good
judgment.” Supp. R. vol. 2, 23. The district court also cited Halbert’s substantial
assistance to the government, her mild intellectual disability, and her drug and
alcohol addiction as reasons for a downward departure. See § 5K1.1; U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.3 (“Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted, if such conditions . . . are present to an unusual degree and
distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the [G]uidelines.”).
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Halbert’s conduct warranted
punishment because she “did not protect her children from being raped and
prostituted . . . and even, to some extent, facilitated or participated in the trafficking
of her daughters by supplying condoms and taking some of the money that they were
making.” Supp. R. vol. 2, 24–25. The district court thus concluded that a sentence of
18 years on each count, to run concurrently, was sufficient.
Halbert now appeals, asserting that this sentence is substantively unreasonable.
“Substantive review ‘involves whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given
all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).’”3 United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir.
3 Those factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public; the kinds of sentences available; any “pertinent” policy statements; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. § 3553(a). 4 Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 5
2008) (quoting United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007)). We
review the substantive reasonableness of sentences for abuse of discretion. Id. at
1214. Under this deferential standard of review, we uphold a district court’s decision
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United
States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 1999)). We also presume a below-
Guidelines sentence like Halbert’s is reasonable, “and the defendant faces a hefty
burden to rebut the presumption of reasonableness in this context.” United States v.
Carter, 941 F.3d 954, 961 (10th Cir. 2019).
Halbert argues that “[h]er unique and calamitous history, mental deficiencies,
and personal characteristics alone warrant a lower sentence.” Aplt. Br. 12. But the
district court considered these items, citing Halbert’s extreme poverty, addiction, and
borderline intellectual functioning as evidence that Halbert deserved a below-
Guidelines sentence. The district court’s decision to impose a sentence significantly
below the Guidelines—though not as low as Halbert requested—was not arbitrary or
unreasonable.
Halbert also argues that her sentence creates an improper disparity between her
sentence and those similarly situated but more culpable. In support, Halbert cites
nationwide sentencing statistics for sex-abuse and child-sex-trafficking offenses. But,
as the government points out, Halbert didn’t present these statistics or this argument
to the district court. This is fatal to her challenge because a sentencing court cannot
abuse its discretion by failing to consider information it did not have. Verlo v.
5 Appellate Case: 24-6181 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 6
Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1125 (10th Cir. 2016) (“We will not hold that the district
court abused its discretion based on evidence not before it when it ruled.”).
Halbert thus cannot rebut the presumption of reasonableness attached to her
below-Guidelines sentence. See Carter, 941 F.3d at 961. We affirm.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge