United States v. Gurrola-Rodriguez

268 F. App'x 732
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMarch 6, 2008
Docket06-4192
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 268 F. App'x 732 (United States v. Gurrola-Rodriguez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Gurrola-Rodriguez, 268 F. App'x 732 (10th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

Efren Gurrola-Rodriguez (Gurrola) moved to suppress evidence obtained from the wiretap of his telephone claiming the government failed to prove the statutory necessity requirement. The district court denied the motion. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Dui’ing the spx’ing of 2004, Special Agent David Crosby with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began investigating a woman suspected of being a methamphetamine drug dealer in the Salt Lake City region of Utah. Through a confidential source, Agent Crosby learned that Silvia Uribe was the dealer. Over the next several months, Agent Crosby conducted multiple undercover controlled buys with Uribe and her husband Alberto Camerana. With each successive transaction Agent Crosby would increase the amount purchased and attempt to place time pressures on Uribe in order to discover her source of supply. Additionally, undercover officers obtained records detailing the calls made by Uribe and Camerana on their telephones and placed a global positioning satellite tracking device on Uribe’s car.

By mid-August the DEA was still unable to determine Uribe’s source of supply. The DEA submitted an application for a wiretap of two phones subscribed to Cam-erana. Agent Crosby’s supporting affidavit detailed the investigation up to that point and explained a wiretap was necessary to discover Uribe’s supplier. The wiretap application was granted.

In a relatively short period of time the DEA was able to determine through the use of the wiretaps that Gurrola was connected to Uribe and Camerana’s drug dealing. After monitox-ing several calls placed between Uribe and her suspected supplier, the DEA was able to isolate the phone number being used by her supplier. Physical surveillance established the number was being used by Gurrola. 1 On September 13, 2004, the DEA submitted an application for a wiretap of the phone connected to that number and identified Gur-rola as one of the targets of the investigation. The reviewing court approved the application. Five additional wiretap applications targeting Gurrola were subsequently submitted and approved.

*734 After several months of continued investigation, the DEA was unable to penetrate the group further. A fourteen-count indictment was filed on November 18, 2004, naming six defendants including Uribe, Camerana and Gurrola. Gurrola was only named in Count 7, charging him with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Gur-rola filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence obtained through the several wiretaps on the telephone used by him. Gurrola argued, inter alia, the government failed to meet the statutory requirement of proving the wiretaps were necessary. Gurrola requested a hearing in order to prove the government failed to meet its burden of necessity, claiming the affidavits in support of the wiretap applications were false or deliberately misleading. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Gurrola’s motion to suppress. It concluded each of the wiretap applications targeting Gurrola was supported by a sufficient showing of necessity.

A jury convicted Gurrola and he was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. He appeals generally from that judgment and sentence, but in particular from the denial of his motion to suppress.

II. DISCUSSION

When the government seeks to obtain a wiretap, it must provide to the court a “full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c). If the judge is convinced, it may issue an ex parte order authorizing the wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).

Gurrola argues the government failed to prove the wiretap of his phone was necessary. “We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s determination that a wiretap was necessary.” United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.2002). 2 The “defendant bears the burden of proving that a wiretap is invalid once it has been authorized.” Id. “If a defendant succeeds in showing that the necessity requirement was not met, evidence seized pursuant to the wiretap must be suppressed.” United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir.2003).

“The purpose of the ‘necessity requirement is to ensure that the relatively intrusive device of wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.” United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222 n. 1. Generally, normal investigative procedures include:

(1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search warrants; and (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants. In addition, if other normal investigative techniques such as pen registers or trap and trace devices have not been tried, a similar explanation must be offered as to why *735 they also would be unsuccessful or too dangerous.

Id. “[T]he government may obtain a wiretapping warrant without trying any other methods of investigation, if it demonstrates that normal investigatory techniques reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous to try.” Id.

Gurrola does not claim the first wiretap application of Uribe and Camerana’s phones was improper. Rather, he argues the second wiretap — obtained on September 13, 2004 — and its fruits should have been suppressed by the district court because the narcotics agents had not utilized normal investigative techniques before seeking the wiretap. 3 Relying on United States v. Mondragon, Gurrola argues the affidavit in support of his phone’s wiretap lacked the requisite analysis of alternative investigative procedures which were used or considered by law enforcement against him.

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Bluebook (online)
268 F. App'x 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-gurrola-rodriguez-ca10-2008.