United States v. Green

69 F.2d 921, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3710
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 5, 1934
DocketNo. 9489
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 69 F.2d 921 (United States v. Green) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Green, 69 F.2d 921, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3710 (8th Cir. 1934).

Opinion

STONE, Circuit Judge.

The statute creating war risk insurance (40 Stat. 398, 409) provides for insurance against death or “total permanent disability.” This insurance was voluntary and a matter of contract. It was in force during the life of the contract (the policy). Therefore, to entitle to recovery thereunder the insured must (where death is not involved) establish “total permanent disability” during the life of the contract [Lumbra v. United States (January 8, 1934) 54 S. Ct. 272, 78 L. Ed. -]; and, in this court [United States v. Cornell, 63 F.(2d) 180; United States v. Peters, 62 F.(2d) 977, 978; United States v. Harth, 61 F.(2d) 541, 543]. Whether a claimed disability was “total permanent” and was such during the life of the contract a,re questions of fact. The initial determination of these fact questions is placed by the statute (40 Stat. 398, 410) in the bureau of war risk insurance with provision for judicial determination in case of disagreement in the bureau. To aid the bureau in performing its duties, the statute (40 Stat. 39S, 399) authorized the director of the [922]*922bureau to make rules and regulations covering various matters including “the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence * * * to establish the right to benefits of * * * insurance provided for in this Act.” In pursuance of that power and to define the meaning of the terms “total” and “permanent” (as applied to disability), the director ruled (T. D. 20 W. R.) that “any impairment of mind or body which renders it impossible for the disabled person to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation shall be deemed * * * to be total disability. Total disability shall he deemed to be permanent whenever it is founded upon conditions which render it reasonably certain that it will continue throughout the life of the person suffering from it.” While “the above-quoted administrative decision is not, and manifestly was not intended to be, an exact definition of total permanent disability or the sole guide by which that' expression is to be construed” (Lumbra v. United States, 54 S. Ct. 272, 276, 78 L. Ed.-, decided January 8, 1934), and while such definition is, obviously, not binding upon courts, yet it has been found useful and has influenced many decisions on this character of insurance. In the Lumbra Case, supra, it is well said: “The various meanings inhering in the phrase make impossible the ascertainment of any fixed rules or formuke uniformly to govern its construction.” About all that can be said is that the phrase is “to be construed reasonably and having regard to the circumstances of each ease,” remembering that “ 'total disability’ does not mean helplessness or complete disability, but it includes more than that which is partial” and “ 'permanent disability’ means that which is continuing as opposed to what is temporary. Separate and distinct periods of temporary disability do not constitute that which is permanent” (Lumbra Case).

The experience of the courts in considering “the circumstances of each case” has developed that certain lines of evidence are, from their very nature, nearly always present and are important. One of these is the character of disability when considered in connection with the individuality of the person disabled., The disability may be of a character (violent insanity for example) which would “totally” disable any person, regardless of differences in individuality. Often, however, the disability is of a kind that its extent depends more largely upon the individuality than upon the character of the disability. Thus the loss of both legs might totally disable a common laborer with slight education and with little stamina and initiative while it would have relatively slight effect upon the earning capacity of a college teacher. Thus the individuality of a claimant may be an important and even a controlling element in the circumstances of his particular ease. Another line of evidence has to do with the claimant’s condition after the lapse of the contract. While such evidence “may be considered only for the purpose of determining his condition while the contract was in force” (Lumbra Case), it, obviously, has a direct bearing upon the permanency of the injury and often upon the totality at the time of the lapse. In consideration of this character of evidence, it is necessary to bear in mind that conditions which may have existed during the contract may be only earlier stages of some ailment which progressively grows worse until after lapse of the contract it causes, for the first time, total and permanent disability. Thus it not infrequently happens that a total permanent disability clearly shown to exist at the time of trial became such-only after, sometimes long after, the contract lapsed.

With the above general observations in mind, we consider the evidence here as to the circumstances of this particular claimant. This evidence shows that appellant was a healthy, strong young farm hand when he volunteered in June, 1917. His educational qualifications are not shown. He was a man of character who wanted to do a man’s part. In April, 1918, he was severely injured while he and other soldiers were carrying a heavy pontoon bridge boat. Some of the other men released their support resulting in the weight of the boat, unexpectedly, crushing him to the ground. The boat was lifted from him and he was taken to the company doctor who examined him but lacked X-ray equipment to ascertain the extent of injury. He recognized that appellant was severely injured but diagnosed merely as “traumatism” and thought the injury would last several years. He taped the body and appellant was confined to his tent for about three weeks during much of which he was lying down. At first, he ,was unable to stand but became better. After he recovered so as to leave the tent, he was unable to do the heavy work required of the engineers regiment (to which he was attached). Therefore, he was transferred (over his protest) to the headquarters regiment, where the work was lighter. His history after leaving his tent and up to his discharge from the army, in June, 1919, is as [923]*923shown in the footnote1. After his discharge from the army, he worked for Mason Brown. Thereafter, he tried farming on several farms —successively the Pipol farm (1920-1921), the Johnson farm (1922-1924), the Coleman farm (1925), and the Conservative farm [924]*924(1926-1927). The testimony as to these operations is as in footnote2

Aftet leaving the last above farm, he moved to Gallatin, Mo., -where he attempted some lig-ht work and then went to Winston, Mo., where he attempted to operate a res[929]*929taurant. His last attempt was with a farm near Winston. The testimony covering’ the lime in Gallatin, in Winston, and on the farm near Winston is as sot out in footnote 3. The [930]*930medical testimony is as set out in footnote 4. The outline of testimony stated in this opinion and footnotes is entirely from testimony of witnesses placed on the stand by plaintiff and none of whom were hostile to him. The defendant presented testimony, both lay and [931]*931medieal, to tlxe contrary, but we Iiave taken, no account thereof.

Taking the ease thus made by plaintiff and drawing such reasonable deductions therefrom in his favor as seem justified, we think the situation is, concisely stated, as follows: The injury from the fall of the boat upon plaintiff is the source and cause of his subsequent trouble and condition.

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Bluebook (online)
69 F.2d 921, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3710, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-green-ca8-1934.