United States v. Cornell

63 F.2d 180, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 3357
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 14, 1933
DocketNo. 9593
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 63 F.2d 180 (United States v. Cornell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cornell, 63 F.2d 180, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 3357 (8th Cir. 1933).

Opinion

KENYON, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in fa.vor of appellee on a war risk insurance policy. Appellee will be designated' as plaintiff; appellant as defendant. The only error assigned is the action of the court in overruling defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the close of' all the evidence.

Plaintiff enlisted in the Army of the United States in June, 1918, and'wus honorably discharged therefrom August 16, 1919.

The instructions of the court are not in the record, but plaintiff seems to have rested his ease on the proposition that he was totally and permanently disabled at the time of his discharge August 16, 1919, although the contract of insurance did not lapse until January 1, 1923.

Our inquiry here is whether the jury’s verdict of total and permanent disability at the date of his discharge is based on substantial evidence. The burden was upon plaintiff to establish total, permanent disability while the policy was in effect. Blair v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 47 F.(2d) 109; United States v. Le Duc (C. C. A, 8) 48 P.(2d) 789; Eggen v. United States (C. C. A. 8) 58 P.(2d) 616.

In considering the question before us, the evidence introduced by plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable consideration that can fairly be accorded it.

Tn the natural sympathy which all feel for,, disabled soldiers there is a humane tendency to regard this war risk insurance as in the nature of a bounty from a grateful gov-[181]*181eminent, but it is not, and these policies of insurance are contracts, and must be so dealt with.

The courts have quite generally adopted the definition of the Treasury Department that total disability is “any impairment of mind or body which renders it impossible for the disabled person to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation.” United States v. Perry (C. C. A. 8) 55 F.(2d) 819, 821; United States v. Harth (C. C. A. 8) 61 F.(2d) 541; Eggen v. United States (C. C. A.) 58 F.(2d) 616, where the recent cases are quite fully cited.

Of course, the total disability must become permanent before the policy lapses. Permanency developing thereafter cannot resurrect a dead polipy. The terms of this definition have been given a rational and reasonable interpretation by the courts, for difficulties arise in any literal interpretation of some of the words or phrases employed, such as the words “impossible,” “continuously,” and the term “any substantially gainful occupation.” In Nicolay v. United States (C. C. A. 10) 51 F.(2d) 170, 173, the court, referring to the use of the word “impossible,” said “it cannot fairly be said that it is ‘possible’ for an insured to work because, under the stimulus of a strong will power, it isi physically possible for him to stick to a task, if the work is done at the risk of substantially aggravating his condition.” See Barksdale v. United States (C. C. A. 10) 46 F.(2d) 762; United States v. Perry (C. C. A. 8) 55 F.(2d) 819; United States v. McGill (C. C. A. 8) 56 F.(2d) 522. In United States v. Fly (C. C. A. 8) 58 F.(2d) 217, Judge Stone uses the phrase “inability to follow eontinu- ■ ously,” etc., instead of “impossible to follow continuously,” etc., which perhaps is more accurate.

The word “continuously” as used in the ■ definition of total disability is generally construed to mean with reasonable regularity in contradistinction to spasmodically following a gainful occupation. Spasmodically is not continuously. Ford v. United States (C. C. A. 1) 44 F.(2d) 754; Carter v. United States (C. C. A. 4) 49 F.(2d) 221; White et al. v. United States (C. C. A. 5) 53 F.(2d) 565; United States v. Perry (C. C. A. 8) 55 F.(2d) 819; United States v. Peet (C. C. A. 10) 59 F.(2d) 728; United States v. Harth (C. C. A. 8) 61 F.(2d) 541.

“Substantially gainful occupation” as used in the definition means any occupation for which insured is by nature fitted or competent to follow which will enable him ordinarily to make a living for himself. Barks-dale v. United States, supra; United States v. Perry, supra. The performing of some work does not in itself show that a party was not totally disabled. The test is the ability to work without serious peril to the life or health, or as said in United States v. Harth, supra, at page 544 of 61 F.(2d), “without the risk of substantially aggravating the ailment with which he is afflicted.” United States v. Eliasson (C. C. A. 9) 20 F.(2d) 821; United States v. Phillips (C. C. A. 8) 44 F.(2d) 689; United States v. Rasar (C. C. A. 9) 45 F.(2d) 545; Sorvik v. United States (C. C. A. 9) 52 F.(2d) 406; United States v. Perry (C. C. A. 8) 55 F.(2d) 819.

Total disability is permanent if conditions; are such that there is a reasonable certainty of its continuing throughout sufferer’s life. Eggen v. United States, supra.

With these general legal principles in mind we turn to the evidence. On November 1, 1918, plaintiff, while serving in the United States Army in Franco, suffered a severe shrapnel wound on his left shoulder. The wound was a penetrating one from the base of the neck on the left side of the seventh cervical and • dorsal vertebra. His wound broke open after he got home, and the same discharged pus and was sore and feverish for some time. He had more or less trouble with it, and there were a number of operations between August 16, 1919, and 1932. The first one was serious, the last a minor affair. All were in connection with the wound. Dr. Wagener operated on him the first time. Thereafter Dr. Henry performed the operations. He was the main medical witness for plaintiff, and testified in part as follows:

■ “I treated him at that time from August, 1920 to May 1, 1921. His history as given to me was that he received this wound in one of the battles in France, the shrapnel went in one side of his neck and came out his back; he was treated on the battlefield and it apparently healed until this time but was always more or less sore and gave him more or less trouble; then it became acutely inflamed and required a further operation.

“I have here a record of seven operations and they would vary. He would be in the hospital from three or four days to two or three weeks each time depending on the severity of the infection at that time.

“The first operation was August 12, 1920, and the last one was January 3, 1930, that is ten years. * * *

[182]*182“There was always more or less stuffing off of the bone. That is what we call osteomyelitis. That condition was not there every time, possibly half of the time there would be a stuffing of the bone. It would have to be scraped off or chiseled off or taken out in some way. The shrapnel apparently were in this point (indicating the top 'shoulder wound) and of course he had his clothing on and it shot the clothing through a part of it and it came back in there (indicating the back wound) and it was my.job to get a pieee of the clothing or a pieee of a bullet or dead bone that had sluffed off as a result of the infection out of the wound, and I had actually pieked out some pieces of the clothing and pieces of bone out of this wound during those operations. * * *

“Sometimes we would have to put him in the hospital for two or three weeks and sometimes there would be a month or two he could do light work.

“He has been sick off and on and then he would have spells off and on and then have a month or two when he would be pretty well and then he would go back to his work but I never would say he was a well man but is a man that will have to watch his comers.

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Bluebook (online)
63 F.2d 180, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 3357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cornell-ca8-1933.