United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1070
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
CARLOS GONZALEZ,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark G. Mastroianni, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí and Rikelman, Circuit Judges, and Katzmann,* Judge.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellant.
Linda J. Thompson, with whom James R. Goodhines, Goodhines Law Offices, and Thompson & Thompson, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
August 26, 2024
* Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. After the government searched
the house where Carlos Gonzalez lived for evidence of an illegal
pill-making operation, Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence
found during the search. The district court granted his motion,
concluding that the critical facts supporting the search warrant
application were too "stale" and that the affidavit was otherwise
so bare bones that no reasonable officer could have relied on the
warrant. The court pointed out that according to the affidavit,
the mastermind of the pill-making operation had moved out of that
same house four and a half months earlier, there was little (if
any) suspicious activity at the house after his move, and the
pill-making equipment was highly portable.
The government appeals, arguing that the facts in the
affidavit were enough to justify a finding of probable cause, and,
in any event, they were not so conclusory that a reasonable officer
could not rely on the warrant. Thus, the government asks us to
reverse the district court's ruling suppressing the evidence from
the search.
We agree with the government. Although we elect to
bypass the district court's probable-cause determination, which we
view as a close call, we find that a reasonable officer could have
relied on the warrant in good faith. As the government argues,
based on the facts in the affidavit, a reasonable officer could
have concluded that the leader of the pill-making operation had
-2- every reason to keep the operation where it had been successful
for years -- the house where Gonzalez continued to live. Thus, we
vacate the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and
remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Before diving into the details of the lengthy search
warrant affidavit, we summarize the key facts. On January 20,
2022, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Scott
Smith applied for a warrant to search a three-story, two-family
house at 8 Mereline Avenue in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts. In
his affidavit supporting the warrant application, he described the
DEA's four-year investigation into a pill-making operation that
distributed counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl and
heroin. According to Smith, the operation ran out of two
locations: the 8 Mereline Avenue house, owned by Michael Matos and
his wife Neysha, and an auto-repair shop in nearby Agawam, owned
by Hector Ramos.
Smith went on to describe how Michael Matos oversaw the
production of the counterfeit pills in the basement of 8 Mereline
Avenue. According to Smith, Matos used tableting machines and
binding agents to process heroin and fentanyl into pills. To make
the pills resemble oxycodone tablets, Matos used dyes and imprinted
the pills with letters and numbers that typically signify certain
dosages of oxycodone. Smith explained that Gonzalez and Matos
-3- then supplied the fentanyl and heroin pills to Ramos, who stored
the pills and sold them from his auto-repair shop.
Critically for this case, Matos and his wife lived on
the second floor of 8 Mereline Avenue until September 2021, when
they moved to a new home about fifteen minutes away in Somers,
Connecticut. The Matos family continued to own 8 Mereline Avenue
and visit the house after they relocated, and no one else moved
into the second-floor unit. Meanwhile, Gonzalez, who had lived on
the first floor of 8 Mereline Avenue since at least June 2020,
continued to reside in the house with his girlfriend Kiara
Rodriguez-Santiago, including on the date of the search in late
January 2022.
In his warrant application to the magistrate judge,
Smith sought to search both 8 Mereline Avenue and Ramos's auto-body
shop. He stated that there was probable cause to believe that
both locations were being used in connection with a drug operation
and that drugs, paraphernalia for processing and distributing
drugs, and cash proceeds would be found in both places.
DEA agents executed the search warrant for 8 Mereline
Avenue on January 25, 2022. They seized, among other things,
5,000-6,000 counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl, two
firearms, two magazines with several rounds of ammunition, and
equipment and supplies for making counterfeit pills. This
-4- equipment included pill-press parts, dye molds for stamping pills,
and counterfeit oxycodone labels.
With this factual overview in place, we proceed to
discuss the details of the DEA investigation as described in
Smith's affidavit, citing "only those facts necessary to put the
probable-cause [and good-faith] issue into workable perspective."
United States v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 2016).
A. The DEA Investigation
Federal agents began to investigate Matos's pill-making
operation in early 2018, four years before the warrant was issued,
when pills containing heroin were discovered inside a toolbox
repossessed from Matos. Those pills were marked with "M" on one
side and "30" on the other -- the same markings used by an
FDA-registered drug manufacturer for its thirty milligram
oxycodone tablets. A few months later, officers with the East
Longmeadow Police Department, who were helping with the federal
investigation, conducted two traffic stops near "the area" of 8
Mereline Avenue. During the first stop, officers recovered
counterfeit oxycodone tablets. During the second stop, an officer
discovered about twelve grams of heroin in the possession of a
driver who had links to Matos.
Smith's affidavit in support of the search warrant
features accounts from two confidential informants (CIs),
including one who saw Matos's operation in action in the basement
-5- of 8 Mereline Avenue. The two CIs cooperated with law enforcement
after they were arrested on April 5, 2021, in connection with a
separate fentanyl-pill-processing operation in Springfield,
Massachusetts. One of the informants (CI-2) explained that, in
early 2020, he and his partner (CI-1) learned that a person named
"Mikey" was making a significant profit from manufacturing and
selling counterfeit oxycodone tablets -- an operation that they
decided to replicate. CI-2 first met Mikey at Ramos's auto-repair
shop, where Mikey brought out a tableting machine and showed CI-2
how it worked. CI-2 stated that Mikey carried the tableting
machine in a large suitcase wrapped in a comforter and that he had
a second suitcase that contained "all of the other processing
equipment." CI-2 then explained how he met with Mikey three times
at Mikey's residence. Each time he went to Mikey's residence,
CI-2 brought ten to twenty grams of heroin, which Mikey would mix
and process into counterfeit oxycodone tablets using a pill-press
machine in the basement, charging CI-2 between eight and nine
dollars per pill. Using a map on an agent's cell phone, CI-2
showed agents that Mikey's residence was on Mereline Avenue.
According to CI-2, the last time he met with Mikey on Mereline
Avenue was in April or May of 2020, about one year and nine months
before the search warrant here was issued.
CI-1 corroborated CI-2's account. He told agents that
he and CI-2 had been manufacturing counterfeit oxycodone tablets
-6- for about one year -- so, since around April 2020. He explained
that they learned how to make fake pills on the internet and with
the help of a person named Mikey, who met with CI-2, owned a BMW
and a Tesla, and lived "in the area of" the Friendly's Restaurant
in East Longmeadow. To put CI-1's information in context, Smith
explained in his affidavit that 8 Mereline Avenue is located about
0.3 miles from the Friendly's Restaurant in East Longmeadow and
that Neysha Matos owns a 2014 BMW and a 2015 Tesla. Based on the
accounts of CI-1 and CI-2, Smith believed that "Mikey" referred to
Michael Matos and that the residence where CI-2 observed a
pill-making operation was 8 Mereline Avenue.
In addition to detailing the accounts by CI-1 and CI-2,
Smith described how pill-making equipment was ordered or sent to
8 Mereline Avenue in 2020 and 2021. In December 2020, Customs and
Border Patrol officers seized a pill-press machine that was en
route to Neysha Matos at 8 Mereline Avenue. In February 2021,
Kiara Rodriguez-Santiago ordered a pill-press punch set to be
shipped to 8 Mereline Avenue, and in May 2021, Gonzalez ordered
two pill-press punch sets to be shipped there.
Importantly for our purposes, Matos and his wife
purchased a new home in Somers, Connecticut in July 2021. And on
September 6, 2021, about four and a half months before the search
warrant was issued, they moved from 8 Mereline Avenue into this
new home.
-7- Agents continued to surveil 8 Mereline Avenue after
Matos and his wife moved out, but the activity they saw at the
house in the next several months was much more limited, especially
after mid-September. On September 13, 2021, agents observed Matos
and Gonzalez leave the home in a blue pickup truck registered to
Gonzalez and drive to Ramos's shop. There, Matos and Gonzalez met
with Ramos and went inside his office. About fifteen minutes
later, Gonzalez and an unidentified man wearing a fanny pack across
his chest drove back to 8 Mereline Avenue in a truck registered to
Neysha Matos. Three days later, on September 16, Gonzalez and
three others drove from Ramos's shop to a Walmart in Westfield,
Massachusetts, where Gonzalez paid about $460 in cash for items
that Smith stated were commonly used to process narcotics.
Gonzalez and the others then drove to a home on Norman Street in
Springfield, Massachusetts, at which point the truck backed into
the driveway, close to an open garage door, and everyone exited.
Three minutes later, they all got back into the truck and drove to
8 Mereline Avenue.
After these two events in mid-September 2021, Smith's
affidavit documents less frequent activity at 8 Mereline Avenue.
Much of the activity that is described is not obviously related to
illegal pill making. Smith relayed that in November 2021, about
two and a half months before the search warrant was issued, Matos
spent about six hours at 8 Mereline Avenue. Matos then left the
-8- house with another individual, who was never identified, each
carrying an Amazon box. About forty minutes after Matos left, a
car drove up and parked in front of 8 Mereline Avenue. That car
was registered at the same address provided by the driver who was
stopped by the police near the house in 2018 with heroin in his
car. An unidentified man got out of the car and walked down the
driveway, though the affidavit contains no other details about the
visit. Then, on January 6, 2022, agents observed Matos drive a
pickup truck registered to Gonzalez to a hardware store and return
to 8 Mereline Avenue. Although Smith obtained a copy of Matos's
receipt, the affidavit does not specify what Matos bought at the
store. Also on January 6 (and at other times over the "several
weeks" preceding the search), agents saw a Tesla parked on the
street; that car was purchased by Matos and another person who
lived on 49 Norman Street in Springfield -- the home where Gonzalez
had stopped after he purchased alleged drug-processing supplies in
September. But again, Smith did not describe in his affidavit any
interactions between the occupants of the Tesla and anyone at 8
Mereline Avenue.
Finally, Smith discussed controlled purchases that
another confidential informant (CI-3) made at Ramos's shop
throughout the investigation. The purchase closest in time to the
search warrant application occurred during the week of December 6,
2021, when CI-3 purchased counterfeit oxycodone pills stamped with
-9- "M" on one side and "30" on the other -- like the pills found in
the toolbox repossessed from Matos in 2018.
Smith concluded his affidavit with information about
Michael and Neysha Matos's bank accounts. According to Smith, the
account records revealed large cash deposits throughout 2020 and
2021 -- money that could not be traced to a legitimate source of
income.
B. Gonzalez's Indictment and Motion to Suppress
After the search and seizure of pills and firearms from
8 Mereline Avenue on January 25, 2022, a grand jury indicted
Gonzalez on (1) one count of possession with intent to distribute
400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vi), and (2) one count of possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
Gonzalez then moved to suppress the evidence seized
during the search. He argued that Smith's affidavit relied on
stale information and failed to show a sufficient nexus between 8
Mereline Avenue and evidence of drug activity.
The district court granted Gonzalez's motion to
suppress. In a detailed opinion, it held that the affidavit did
not demonstrate probable cause to believe that evidence of an
illegal pill-making operation would be found at 8 Mereline Avenue
in late January 2022. United States v. Gonzalez, No. 22-30027,
-10- 2023 WL 8789287, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2023). The court
determined that "[a]lthough the affidavit provided some connection
between the residence and suspected criminal activity in 2020 and
mid-2021, this information was too stale by the time the government
applied for the search warrant." Id.
The district court found no probable cause for three
main reasons. First, it focused on the Matos family's move from
Mereline Avenue to Connecticut in September 2021. Id. The court
acknowledged that the affidavit "intricately and amply link[ed]
Michael and Neysha Matos to 8 Mereline Avenue and suspicious
activity indicative of an illegal drug operation," but it
determined that the events creating that link occurred before the
move. Id. The court found that this time gap, combined with the
move, was "critical and . . . fatal to the probable cause
determination." Id. In its view, the affidavit lacked facts
suggesting that evidence of pill making would still be kept at 8
Mereline Avenue in late January 2022, months after the move and
years after CI-2 saw the operation in action in the basement. Id.
Second, the court explained that the affidavit indicated that the
pill-press punches and tableting machines were highly portable.
Id. According to CI-2, Matos could transport the tableting machine
and the other processing equipment in two suitcases. Id. Third,
the court noted that the affidavit identified other places where
Matos easily could have relocated the pill-making equipment:
-11- Ramos's auto-body shop and his new Connecticut home. Id. at *7.
The court further determined that the events recounted in the
affidavit that occurred in the four and a half months before the
search -- such as Gonzalez's trip to Walmart in September 2021 and
Matos's visit to Mereline Avenue in January 2022 -- did not revive
the out-of-date information or establish a tangible link between
the drug operation and 8 Mereline Avenue. Id. at *7-9.
Although deeming it a "much closer question," the
district court also concluded that the good-faith exception set
out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), could not save
the search. Id. at *9. In its view, "the affidavit represent[ed]
the type of 'bare bones' or conclusory showing which does not
satisfy the good[-]faith exception" because "the connection
between 8 Mereline Avenue and any recent criminal activity was
extremely thin, bordering on non-existent." Id. (quoting Leon,
468 U.S. at 915, 926). Because staleness is a fundamental defect,
the court explained, an objectively reasonable officer would have
realized that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.
Id. at *9-10. It thus held that suppression of the evidence was
the appropriate remedy. Id. at *10.
The government's timely appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion
about whether a given set of facts amounts to probable cause.
-12- United States v. Perez Soto, 80 F.4th 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2023).
Similarly, we review de novo the applicability of the Leon good-
faith exception. United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64,
72 (1st Cir. 2015).
III. DISCUSSION
The government argues that the district court legally
erred in concluding that the facts in Smith's affidavit were stale
and thus could not support a finding of probable cause. It also
contends that even if the affidavit failed to establish probable
cause, it was not so bare bones or conclusory that no objectively
reasonable officer could have relied on the search warrant. For
that reason, the government urges us to exercise our discretion to
bypass the probable-cause issue and reverse on the ground that the
officers' conduct in this case is covered by the Leon good-faith
exception.
We agree with the government that we can bypass the
probable-cause finding and proceed straight to the Leon good-faith
issue here. Thus, we assume arguendo that the affidavit failed to
establish probable cause that evidence of the pill-making
operation would be found at 8 Mereline Avenue in late January 2022.
And we focus our analysis instead on "consideration of the
officers' good faith." Leon, 468 U.S. at 925 (recognizing the
appropriateness of such an approach in some cases and reversing
based on application of the good-faith test, without disturbing
-13- the district court's finding of no probable cause); see also United
States v. Robinson, 359 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2004) (declining to
decide whether warrant was supported by probable cause and instead
affirming on the ground that affiant acted in objective good faith
in applying for warrant); United States v. Beckett, 321 F.3d 26,
32-33 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2003) (taking same approach); United States
v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 744-45 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing that,
under Leon, "courts have discretion to consider the issue of
officers' good faith without first addressing Fourth Amendment
issues" and assuming in defendant's favor that probable cause did
not support search before turning to good faith).
Before diving into the Leon analysis, however, we
briefly address a threshold issue. Gonzalez claims that the
government waived its probable-cause-bypass argument because it
did not mention this possible approach to the district court. But
the government argued to the district court, as it does on appeal,
that the good-faith exception applies and the evidence need not be
suppressed, even if the affidavit lacked probable cause. And its
argument that we can reverse on good-faith grounds is one it could
make only on appeal. So, there was no waiver by the government
here.
We turn now to the good-faith analysis. Ultimately, we
conclude that the Leon good-faith exception applies. We part ways
with the district court's careful opinion because we conclude that
-14- it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that
Matos's pill-making operation was still underway at its
longstanding home base in early 2022. We reach this conclusion
based on several key facts in the affidavit: Matos still owned 8
Mereline Avenue and continued to live nearby and visit; the
remaining occupants of 8 Mereline Avenue were Gonzalez and his
girlfriend, who also appeared to be involved in the operation; and
the pill-making operation had operated successfully from 8
Mereline Avenue for years, and thus, an objectively reasonable
officer could have concluded that Matos had little reason to move
it.
A. The Probable-Cause Standard
To explain why an objectively reasonable officer could
have believed that probable cause supported the warrant, we lay
out the relevant standard. "An application for a warrant must
demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been
committed -- the 'commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence
of the offense will be found at the place searched -- the so-called
'nexus' element." United States v. Roman, 942 F.3d 43, 50 (1st
Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st
Cir. 2015)). As to the nexus element, the magistrate judge must
"make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
-15- in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983); see also Rivera, 825 F.3d at 63 (explaining that "'fair
probability' is another way of saying 'reasonable likelihood'").
Fair probability is less than a more-likely-than not standard.
United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir. 1999).
Importantly, the "commission" and "nexus" elements of
the probable-cause inquiry "each include a temporal component."
United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 1996).
Thus, the magistrate judge must "consider the accuracy and
reliability of the historical facts related in the affidavits."
Id. But the magistrate judge also must determine "whether the
totality of the circumstances reasonably inferable from the
affidavit[]" establishes a fair probability that evidence of the
crime will be found in the place to be searched "at about the time
the search warrant would issue, rather than at some remote time."
Id. Information in an affidavit is stale if it "establishe[s]
probable cause at some point in the past but does not support
probable cause at the time of the warrant's issuance." United
States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir. 2015).
Under the exclusionary rule, when a magistrate judge
issues a warrant that is not supported by probable cause, the
evidence obtained from the search is usually suppressed. United
States v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2023). That is,
unless the Leon good-faith exception applies.
-16- B. The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
Suppression of evidence from an illegal search is
"inappropriate . . . if the officer who conducted the search acted
in reliance upon the defective warrant and that reliance was
objectively reasonable." Id. This rule is known as the
"good-faith exception." Id. It is based on the principle that,
"[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it,
and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system." Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 144 (2009). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen the
police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent'
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of
exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs."
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (quoting Herring,
555 U.S. at 144). On the other hand, "when the police act with an
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is
lawful . . . or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated
negligence[,] . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force, and exclusion cannot pay its way." Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The government bears the "heavy burden" of showing that
its officers acted with objective good faith. United States v.
Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013). In assessing whether the
-17- government has met this burden, "we evaluate all of the attendant
circumstances at the time of the warrant application and its
execution." United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.
2001).
With this background in place, we turn to Smith's search
warrant affidavit.
1. Was Smith's Affidavit Conclusory or Bare Bones?
We start with the issue on which the parties focus most
of their attention: whether the affidavit here was "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause" that an officer's belief that probable
cause existed was "entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d
327, 334 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that a "bare bones affidavit"
on which it is objectively unreasonable for an officer to rely is
one that "provide[s] the magistrate [judge] with only the
suspicions and conclusions of the officer" without underlying
factual information in support). The government argues that an
objectively reasonable officer could have believed the search
warrant was valid because, even accounting for Matos's move, the
affidavit contained detailed information linking the pill-making
operation to 8 Mereline Avenue about four and a half months before
the search. According to the government, given the long-running
nature of the operation and the lack of facts suggesting that Matos
had moved it to his new Connecticut home, it was logical for an
-18- officer to believe that there was a fair probability evidence of
pill making would still be found at Mereline Avenue as of late
January 2022. Gonzalez, by contrast, contends that Matos's move
to a new residence, together with the passage of four and a half
months with no significant criminal activity at 8 Mereline Avenue,
were "obvious and fatal" to probable cause, such that no reasonable
officer could have relied on the warrant.
We hold that the government has met its burden to
demonstrate that the good-faith exception applies. See Beckett,
321 F.3d at 32 (recognizing that an affidavit could be insufficient
for the purpose of probable cause but sufficient for an officer to
rely on in objective good faith). We reach this conclusion for
two main reasons. First, a reasonable officer could infer from
facts in the affidavit that Matos had little incentive to move his
successful, ongoing operation from Mereline Avenue to his new
family home in Connecticut. Second, the staleness issue in this
case is at least a close call, and, as such, we cannot say that it
would be objectively unreasonable for an officer to rely on this
warrant after it was approved by the magistrate judge. Thus, the
affidavit was not so bare bones or conclusory such that it fails
under Leon.
As the district court found, and the parties do not
appear to dispute, ample facts suggested an illegal drug operation
at 8 Mereline Avenue from 2020 until mid-2021, before the Matos
-19- family moved. For example, CI-2 stated that he learned how to
produce counterfeit oxycodone pills in part through visits to
"Mikey's" residence on Mereline Avenue, with the most recent visit
in April or May of 2020. There, he watched "Mikey" mix and process
the heroin CI-2 brought into counterfeit oxycodone tablets using
a pill-press machine and dyes in the basement, charging CI-2 for
each pill produced. Along with relaying CI-2's eyewitness account
of the operation at work, the affidavit stated that one pill-press
punch set was shipped to Rodriguez-Santiago at 8 Mereline Avenue
in February 2021, and two pill-press punch sets were shipped to
Gonzalez there in May 2021.
The district court concluded, however, that these facts
were stale by early 2022. It found that no probable cause existed
to search 8 Mereline Avenue in late January 2022 because Matos had
moved out of the house, there was very little (if any) suspicious
activity at the location after his move, and the pill-making
equipment was highly portable. Gonzalez, 2023 WL 8789287, at *7.
And we agree with the district court that, after mid-September and
until the government applied for the search warrant in January,
the affidavit shows a drop-off in activity indicative of a drug
operation at 8 Mereline Avenue. As the court observed, the
affidavit contains fewer facts identifying 8 Mereline Avenue as a
probable hub for a pill-making operation after the move compared
to 2020 through mid-2021.
-20- But the government persuasively argues that the
magistrate judge was required to evaluate the facts in a
common-sense manner. And reviewing the affidavit's facts through
that lens, a reasonable officer could have concluded that the
warrant was valid because it was unlikely that the head of a drug
operation would move it to his new family home, instead of keeping
it at its existing location where it had functioned for years
without detection (as far as Matos seemingly knew). See
Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d at 114 (examining the inferences an officer
could draw from the totality of circumstances in the affidavit to
determine whether, at the time the warrant was issued, an
objectively reasonable officer would believe that the defendant's
residence was still serving as the site of his drug operations).
Five key facts in the affidavit made it reasonable for
an officer to believe that Matos had every incentive to keep his
drug operation in its long-standing location. First, the Matos
family continued to own the house on Mereline Avenue after they
moved to their new home, only about fifteen minutes away. See
United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 568 (1st Cir. 1996)
(explaining that "[t]he target's ownership of the real estate to
be searched influences the staleness calculus"). Second, 8
Mereline Avenue is located close to Ramos's shop, the other
operational hub identified in the affidavit. Third, Matos
continued to spend time at Mereline Avenue up until the month of
-21- the search, and it did not appear that anyone moved into the second
floor of the house after he and his wife moved out. Fourth,
Gonzalez and Rodriguez-Santiago were connected to the drug
enterprise, and they still lived at 8 Mereline Avenue when the
warrant was issued. Smith's affidavit described Gonzalez's
involvement in the pill-making operation in 2021, including his
purchase of pill-press punch sets in May to be sent to Mereline
Avenue, his multiple trips to Ramos's shop, and his September trip
from Ramos's shop to Walmart to buy alleged drug-processing
supplies. Smith also stated that pill-making equipment under
Rodriguez-Santiago's name was shipped to Mereline Avenue in late
February 2021.
Finally, the affidavit described an ongoing, successful
drug operation that was active one month before the search. See
United States v. Encarnacion, 26 F.4th 490, 498 (1st Cir. 2022)
(explaining that the timeliness of probable cause varies "with the
nature of the suspected offense"); United States v. Nocella, 849
F.2d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing that drug conspiracies
are ongoing operations that "[b]y [their] very nature [and] if
unchecked, [are] apt to persist over relatively long periods of
time").1 For example, in December 2021, CI-3 went to Ramos's shop
1The existence of circuit precedent on this probable cause-related issue is relevant to our assessment of whether it was reasonable for an officer to believe that the warrant was
-22- and purchased counterfeit oxycodone pills that had the same
markings as those found in Matos's toolbox that was repossessed
from him in 2018, when he was living at Mereline Avenue. And bank
records for the Matos family showed hundreds of thousands of
dollars in cash deposits in 2020 and 2021 that could not be traced
to a legitimate source of income.
From the totality of these facts, a reasonable officer
could have believed that Matos would have chosen to keep his
operation at 8 Mereline Avenue, where it had been prosperous for
many years, and that there was a fair probability that evidence of
pill making would be found there at the time of the search. See
United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 940 (1st Cir. 1992),
abrogated on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S.
12 (2000) (crediting the "net 'common sense' import of the
information" in an affidavit when determining whether the place to
be searched was a "secure operational base" where evidence would
be stored); Beckett, 321 F.3d at 32 (agreeing with the district
court that facts showing a nexus between evidence of criminal
activity and the defendant's home were "less than overwhelming"
but finding that inferences about where the defendant would store
lawfully issued. See United States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 148 (1st Cir. 2012) ("With [United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963, 966 (1st Cir. 1976)] on the books and the account of the evidence found in the house, the Task Force officers acted in what the preceding discussion shows was objectively reasonable reliance on the search warrant." (cleaned up)).
-23- items of enduring utility were objectively reasonable). Thus, a
reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant. See Zayas-
Diaz, 95 F.3d at 116; see also United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d
22, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that the probable-cause
inquiry does not involve "merely counting the number of days
elapsed" between events described in the affidavit and the
warrant's issuance, but, rather, "[e]verything depends on context"
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The fact that, as the district court observed, Matos's
pill-making equipment was portable did not render an officer's
reliance on the warrant objectively unreasonable. Even if the
equipment itself could be moved, it was still reasonable to believe
that Matos had little incentive to set up a new hub for the
conspiracy.
At the very least, the key facts amount to "evidence
sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent
judges as to the existence of probable cause." Leon, 468 U.S. at
926; see United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Grubbs, 547
U.S. 90 (2006) (explaining that exclusion of evidence is
inappropriate in cases involving "borderline calls about the
existence of probable cause"); United States v. Scroggins, 361
F.3d 1075, 1084 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the exclusionary
rule's deterrent purpose is not served when "the police take a
-24- close call to a judge before searching"). In such circumstances,
we cannot say that no reasonable officer could have relied on the
warrant.
Having determined that a reasonable officer could have
believed that the affidavit established probable cause for the
search, we turn to two additional arguments Gonzalez makes as to
why the good-faith exception should not apply.
2. Did the Magistrate Judge Wholly Abandon Her Judicial Role?
Gonzalez suggests that the good-faith exception does not
apply for a separate reason -- the magistrate judge "wholly
abandoned [her] judicial role." See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. We
determine, however, that Gonzalez has failed to support this
contention.
Gonzalez notes that the warrant application and
sixty-four-page affidavit were filed on January 20, 2022, and the
magistrate judge issued the warrant at 9:30 am that same day. From
this timeline, he asserts that "the record . . . raises the
specter that the magistrate [judge] might not have thoroughly
considered Smith's affidavit" and instead served as a "rubber stamp
for the police." See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914–15.
The government points out that it is standard practice
for the affidavit and warrant to have the same date, and Gonzalez
offers no information to undermine the government's account. As
the government explains, it typically submits a search warrant
-25- affidavit to the magistrate judge in advance, at which point the
judge may ask the government to address areas of concern. Then,
assuming the magistrate judge approves the warrant, final versions
of the warrant application, affidavit, and warrant are filed on
the docket with identical dates.2 Therefore, the government
maintains, the fact that the affidavit and warrant have the same
date does not indicate how much time the magistrate judge may have
spent reviewing the affidavit. We also note that Gonzalez's
contention overlooks the fact that the magistrate judge issued a
search warrant for 8 Mereline Avenue on December 10, 2021, but
when that warrant was not executed within fourteen days, Smith
filed another affidavit -- the one at issue here. That affidavit
was largely identical to the first; the only difference was that
it contained about three additional pages describing the
surveillance of Mereline Avenue in January 2022. Thus, the fact
that the affidavit and warrant bear the same date is not enough to
suggest that no reasonable officer could rely on the warrant.
3. Franks Issues
Gonzalez also contends that the good-faith exception
should not apply because of "lurking Franks problems," but this
2 We further note that the process of obtaining a search warrant involves an ex parte proceeding in which the government asks the magistrate judge to find probable cause to conduct a search. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d). The record does not suggest any judicial impropriety in that process.
-26- issue is one for the district court to consider in the first
instance. Before the district court, Gonzalez moved to continue
the suppression hearing so that he could file a motion for a
hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).3 The
district court denied his request but informed Gonzalez that, if
it ruled in the government's favor on the suppression motion, "the
door is still open for there to be a supplement, if there's a
showing for a Franks issue to be raised." The court then evaluated
the suppression motion -- considering whether the four corners of
the affidavit set forth probable cause and whether a reasonable
officer could have relied on the warrant -- while "making clear
that [Gonzalez was] not waiving [his] right to file a Franks
hearing or a request" later, if his pursuit of the potential Franks
issue he identified was fruitful.
Now, following our review of the suppression ruling, we
conclude that the affidavit was not so devoid of indicia of
probable cause that no reasonable officer could have relied on it,
and that the record does not suggest the magistrate judge wholly
abandoned her judicial role. In so concluding, we do not pass on
3 Under Franks, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) the affidavit contains an intentional or reckless false statement or omission, and (2) the false statement or omission was necessary to the finding of probable cause. United States v. O'Neal, 17 F.4th 236, 244 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 156).
-27- any potential argument by Gonzalez that, under Franks, the warrant
is nevertheless invalid and the evidence should be suppressed
because the affidavit contains intentional or reckless material
misrepresentations or omissions. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923
(explaining that the good-faith exception does not apply when the
affiant misleads the magistrate judge with information that
violates Franks); United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565, 572-75
(1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that the government failed to show
objective good faith and that excluding evidence would have a
substantial deterrent effect on the police because the affidavit
made material omissions and included false and misleading
statements). And because we now vacate the district court's
suppression order and remand for further proceedings, Gonzalez can
make such an argument and challenge statements in the affidavit on
remand.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we vacate the district court's
order granting Gonzalez's suppression motion and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
-28-