United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1889
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT DAIGLE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Lipez and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Zainabu Rumala, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for appellant. Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
June 10, 2026 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Robert Daigle appeals the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered in a search
of his home. According to Daigle, the government did not establish
probable cause to believe that child pornography would be found on
his home computer at the time of the search. The district court
concluded otherwise, relying on facts showing that, nine months
earlier, a computer with an IP address tied to Daigle's residence
had logged requests on a specialized network for three electronic
files that contained child pornography, all within ten minutes.
We conclude that these facts were sufficient to meet the probable
cause standard and thus affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
This case arises from a decade-long investigation by law
enforcement into Freenet, a peer-to-peer network that "allows
users to anonymously share files, chat on message boards, and
access websites within the network." To put the legal issues in
context, we recount the basic mechanics of Freenet, as well as the
events that led the government to Daigle. We draw the facts from
the search warrant affidavit submitted in this case by Special
Agent Brian O'Sullivan of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI).
- 2 - 1. The Mechanics of Freenet
To access the Freenet network, "a user must first
download the Freenet software, which is free and publicly
available." A computer running the Freenet software "connects
directly to other computers running Freenet, which are called its
'peers.'" When a user installs Freenet, they "agree[] to provide
to the network a portion of the storage space on [their] computer
hard drive, so that files uploaded by Freenet users can be
distributed and stored across the network."
Once a user uploads a file to Freenet, "the software
breaks the file into pieces (called 'blocks') and encrypts each
piece." These encrypted blocks are then "distributed randomly"
and stored by peer computers. Freenet creates an "index piece,"
which contains a list of all the file's blocks, and assigns a
"unique key -- a series of letters, numbers and special
characters" -- to the file.
To download a file on Freenet, a user must have the key
associated with that file. When a user tries to download a file,
Freenet requests that file's blocks from other computers running
the Freenet software (the peers). Instead of requesting all the
blocks from one peer, Freenet "divide[s] up" the block requests
"in roughly equal amounts among the user's peers." If a peer
computer does not have the requested blocks, that peer will divide
up the request and ask additional peers for the missing blocks,
- 3 - and so on. Critically, just because a user requests a file does
not guarantee that they can retrieve the blocks for that file or
download it.
Freenet's design "attempts to hide" which user uploaded
or downloaded a file "by making it difficult to differentiate"
between the original requestor of a file and a peer who simply
forwarded another peer's request for that file. Still, "Freenet
warns its users in multiple ways that it does not guarantee
anonymity," including by explaining on its public website that it
does not mask a computer's IP address.
Although Freenet is not dedicated to child pornography,
users can "advertise and distribute images and videos of child
pornography" on the network.1 Importantly, Freenet does not offer
a search function, meaning that a user in search of child
pornography must first identify the key for a specific file and
then use that key to download the file. To obtain such a key,
Freenet users can go to "message boards" on the network, where
other users might post messages related to child pornography.
These message boards often have labels that are suggestive of the
1A peer-reviewed, publicly available academic paper studied 70,000 keys "posted to forums [on Freenet] openly dedicated to child sexual exploitation and confirmed to include known [child pornography] images." Brian N. Levine et al., Statistical Detection of Downloaders in Freenet, Procs. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng'rs Int'l Workshop on Priv. Eng'g, May 2017, at 8. That study determined that approximately 35% of Freenet's overall traffic related to requests for files using those keys. See id.
- 4 - sexual exploitation of children. Freenet users can also access
websites that only operate within the network, known as
"Freesites." Certain Freesites contain viewable images of child
pornography, along with keys related to child pornography files.
To support investigations into the sharing of child
pornography on Freenet, law enforcement officers have access to a
modified version of the Freenet software, which has been loaded
onto government computers. This modified version is "nearly
identical to Freenet," except that it permits officers to track
certain information about each request for file blocks that
government computers receive from Freenet users. This information
includes the requesting user's IP address.
Law enforcement officers "do not target specific peers
on Freenet nor do [they] solicit requests from any peers." Rather,
they "collect keys associated with suspected child pornography
files" and only investigate Freenet users who use those keys to
request files. Officers obtain such keys from Freenet message
boards, Freesites, and their prior investigations.
A peer-reviewed, publicly available academic paper
describes a mathematical formula for determining whether a request
for a file of interest originated from a given computer. See Brian
N. Levine et al., Statistical Detection of Downloaders in Freenet,
Procs. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng'rs Int'l Workshop on Priv.
Eng'g, May 2017, at 8. Based on his training and experience,
- 5 - O'Sullivan "believe[d] [the formula] to be a reliable method" for
law enforcement officers to use in identifying which computer on
the Freenet network initiated a request for child pornography
files.
2. The Investigation
Using their modified version of Freenet, law enforcement
officers identified a computer with an IP address of 96.230.244.94,
which was running the Freenet software. Within a ten-minute
timeframe, the user of that computer had requested the blocks of
three different files. Officers knew that each of those three
files contained child pornography. They had acquired the keys for
the three files from various sources: a Freenet message board, a
Freesite, and a previous investigation. But they were "not aware
of how, or from where, this particular Freenet user obtained [the]
key[s] in order to attempt to retrieve the files of interest."
The Freenet user initiated the three file requests on
Sunday, April 11, 2021, at 7:10 PM, 7:13 PM, and 7:20 PM. Based
on the mathematical formula discussed above, O'Sullivan believed
that this Freenet user was "the original requestor" of the three
files. Law enforcement officers linked the user's IP address to
a computer located in a home in Waltham, Massachusetts, which they
subsequently confirmed was Daigle's residence.
As O'Sullivan explained, requesting blocks associated
with a file on Freenet is equivalent to a "user attempt[ing] to
- 6 - download the file's contents from Freenet." Making such an
attempt, however, does not mean that the user "retrieved all of
the necessary [blocks] to successfully download the file." During
their investigation, law enforcement officers were unable to
confirm whether the user who had requested the three files on April
11 had in fact downloaded them.
After recounting the steps that led law enforcement
officers to Daigle's residence, O'Sullivan described in his
affidavit the characteristics common to "consumers" of child
pornography. As he explained, these characteristics include
collecting and maintaining child pornography materials "for
several years" and "go[ing] to great lengths to conceal and protect
[those collections] from discovery, theft, and damage." According
to O'Sullivan, consumers of child pornography often store their
collections in various places, including their computers and
digital devices.
Relying on his experience, O'Sullivan recounted that
individuals who possess child pornography on one digital storage
device are likely to possess it on another device as well. As he
put it, this makes it "more likely than not that evidence of [such]
access will be found in [the suspect's] home." Ultimately,
O'Sullivan believed that a Freenet user at Daigle's residence
"likely display[ed] characteristics common to consumers of child
pornography."
- 7 - In his affidavit, O'Sullivan also detailed his training
and experience in investigating computer-related crimes generally,
including those involving child pornography. He explained that a
"computer's ability to store images in digital form makes the
computer itself an ideal repository for child pornography."
According to O'Sullivan, "a computer user's Internet activities
generally leave traces or 'footprints' in the web cache and history
files of the browser used," and "[s]uch information is often
maintained indefinitely until overwritten by other data." He
further described how "[e]lectronic files downloaded to a storage
medium can be stored for years at little or no cost" and can be
"recovered months or years later" after being deleted. Thus,
O'Sullivan attested that there was probable cause to believe that
evidence of child pornography would be found on a storage medium
at Daigle's residence, even months after the attempted downloads.
The government submitted the search warrant application
for Daigle's residence on January 10, 2022, nine months after the
requests for the Freenet files at issue. The next day, following
authorization from a magistrate judge, law enforcement officers
executed the search warrant; during the search, they discovered
files containing child pornography.
B. Procedural History
Based on the evidence seized during the search, a grand
jury indicted Daigle for receipt of child pornography, in violation
- 8 - of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). In March 2024, Daigle
moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the January 2022
search.2 The district court denied Daigle's motion, concluding
that O'Sullivan's affidavit established probable cause to believe
that a search of Daigle's residence would lead to evidence of child
pornography; it also explicitly held that the information in the
warrant was not stale. See United States v. Daigle, 731 F. Supp.
3d 168, 171-72 (D. Mass. 2024). Alternatively, the court
determined that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
would apply, thus permitting the government to rely on the evidence
from the search. See id. at 173. Daigle entered a conditional
guilty plea, while preserving his right to appeal the ruling
denying his motion to suppress.
Daigle then timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In evaluating a ruling on a motion to suppress, "[w]e
review de novo the district court's legal conclusion about whether
a given set of facts amounts to probable cause." United States v.
Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.
Gonzalez, 113 F.4th 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2024)). Here, Daigle argued
2Daigle also requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), to challenge the veracity of the warrant affidavit. The district court denied his request, and Daigle does not appeal that ruling. See United States v. Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d 168, 172-73 (D. Mass. 2024).
- 9 - in his motion that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient
to support a finding of probable cause, and there was no
evidentiary hearing of any kind. In such cases, we "accord[]
deference to the reasonable inferences" that the magistrate judge
issuing the search warrant "may have drawn" from the facts stated
in the affidavit. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Sylvestre, 78 F.4th 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2023)); see United
States v. Cortez, 108 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2024).
III. DISCUSSION
Daigle argues that O'Sullivan's affidavit failed to
establish probable cause to justify a search of his residence for
evidence of child pornography, including because the information
in the affidavit was stale. As we explain, we disagree.
A. The Probable Cause Standard
When the government applies for a warrant, it "must
demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been
committed -- the 'commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence
of the offense will be found at the place searched -- the so-called
'nexus' element." Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 148 (quoting United
States v. Roman, 942 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2019)). In evaluating
the nexus requirement, "the magistrate judge must 'make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the [search warrant]
affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
- 10 - evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Id.
(second alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). "Fair probability is less than a
more-likely-than not standard." Id.
Both elements of the probable cause inquiry "include a
temporal component." Id. (quoting United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95
F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 1996)). "Thus, the magistrate judge must
'consider the accuracy and reliability of the historical facts
related in the affidavit[].'" Id. (quoting Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d at
113). In doing so, the magistrate judge "must determine 'whether
the totality of the circumstances reasonably inferable from the
affidavit[]' establishes a fair probability that evidence of the
crime will be found in the place to be searched 'at about the time
the search warrant would issue, rather than at some [earlier]
time.'" Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Zayas-Diaz,
95 F.3d at 113).
When the information in an affidavit "establishe[s]
probable cause at some point in the past but does not support
probable cause at the time of the warrant's issuance," that
information is considered "stale." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir.
2015)). There is no bright-line rule for staleness. In evaluating
a staleness claim, "we do not measure the timeliness of information
simply by counting the number of days that have elapsed."
- 11 - McLellan, 792 F.3d at 210 (quoting United States v.
Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2008)). Rather,
"we must assess the nature of the information, the nature and
characteristics of the suspected criminal activity, and the likely
endurance of the information." Id. (quoting Morales-Aldahondo,
524 F.3d at 119).
If probable cause did not exist but a magistrate judge
nonetheless authorized the search, then "the evidence obtained
from the search is usually suppressed," unless the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th
at 148.
B. Analysis
Daigle lodges two specific challenges to the district
court's ruling denying his motion to suppress. First, he argues
that there was not enough information in the search warrant
affidavit to believe that he intentionally accessed child
pornography. Second, he contends that the information in the
affidavit was stale because it described attempted downloads of
child pornography that had occurred nine months earlier. We are
not persuaded by either argument.
1. Intentionality
We start with Daigle's contention that the government
did not establish probable cause to believe that he intentionally,
- 12 - rather than coincidentally, attempted to download child
pornography.
In making this argument, Daigle emphasizes that the
government has never alleged that Freenet's "primary
purpose . . . [is] the trading of child pornography." Thus,
Daigle maintains, the mere fact that he joined the Freenet network
cannot prove that he did so with the intent of accessing child
pornography. Daigle also points out that a Freenet user can
request a file without knowing the contents of that file, given
that a key is not attached to a thumbnail or hyperlink that would
reveal the file's contents. Although a key could contain a term
suggestive of child pornography (for example, "lolita"), he
emphasizes that the warrant affidavit does not mention any such
terms associated with the keys that he used. He also highlights
that the affidavit provides no information about how he obtained
the keys. Finally, Daigle reiterates the government's concession
that requesting a file on Freenet does not guarantee that a user
will retrieve all the blocks for that file such that they can
successfully download it.
To be sure, Daigle raises valid points about the features
of Freenet and the limits of the information in the government's
search warrant application. But in framing his arguments on
appeal, Daigle does not fully grapple with the applicable legal
standard.
- 13 - As we have repeatedly held, probable cause requires only
a "fair probability" that evidence of the crime will be found in
the place to be searched. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 148. In
determining whether that standard has been met, courts must
evaluate the totality of the information presented by the
government through the lens of common sense. See id. And "an
officer [need not] rule out potentially innocent explanations for
every piece of evidence before reaching a reasonable conclusion
that there is probable cause." United States v. Flores, 888 F.3d
537, 545 (1st Cir. 2018).
The facts here showed that a Freenet user at Daigle's
residence initiated three requests to download three separate
files, each of which the government knew to contain child
pornography, all within ten minutes. The facts also indicated
that Freenet requires a user to engage in a complicated, multi-step
process to request a file. On this record, we see no error by the
district court in concluding that the unique features of Freenet,
combined with the multiple requests within a short period of time,
supported a fair probability that "a [Freenet] user at [Daigle's]
residence intentionally requested the files to gain access to child
pornography." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 171. That it remained
possible that this user's actions were innocent and unrelated to
viewing child pornography does not undercut that conclusion.
- 14 - In urging us to reverse the district court's ruling,
Daigle relies heavily on United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d
Cir. 2008), but the facts of that case are distinct in important
ways. In Falso, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that the FBI agent's "inconclusive statements" about whether
the defendant had accessed or even attempted to access a publicly
available website featuring child pornography "f[ell] short of
establishing probable cause." Id. at 121. As the Second Circuit
reasoned, even if it inferred that Falso had accessed the website,
the affidavit lacked any allegation that the defendant had
"accessed, viewed or downloaded child pornography." Id. Likewise,
the court observed, the affidavit failed to offer particular
"details about the features and nature of the . . . site,"
including "whether the [child pornography] images were prominently
displayed or required an additional click of the mouse" or "were
downloadable." Id.
Because the affidavit here, like the one in Falso, did
not state that Daigle viewed or successfully downloaded the child
pornography files, Daigle argues that it could not establish
probable cause. But unlike the "inconclusive" statements by the
FBI agent in Falso, id., O'Sullivan specified that a Freenet user
at Daigle's residence had requested three files that the government
knew contained child pornography, all within ten minutes.
O'Sullivan also provided a thorough description of Freenet's
- 15 - unique "features and nature," id., including the multi-step
process for requesting a file and that a Freenet user would need
to obtain the file's key before requesting it. Those facts, taken
together, tended to negate the conclusion that the user in question
had accidentally stumbled onto the files. Thus, the totality of
the circumstances created a fair probability that the user had
attempted to download child pornography.
Daigle also argues that the district court erred by
factoring the anonymity of Freenet into its analysis, but, again,
we disagree. The court explained that "the anonymized nature of
Freenet . . . enhance[d] the probability that a user at [Daigle's]
residence sought child pornography and not some other innocuous
material." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 171. In doing so, the court
cited our decision in United States v. Anzalone, 923 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2019), which concerned the FBI's investigation into Playpen,
an online forum that permitted users to distribute child
pornography. See id. at 2. In Anzalone, we held that "the totality
of the information asserted in the warrant affidavit -- Playpen's
hidden nature . . . , its registration requirement, its focus on
anonymity, and the image depicted on its homepage -- established
the fair probability that users went into Playpen to access child
pornography." Id. at 5.
Daigle maintains that Anzalone is off point because,
unlike Playpen, Freenet "is not hidden" but publicly available, it
- 16 - "does not require registration," and it "has no imagery indicating
illicit material." In Daigle's words, "the promise of anonymity"
on Freenet "does not equate to ill intent."
But Daigle acknowledges that we "did not focus solely on
the anonymous nature of Playpen in affirming the probable cause
finding" in Anzalone. Likewise, the district court here noted
that Freenet's anonymity was "independently insufficient to
establish probable cause." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 171. In
fact, the court devoted only one sentence of its analysis to
Freenet's anonymity and instead focused on the circumstances as a
whole. See id.
Just as importantly, we rejected the claim in Anzalone
that a court should treat as "not indicative of criminality" the
fact that online users had to "take several . . . affirmative
steps to locate Playpen." 923 F.3d at 5 (emphasis added). As we
explained, the defendant's argument overlooked that probable cause
"hinge[s] not on discrete pieces of standalone evidence, but on
the totality of circumstances." Id. Here, the "affirmative steps"
that a Freenet user would need to take to access a child
pornography file -- downloading the Freenet software, obtaining
the specific key for that file without the benefit of a search
function, and making block requests from peers -- are important
aspects of the overall probable cause picture.
- 17 - Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree
with the district court that "it was reasonable for investigators
to infer that three separate requests for three different files
known to contain child pornography within a short timeframe
[indicated more than] mere coincidence." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d
at 171.
2. Staleness
Next, Daigle contends that the information in the search
warrant affidavit was stale and thus could not prop up a finding
of probable cause. To support his argument, he points to the
nine-month gap between the download requests on Freenet and the
search warrant application. In his view, even if the facts alleged
in the affidavit could support a conclusion that he intentionally
requested child pornography files on Freenet, those facts were
insufficient to permit the conclusion that he would have those
files nine months later.
Although Daigle concedes that "the passage of time alone
does not necessarily render information stale," he maintains that
O'Sullivan's affidavit lacked specific facts indicating that child
pornography would "still [be] located" in his home at the time of
the search. According to Daigle, his "limited encounter with child
pornography" on Freenet was not enough to conclude that he was a
consumer of child pornography, which in turn undermined any
inference that he would retain illicit materials indefinitely.
- 18 - On the record here, we cannot agree with Daigle's
staleness arguments. In our view, the totality of the facts in
O'Sullivan's affidavit added up to a fair probability that Daigle
was a consumer of child pornography. That Daigle engaged in a
multi-step process to request, in quick succession, three files
known to the government to contain child pornography adequately
indicated an intent to download illicit materials. From this
activity, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that
he was a collector of child pornography who would store such
materials. See Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d at 118-19 (holding
that three-year-old information was not stale in light of agent's
testimony that "a person who uses a computer to access child
pornography is likely to use his computer both to augment and to
store the collected images"); see also McLellan, 792 F.3d at 209
n.5 ("[C]ourts have held time and time again that child pornography
traders and collectors maintain their collections for long periods
of time, and often store [them] in safe, close, and easily
accessible locations.").
In arguing to the contrary, Daigle relies heavily on
United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015), but that
case does not help his position. To be sure, the Second Circuit
agreed with the defendant's staleness argument in Raymonda. See
id. at 117. As the court pointed out, the affidavit supporting
the search warrant application "contained no evidence" that the
- 19 - suspect "had deliberately sought to view [certain] thumbnails" of
child pornography on a particular website "or that he discovered
[that website] while searching for child pornography." Id. at
117. Indeed, the government agent who applied for the warrant
"only uncovered the website through an innocuous link on the
message board of another site not explicitly associated with child
pornography." Id. Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned, the facts
in the case were "at least equally consistent with an innocent
user inadvertently stumbling upon a child pornography website,
being horrified at what he saw, and promptly closing the window."
Id. "Under those circumstances, absent any indicia that the
suspect was a collector of child pornography likely to hoard
pornographic files," the court concluded that a "single incident
of access" was not enough to justify a search of the suspect's
computer more than nine months later. Id.
The facts of this case are different. Critically, the
affidavit here supports the conclusion that Daigle did not
"innocent[ly] stumble" upon the child pornography files on
Freenet. Id. at 121. Rather, O'Sullivan detailed the involved,
multi-step process for requesting such files on the network. This
complicated process "tend[ed] to negate the possibility that
[Daigle's] brush with child pornography was a purely negligent or
inadvertent encounter." Id. at 115. Indeed, as the Second Circuit
recognized in Raymonda, courts have found probable cause (and
- 20 - rejected staleness arguments) based on "a single incident of
possession or receipt . . . [when] the suspect's access to the
pornographic images depended on a series of sufficiently
complicated steps to suggest his willful intention to view the
files." Id. (emphasis added).
Daigle next points to United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1990), to shore up his argument, but that case is
also readily distinguishable. Weber is not a staleness case per
se, but Daigle relies on it for the principle that O'Sullivan's
statements about the habits of consumers of child pornography
cannot be relevant to the staleness analysis when the government
has failed to show that he is such a consumer. The evidence in
Weber that the defendant was a consumer of child pornography,
however, was much weaker than the evidence here. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that, although the search
warrant affidavit described how the defendant had received
advertising materials that "apparently" contained child
pornography years earlier, the affidavit did not suggest that he
had requested those materials. Id. at 1344. The court was also
unmoved by the fact that the defendant had "answered a
government-generated advertisement for child pornography and
ordered materials," because those materials would not be delivered
until "just before" the warrant's execution. Id. Those facts
aside, the court described the affidavit as offering "rambling
- 21 - boilerplate recitations" about "the habits ascribed to" child
pornography collectors, without tying the defendant's own conduct
to those habits. Id. at 1345. Thus, the court concluded that
probable cause for the search was lacking.
By contrast, O'Sullivan's affidavit did not rest on such
shaky ground. Rather, the totality of the information in the
affidavit -- that Daigle attempted to download three child
pornography files within ten minutes -- permitted the reasonable
inference that he was a consumer of child pornography. Because
there were enough facts to conclude that Daigle was a consumer of
child pornography, it was reasonable to infer that he would collect
and then store child pornography materials nine months after the
attempted downloads on Freenet.
But even if we disagreed that the facts demonstrated a
fair probability that Daigle was a consumer of child pornography,
there was enough information in the affidavit to conclude that his
computer would yield relevant digital evidence nine months later.
When discussing computer-related crimes, O'Sullivan described at
length how files downloaded to a computer can be stored
indefinitely and recovered months, even years, after being
deleted. Given the durability of digital evidence, it was
reasonable to infer that evidence of the requests for the child
pornography files would remain on Daigle's computer many months
later. See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir.
- 22 - 2010) (explaining that "information concerning [child pornography]
crimes has a relatively long shelf life" and thus "should not
be . . . quickly deemed stale," "especially" when "the crime in
question is accomplished through the use of a computer" because
"computers have long memories" (citation modified)); see also
United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (rejecting defendant's staleness argument based on
four-month delay in executing search warrant because, "[t]hanks to
the long memory of computers, any evidence of a crime was almost
certainly still on his computer, even if he had tried to delete
the images").
Indeed, we have previously rejected staleness claims in
similar cases that involved more than nine months of delay. See,
e.g., Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d at 119 (rejecting defendant's
staleness argument when more than three years had elapsed between
his downloads of child pornography materials to his computer and
the warrant application). Thus, we see no error in the district
court's conclusion that there was a fair probability that digital
evidence related to the requested files would remain on Daigle's
computer nine months after the download requests on Freenet.3
3 Because we determine that there was probable cause to support the search warrant, we do not address Daigle's argument challenging the district court's alternative ruling denying his motion to suppress based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See McLellan, 792 F.3d at 207 n.4 ("Because we
- 23 - IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we affirm the district court's
ruling denying Daigle's motion to suppress.
agree with the district court on the merits, we do not review [its] alternate holding [that the FBI acted in good faith].").
- 24 -