UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 01-20828 SUMMARY CALENDAR _________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARLAND GODFREY,
Defendant - Appellant.
______________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston (H-00-CR-589) ______________________________________________________________________________ March 26, 2002
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:1
Defendant Garland Godfrey pled guilty to a charge of distributing of a cocaine base
commonly known as crack. Although the indictment did not allege any particular quantity of the
cocaine base, the presentence report concluded that Godfrey's base level under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines should be Level 24 because he was responsible for distributing 4.12 grams
1 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
-1- of crack. The district court sentenced Godfrey to sixty-six months' imprisonment and three years
of supervised release. The court also assessed a mandatory $100 special assessment against him.
As a special condition of his supervised release, the district required Godfrey "to provide the
probation officer access to any requested financial information." R. at 1:145. Godfrey appeals the
sentence, and for the following reasons, we affirm.
I
Godfrey first argues that, under the rationale of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), the district court constitutionally erred by applying a sentencing guidelines enhancement
for drug quantity where the indictment alleged no drug quantity at all. We review the legality of a
criminal sentence de novo. See United States v. Ortlieb, 274 F.3d 871, 879 (5th Cir. 2001).
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury
determination that he is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 476–77. Accordingly, any fact, other than the fact of a prior
conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum is an essential
element of the offense, which must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 490; United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 313
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 492 (2001). Godfrey argues that, because the quantity of
drugs was not charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the district court could not increase his maximum sentence under the sentencing guidelines.
Godfrey's argument is incorrect. Apprendi does not apply to sentencing guideline
enhancements so long as the enhancements do not cause the sentence to exceed its statutory
maximum. The case law is clear on this point. See United State v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500, ___,
-2- Nos. 00-30900, 00-30968, 00-31124, slip op. 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2002) (Apprendi does
not apply when the defendant is sentenced within the permissible sentencing guidelines.); United
States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1163
(2001) ("Apprendi should be applied only to cases in which a sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum, not to cases in which a sentence is enhanced within the statutory range based on a
finding of drug quantity."); United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, reh'g
en banc denied, 260 F.3d 624 (5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 405 (2001) (Where the
defendant does not show that his sentence exceeded the otherwise applicable statutory maximum,
the defendant fails to demonstrate that his sentence violates Apprendi.); United States v. Clinton,
256 F.3d 311, 324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 492 (2001) ("[T]he Court has expressly
rejected the argument that Apprendi applies to enhancements based upon the sentencing
guidelines, whether tied to quantity or some other relevant fact, which do not cause the sentence
to exceed the statutory range . . . ."). Thus, the district court did not err by applying a sentencing
guidelines enhancement for drug quantity.
II
Godfrey argues next that the provisions found at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b) are
unconstitutional. He argues that Congress intended facts that determine the maximum sentence
under the statute to be sentence enhancements rather than elements of separate offenses, a
constitutional violation in light of Apprendi. This Court has already dealt with this argument and
dismissed it. See Fort, 248 F.3d at 482–83 (rejecting an identical argument); United States v.
Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 2000) (revised opinion) (per curiam), reh'g denied, reh'g en
banc denied, 248 F.3d 1141 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1045 (2001) (holding that
-3- nothing in Apprendi would permit this Court to conclude that the provisions found at 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) and (b) is are unconstitutional on their face). Our precedent forecloses Godfrey's second
argument.
III
Lastly, Godfrey argues that the district committed plain error by imposing an
unconstitutional special condition of supervised release ordering that he "provide the probation
officer access to any requested financial information." R. at 1:145. The district court has wide
discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d
155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001). However, that discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which
states that special conditions of supervised release must satisfy three requirements. See Paul, 275
F.3d at 164. First, they must be reasonably related to four specific sentencing factors: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)
the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need
for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the
need for the sentence imposed to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), 3583(d)(1). The second requirement for special conditions of
supervised release is that they not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to
achieve the latter three sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 01-20828 SUMMARY CALENDAR _________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARLAND GODFREY,
Defendant - Appellant.
______________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston (H-00-CR-589) ______________________________________________________________________________ March 26, 2002
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:1
Defendant Garland Godfrey pled guilty to a charge of distributing of a cocaine base
commonly known as crack. Although the indictment did not allege any particular quantity of the
cocaine base, the presentence report concluded that Godfrey's base level under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines should be Level 24 because he was responsible for distributing 4.12 grams
1 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
-1- of crack. The district court sentenced Godfrey to sixty-six months' imprisonment and three years
of supervised release. The court also assessed a mandatory $100 special assessment against him.
As a special condition of his supervised release, the district required Godfrey "to provide the
probation officer access to any requested financial information." R. at 1:145. Godfrey appeals the
sentence, and for the following reasons, we affirm.
I
Godfrey first argues that, under the rationale of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), the district court constitutionally erred by applying a sentencing guidelines enhancement
for drug quantity where the indictment alleged no drug quantity at all. We review the legality of a
criminal sentence de novo. See United States v. Ortlieb, 274 F.3d 871, 879 (5th Cir. 2001).
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury
determination that he is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 476–77. Accordingly, any fact, other than the fact of a prior
conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum is an essential
element of the offense, which must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 490; United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 313
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 492 (2001). Godfrey argues that, because the quantity of
drugs was not charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the district court could not increase his maximum sentence under the sentencing guidelines.
Godfrey's argument is incorrect. Apprendi does not apply to sentencing guideline
enhancements so long as the enhancements do not cause the sentence to exceed its statutory
maximum. The case law is clear on this point. See United State v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500, ___,
-2- Nos. 00-30900, 00-30968, 00-31124, slip op. 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2002) (Apprendi does
not apply when the defendant is sentenced within the permissible sentencing guidelines.); United
States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1163
(2001) ("Apprendi should be applied only to cases in which a sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum, not to cases in which a sentence is enhanced within the statutory range based on a
finding of drug quantity."); United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, reh'g
en banc denied, 260 F.3d 624 (5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 405 (2001) (Where the
defendant does not show that his sentence exceeded the otherwise applicable statutory maximum,
the defendant fails to demonstrate that his sentence violates Apprendi.); United States v. Clinton,
256 F.3d 311, 324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 492 (2001) ("[T]he Court has expressly
rejected the argument that Apprendi applies to enhancements based upon the sentencing
guidelines, whether tied to quantity or some other relevant fact, which do not cause the sentence
to exceed the statutory range . . . ."). Thus, the district court did not err by applying a sentencing
guidelines enhancement for drug quantity.
II
Godfrey argues next that the provisions found at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b) are
unconstitutional. He argues that Congress intended facts that determine the maximum sentence
under the statute to be sentence enhancements rather than elements of separate offenses, a
constitutional violation in light of Apprendi. This Court has already dealt with this argument and
dismissed it. See Fort, 248 F.3d at 482–83 (rejecting an identical argument); United States v.
Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 2000) (revised opinion) (per curiam), reh'g denied, reh'g en
banc denied, 248 F.3d 1141 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1045 (2001) (holding that
-3- nothing in Apprendi would permit this Court to conclude that the provisions found at 21 U.S.C. §
841(a) and (b) is are unconstitutional on their face). Our precedent forecloses Godfrey's second
argument.
III
Lastly, Godfrey argues that the district committed plain error by imposing an
unconstitutional special condition of supervised release ordering that he "provide the probation
officer access to any requested financial information." R. at 1:145. The district court has wide
discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d
155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001). However, that discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which
states that special conditions of supervised release must satisfy three requirements. See Paul, 275
F.3d at 164. First, they must be reasonably related to four specific sentencing factors: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)
the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need
for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the
need for the sentence imposed to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), 3583(d)(1). The second requirement for special conditions of
supervised release is that they not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to
achieve the latter three sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Finally, special conditions
must be consistent with any relevant policy statements in the sentencing guidelines. 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d)(3).
Ordinarily, we review the district court's imposition of supervised release conditions for
-4- an abuse of discretion. See Paul, 274 F.3d at 165. However, because Godfrey failed to object on
this basis in the district court, we review his claim for plain error only. See Fort, 248 F.3d at 478
("Issues that are not raised in the district court are reviewed for plain error."). When applying the
plain error review standard, this Court will address the issue only if there was an error, the error
was clear and obvious, and it affected a substantial right. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 732 (1993); United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 2001). Further, because
review of a plain error is permissive, rather than mandatory, we exercise our discretion to correct
the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; Jiminez, 256 F.3d at 340.
Godfrey argues that the condition requiring disclosure of his financial information is
overbroad and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures and his Fifth Amendment rights against compelled self-incrimination. He relies on United
States v. Stafford, 983 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1993). In Stafford, the defendant was convicted of tax
evasion, and, as a special condition of his probation, the district court ordered him to give his
probation officer access to any requested financial information and to cooperate fully with the IRS
in resolving his tax liability for the years covered in his indictment as a special condition. See id.
at 28. We held that the condition interfered with Stafford's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
and that the interference was not offset by any apparent necessity to achieve a legitimate goal of
sentencing. See id. at 28–29.
Godfrey's interpretation of Stafford is that a special supervised release condition requiring
the disclosure of any requested financial information is permissible only to the extent that it
permits the probation officer to monitor a defendant's compliance with the financial obligations
-5- arising out of the offenses of conviction. Godfrey argues that, because their were no financial
obligations arising out of the offense of his conviction other than the de minimis $100 special
assessment, the condition imposed on his supervised release by the district court was
impermissible.
We see nothing in Stafford to support the general rule that Godfrey recommends. In fact,
Stafford is distinguishable from the present case. Our overriding concern in Stafford was the
conditions' impact on Stafford's ability to litigate fairly his tax liability in the future, and we
ordered the revision only "[t]o the extent that the two conditions of probation may interfere with
Stafford's ability to fully and fairly question and litigate his tax liability." 983 F.2d at 29. Because
there is no similar concern in this instance, Godfrey's reliance on Stafford is misplaced.
Godfrey also claims that the sentences guidelines themselves show the inappropriateness
of the special condition imposed on his supervised release. Citing U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(3), p.s.,
Godfrey claims that the guidelines suggest that such a condition should be imposed on a
defendant's supervised release only if the court imposes a financial obligation on the defendant.
What Godfrey fails to recognize is that the special conditions listed in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d), p.s.,
are "recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be appropriate
in particular cases." Id. (emphasis added).
Given the distinguishing facts of Stafford and Godfrey's misinterpretation of the relevant
policy statements in the sentencing guidelines, we cannot say that the district court committed
plain error by imposing a special condition on Godfrey's supervised release.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
-6-