United States v. Glaxo Group Limited

328 F. Supp. 709, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12814, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,715
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 17, 1971
DocketCiv. A. 558-68
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 328 F. Supp. 709 (United States v. Glaxo Group Limited) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Glaxo Group Limited, 328 F. Supp. 709, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12814, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,715 (D.D.C. 1971).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

GASCH, District Judge.

In this action the Government seeks declaratory and injunctive 1 relief against two British corporations for violations of section one of the Sherman Act. 2 Defendant Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited (ICI) manufactures the antibiotic griseofulvin. The drug is marketed in the United States by Ayerst Laboratories Division of American Home Products Corporation (Ayerst) under an exclusive distributorship agreement with ICI. 3 Included in this agreement was a provision prohibiting Ayerst from reselling bulk supplies of griseofulvin without ICI’s consent. On plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment this Court ruled that ICI’s restriction of its vendee’s freedom to resell purchased goods was a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 4 Similar agreements between defendant Glaxo Group Limited (Glaxo) and its United States distributors Johnson and Johnson, Inc., and Schering Corporation were subsequently held to be per se violations of the Sherman Act. 5 Finally, an agreement between Glaxo and ICI that ICI would not permit its vendees to resell bulk form griseofulvin purchased from ICI was declared a per se violation of the antitrust laws insofar as it applied to United States vendees of ICI. 6 These grants of partial summary judgments in favor of plaintiff amount to full adjudication on the merits and the case is now before the Court for entry of final judgment. 7

Plaintiff and defendants have each submitted proposed final judgments; extensive briefs and affidavits were filed in support of the parties’ positions with respect to the scope of relief to be granted and a hearing was held in open Court concerning the form of final judgment. Defendants contend in the first instance that no injunctive relief is warranted under the circumstances of this case. The principal area of contention, however, concerns that portion of the Government’s proposed decree which would require defendants to (1) sell griseofulvin in bulk on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and prices to all bona fide applicants, and (2) grant reasonable royalty-licenses under their *711 United States patents relating to the manufacture and processing of griseofulvin 8 together with technical data usable in the manufacture or processing of griseofulvin.

Defendants’ contention in opposing any injunctive relief is based on the voluntary abandonment of the bulk resale restrictions by Glaxo and ICI prior to litigation in this case. They rely on the rule that even where there has been an adjudicated violation of the antitrust laws injunctive relief is appropriate only where there is a significant threat of future violation. United States v. W. T. Grant Co. 9 The Court concludes, however, that on the evidence presented in this record and on the statement by defendants that it has been their regular policy in the past to include such restrictive covenants in their contracts, that the threat of future violations is sufficient to warrant enjoining repetition of the illegal activity. 10

The relief proposed by the Government goes beyond mere restraint of the conduct found to be illegal. It seeks positive relief in the form of compulsory sales and compulsory patent-licensing provisions. As authority for this relief, plaintiff relies primarily on International Salt Co. v. United States, 11 Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 12 and United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 13

The Government characterizes the holding in International Salt as authorizing the ordering of compulsory, nondiscriminatory sales to “effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints.” 14 The decree in International Salt, however, did not compel sale of defendant’s machines but rather compelled nondiscriminatory lease or sale or license. 15 The illegality found in International Salt was a tying clause employed by defendant in leasing patented sale dispensing machines which required the lessee to purchase all salt for use in the machines from International. Thus the requirement that International distribute its machines on a nondiscriminatory basis so as not to give more favorable terms to customers who purchased all or substantially all of their salt from International was closely related to the principal illegal activity adjudicated in the case. The decreeing of compulsory sales by ICI and Glaxo to all applicants cannot logically or factually be related to the continuance of the illegality found in this case — the restraint of their vendees’ freedom to resell in bulk.

In Besser the defendants had eliminated competition in the concrete block industry through outright purchase of competitors and strict patent-licensing arrangements. 16 After first sustaining the trial court’s conclusion that defendants had conspired to monopolize and had monopolized and attempted to monopolize interstate commerce in concrete block making machinery in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman *712 Act, the Court ratified the decree which ordered defendants to offer for sale the machines which they had previously only leased. The Court stated that “[c]ompulsory licensing and sale of patented devices are recognized remedies. They would seem particularly appropriate where, as here, a penchant for abuse of patent rights is demonstrated.” 17 In the present case there was no showing that ICI or Glaxo had a “penchant for abuse of patent rights” nor were they convicted, as was Besser, of using their patent rights to monopolize an industry. 18 The direction to offer to sell as well as lease patented machinery in Besser went directly to the machanics used to monopolize. The restraint on alienation in the present case, although declared a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act, has not been shown to have had the effect of monopolizing the market nor have ICI’s and Glaxo’s exclusive distributorship arrangements, which the compulsory sale provision would defeat, been shown to be illegal restraints on competition. The circumstances of the cases and the relationship of the violations to conduct sought to be restrained differ so greatly that Besser cannot be held controlling here.

The circumstances and holding in United Shoe

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
328 F. Supp. 709, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 447, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12814, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,715, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-glaxo-group-limited-dcd-1971.