United States v. Giuliani

147 F. 594, 1906 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedMay 15, 1906
DocketNo. 1
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 147 F. 594 (United States v. Giuliani) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Giuliani, 147 F. 594, 1906 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124 (D. Del. 1906).

Opinion

BRADFORD, District Judge

(charging jury). The indictment in this case charges Lucia Giuliani alias Lucia Marasso, the defendant, with violating the provisions of section 3 of the act of Congress of March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1214 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 276], entitled “An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States.” That section provides that “the importation into the United .States of any woman or girl for the purposes of prostitution is hereby forbidden, and whoever shall import or attempt to import any woman or girl into the United States for the purposes of prostitution, or shall hold-or attempt to hold, any woman or girl for such purposes in pursuance of such illegal importation, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,” shall be punished as therein provided. The indictment as found by the" grand jury originally contained three counts. The first count has been abandoned by the government and there are, therefore, only the second and third counts for your consideration. The second count charges, in substance, that the defendant and one Gesuele De Loreto having on or about the fourteenth day of December, 1905, illegally imported into the port of New York in the state of New York on the steamship Prinz Adalbert from the city of Naples in the Kingdom of Italy a woman of the name of Rosa Caliendo alias Rosa Caliento for the purposes of prostitution, the defendant; in pursuance of such illegal importation did on December Id, 1905, and thereafter on divers other days until January 19, 3906, in the district of Delaware, feloniously hold the said Rosa Caliendo at and in the premises Nos. 216 and 218 East Second Street, in this city, for the purposes of prostitution. The. third count is in all respects similar to the second, except that, instead of charging that the defendant feloniously held [596]*596Rosa Caliendo for the purposes of prostitution, it charges that the defendant feloniously attempted to hold her for such purposes. To warrant a verdict of guilty on both or either of the counts remaining open for jour consideration all the essential ingredients or elements of criminality as therein charged must be established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt as hereinafter defined. To justify a. conviction of the defendant on the second count you must be so satisfied that the defendant either in co-operation with Gesuele De Loreto •or by herself knowingly and wilfully imported or caused to be imported Rosa Caliendo from Naples to the port of New York by the ■steamship Prinz Adalbert for the purposes of prostitution; and that thereafter the defendant knowingly and wilfully and in pursuance of and to effect the object of such illegal importation, held Rosa Caliendo on some day or days between December 14, 1905, and January 19, Í906, both inclusive, at the above-mentioned premises in this city for the purposes of prostitution. To justify a conviction of the defendant on the third count you must be satisfied that the defendant either in co-operation with Gesuele De Loreto or by herself knowingly and wilfully imported or caused to be imported Rosa Caliendo in the manner and for the purposes above set forth; and that thereafter the defendant knowingly and wilfully attempted, at some time or times within the above mentioned period at the above mentioned premises in this city, to hold Rosa Caliendo for the purposes of prostitution. If Rosa Caliendo solely in the exercise of her free and unconstrained will remained during the whole of the above mentioned period at the premises in question for the purposes of prostitution, although at the invitation of or by reason of alluring promises made by the defendant, the defendant did not hold Rosa Caliendo for the purposes of prostitution as charged in the second count, and your verdict in that case should be not guitij as to the second count. But to constitute a holding •of Rosa Caliendo for the purposes of prostitution as charged in the second count, it is not necessary that the defendant should have detained her by physical force, as, for instance, by chaining her or forcibly confining her or placing her under lock and key at the premises in question, or by placing a guard over her to restrain or control her bodily freedom or power of locomotion in order to compel her to submit herself to prostitution. It is sufficient to constitute a holding in the meaning of the statute that Rosa Caliendo should have been detained by the defendant at the premises in question for the purposes of prostitution either by pltysical means, directly or indirectly applied to her by the defendant, or by threats, express or implied, directly or indirectly made to her by the defendant or by command or command's made to her directly or indirectly by the defendant, and calculated and operating to restrain her freedom of-action and will. To constitute an attempt by the defendant at the premises in question to hold Rosa Caliendo for the purposes of prostitution, as charged in the third count, it is necessary that the defendant should have endeavored or made an effort, though ineffectual, by means designed and to a greater or less extent calculated to effect the object, tohold her'for the purposes of prostitution in the sense of [597]*597the term hold as above defined, with an intent on the part of the defendant at the time of so endeavoring or making effort to hold her for the purposes of prostitution. It is not necessary to a conviction under the third count that the attempt to hold should be successful. The statute denounces an attempt to hold equally with a holding. An attempt to hold for the purposes of prostitution may be made, as in the case of a holding for such purposes, by physical force, threats or commands, or by other means designed and calculated to restrain freedom of action and will. If the defendant made an attempt to hold Rosa Caliendo for the purposes of prostitution, as charged in the third count, she should be convicted if the other elements of criminality therein charged have been established to your satisfaction.

There are certain principles of law for your guidance in your deliberations to which it is now the duty of the court to direct your attention. There is a conclusive presumption of law founded on the clearest principles of public policy that persons of sound and mature mind have knowledge of the criminal laws of the government under which they live and are responsible for their violation; and the law presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that all persons are of sound mind. The law presumes that persons charged with crime are innocent until they arc proved by competent evidence to be guilty. This presumption is evidence in favor of the defendant and stands as her sufficient protection unless it has been overcome by the evidence in the case, taken as a whole, proving her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To justify a verdict of guilty, the evidence in the case as a whole must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of the guilt of the defendant as charged in both or cither of the counts of the indictment remaining open for your consideration; and from this it, of course, follows that if the jury find that all the evidence in the case when taken together is as compatible with the theory of innocence as with the theory of guilt there should be an acquittal. The commission of a criminal offense can be proved by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence, provided the circumstances proved, together with all reasonable inferences drawn from them, are such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury that the defendant is guilty. You are to take into consideration all the evidence in this case, both direct and circumstantial.

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Bluebook (online)
147 F. 594, 1906 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-giuliani-ded-1906.