United States v. Gerald Waechter

771 F.2d 974, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 22689
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 4, 1985
Docket83-1382
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 771 F.2d 974 (United States v. Gerald Waechter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Gerald Waechter, 771 F.2d 974, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 22689 (6th Cir. 1985).

Opinion

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Gerald Waechter appeals from his conviction on seventeen counts of knowingly making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 18 U.S.C. § 1010. Waechter is a real estate investor whose alleged false statements involved bids that he caused to be placed for houses HUD was selling. The Government alleged that Waechter’s practice of having employees submit multiple bids for a single property, in a manner that did not reveal that Waechter controlled all the bids, constituted false statements because Waechter intended to withdraw any bid except the lowest bid necessary to outbid his competitors and enable him to purchase a house. As we find no evidence that Waechter’s method of bidding involved making either express or implied statements to HUD that were false, the district court’s judgment in this case is reversed.

I.

In 1974, HUD owned over 15,000 single-family houses in the Detroit metropolitan area as a result of foreclosures of Federal Housing Administration loans. The size of this inventory of houses in need of repair was unmatched elsewhere in the country. Although HUD generally repaired houses itself before offering them for sale to the public, the department determined to make an exception in Detroit. HUD established a special pilot program in Detroit under which private parties purchased HUD houses “as is.” The purchasers were either investors who repaired the houses and then offered them for resale, or owner-occupants. The object of the Detroit pilot program was to transfer HUD’s overwhelming inventory of houses to private owner-occupants as quickly as possible.

The Detroit office of HUD operated independently from Washington in establishing the rules and regulations that governed the pilot program. A group of employees in the Detroit HUD office made policy decisions concerning the pilot program. Policies were not always reduced to writing. Some policies remained informal and unannounced, while others were published in HUD’s selling list books which informed the public of the houses that were available for sale and the requirements for placing bids on the houses.

The Detroit HUD office established a bidding system under which it accepted bids on each of a group of houses until a publicly-announced closing date. HUD then sorted the bids according to the individual house with which they were concerned. At a public bid-opening ceremony the name and address of each bidder and the amount of each bid was read aloud. When a “doing business as” (d/b/a) name was used, HUD announced only that name, although an individual’s signature was required on each bid. HUD generally retained the three highest bids on each house and returned all other bids to the persons who submitted them. The three highest bids on each property were referred to as the top bid, the first back-up bid, and the second back-up bid. An owner-occupant whose bid was among the top three bids always received the first opportunity to purchase the house in preference to two investors with higher bids.

Under the bidding system established for the Detroit pilot program it was necessary to retain the two back-up bids because bids were only “Offers to Deal” rather than “Offers to Purchase.” Although a form entitled “Offer to purchase and Broker’s Tender” was used for bids, HUD’s pilot program listing books defined bids as “Offers to Deal.” Previously, a bid on a HUD *976 house was irrevocable, legally binding on the bidder, and had to be accompanied by a deposit check representing ten percent of the bid. Under the pilot program, HUD received between 600 and 1200 bids for some bid openings, which might involve between 100 and 200 houses. HUD did not have the clerical staff to return by certified mail all the deposit checks of losing bids. Therefore, under the pilot program, a bidder was not required to submit a deposit check along with each bid. A bidder retained the option of withdrawing, cancel-ling, or simply not responding to his or her winning bid for any reason.

Submission of a bid on a particular house did not represent a firm committment to purchase the property. Instead, the winning bidder had from the day of the bid-opening until the following Friday to deposit ten percent of the top bid. If the winning bidder did not meet this deadline for any reason, HUD notified the first back-up bid, who received forty-eight hours during which to deposit ten percent of that bid. If the deposit was not submitted in time, the party who had placed the second back-up bid received another forty-eight hours during which to make the deposit. If all three bidders declined or otherwise failed to deposit ten percent of their bids, HUD took the property off the market until a later date, at which time the house would in most cases be offered at a lower minimum bid.

HUD had no regulation or publicly-announced policy against the use of d/b/a’s in bidding for houses offered through the Detroit pilot program. Nor did HUD have a publicly-announced policy prohibiting multiple bids on a single property by a single person. HUD employees testified that as a matter of unpublished, in-house policy, HUD considered genuine only the highest bid by an individual or members of the same family for any one property. Allegedly all other bids were considered “non-responsive” and were disregarded. On July 16, 1979, six days after the last acts by Waechter and his employees that were the basis of Waechter’s indictment, HUD first published its policy against multiple bidding by a single person on a single property.

Multiple bidding by one person, in the sense of one investor bidding for more than one house, was encouraged by HUD. The department’s objective was to reduce its inventory of houses as quickly as it could. HUD did publicly establish one prohibition pertaining to this sort of multiple bidding, which it published in all HUD listing books in bold type:

ATTENTION; INVESTOR PURCHASERS
WARNING
WHEN INVESTORS ARE NOTIFIED THAT THEY ARE THE SUCCESSFUL BIDDER ON MORE THAN ONE PROPERTY IN A SCHEDULED BID OPENING, THEY MUST SUBMIT COMPLETE SALES PACKAGES ON EACH AND EVERY PROPERTY. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL RESULT IN THE CANCELLATION OF ALL SALES TO THAT INVESTOR FOR THAT WEEK’S BID OPENING.

By this policy, HUD employees testified that HUD intended to prevent an investor who had the highest bid on more than one property from purchasing the most profitable properties and declining all other properties. Thus, withdrawal of a winning bid for one property offered on a particular day operated as withdrawal of bids on all other properties offered that day.

Gerald Waechter is a Detroit real estate investor. The evidence adduced at trial reveals that Waechter and his assistant Steve Diamond designed a method of bidding for HUD houses that was tailored to enable them to take advantage of HUD’s bidding practices in administering the pilot program. Waechter’s method of bidding maximized his chances of winning the auction on any particular property while also paying the lowest price possible to purchase the property by outbidding any competitors. Between May 29, 1979 and July 10, 1979, Waechter placed either two or *977 three bids on at least seventeen HUD houses.

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771 F.2d 974, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 22689, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-gerald-waechter-ca6-1985.