United States v. Garcia Rodriguez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 24-1939
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1939 D.C. Nos. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:19-cr-00614-PJH-1 4:22-cv-06506-PJH v. Northern District of California, Oakland JOSE DE JESUS GARCIA RODRIGUEZ, MEMORANDUM* Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Phyllis Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 8, 2026 San Francisco, California

Before: NGUYEN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and MATSUMOTO, Senior District Judge. **

On October 24, 2022, Garcia Rodriguez moved to vacate his conviction under

28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) based on trial

counsel’s alleged failure to advise Garcia Rodriguez of the “virtually certain”

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. deportation consequences of his guilty plea prior to his plea.1 Garcia Rodriguez

alleged that, had counsel done so, he would have proceeded to trial. After the district

court denied the § 2255 motion, Garcia Rodriguez timely appealed. We granted a

certificate of appealability on the issue of IAC and we appointed counsel for Garcia

Rodriguez. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a), and 2255(d),

and we affirm.

We review the district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion de novo,

United States v. Rodriguez, 49 F.4th 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 2022), and the district

court’s underlying factual findings for clear error, United States v. Seng Chen Yong,

926 F.3d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 2019). We may affirm “on any ground supported by the

record.” Johnson v. United States, 139 F.4th 830, 836 (9th Cir. 2025).

To prevail on his IAC claim, Garcia Rodriguez must show that trial counsel’s

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that Garcia

Rodriguez suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687–88, 691 (1984). Because Garcia Rodriguez’s IAC claim fails based on “lack of

sufficient prejudice,” we assume without deciding that counsel’s performance was

constitutionally inadequate. See id. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an

1 Garcia Rodriguez’s pro se § 2255 motion requested that his sentence be reduced to 30 months in prison. In his counseled appeal, however, Garcia Rodriguez clarified that he seeks vacatur of his conviction.

2 ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect

will often be so, that course should be followed.”).

Garcia Rodriguez has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice. To demonstrate

prejudice, Garcia Rodriguez must show that “but for counsel’s errors,” Garcia

Rodriguez “would either have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain.” United

States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States

v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2004)). Because Garcia Rodriguez “has not

argued that he would have received a better plea deal,” prejudice “rests on whether

[Garcia Rodriguez] would have gone to trial had he received better advice regarding

the immigration consequences of his plea.” Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1214. We will

“not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how

he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Lee v. United States, 582

U.S. 357, 369 (2017). We look instead “to contemporaneous evidence to

substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” Id.

To assess whether a defendant “would have gone to trial,” we weigh:

(1) how likely the defendant would be to prevail at trial; (2) the defendant’s relative connections to the United States and to his country of citizenship; (3) the relative consequences of the defendant’s guilty plea compared to a guilty verdict at trial; and most importantly; (4) any evidence of how important immigration consequences were to the defendant at the time he pleaded guilty.

Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1214 (citing Lee, 582 U.S. at 367–71). None of these factors

weigh in favor of Garcia Rodriguez, and thus he has not demonstrated prejudice.

3 The likelihood of prevailing at trial favors the Government. Garcia Rodriguez

has not identified a viable trial defense and concedes that this factor likely weighs

against him. Garcia Rodriguez’s vague assertion that a defense may have been

available is insufficient, especially where, as here, the Government has a particularly

strong case. See United States v. Silveira, 997 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2021).

The second factor is neutral because Garcia Rodriguez had strong connections

to both the United States and Mexico. At the time of his plea, Garcia Rodriguez had

lived in the United States for almost two-thirds of his life, was a legal permanent

resident, and had parents and five siblings residing in the United States. Garcia

Rodriguez’s three children, however, all lived in Mexico with their mothers, and

before his incarceration, Garcia Rodriguez visited them twice or thrice annually.

Thus, this factor does not weigh in favor of either party. See Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at

1214–15.

The third factor weighs in favor of the Government. By pleading guilty to

one count of distribution of methamphetamine, Garcia Rodriguez significantly

reduced his sentencing exposure. Garcia Rodriguez also received the Government’s

guarantee that it would recommend a guidelines sentence of eighty-seven months.

Had Garcia Rodriguez elected to proceed to trial on the three charged counts, the

Government could have superseded “with multiple counts of distribution of 50 or

more grams of methamphetamine . . . in violation of § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), each of

4 which would have carried a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.” By

pleading guilty, Garcia Rodriguez also avoided any additional charges arising from

his continued drug dealing while on pretrial supervision. Because Garcia

Rodriguez’s plea provided a reduction in criminal liability and sentencing exposure

compared to what he would have faced in proceeding to trial, this factor weighs

against him. See Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1215.

The last factor likewise favors the Government. The declarations of trial

counsel and Garcia Rodriguez show that immigration consequences were discussed

in the context of Garcia Rodriguez’s plea. There is, however, no contemporaneous

evidence that immigration consequences ranked paramount for Garcia Rodriguez.

And his “post hoc assertions,” Lee, 582 U.S. at 369, are insufficient to shift this

factor in his favor.

In sum, Garcia Rodriguez has failed to show prejudice. See Rodriguez, 49

F.4th at 1214–16. Thus, even assuming without deciding that counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Garcia Rodriguez is not entitled

to relief under § 2255. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699–700.2

AFFIRMED.

2 We do not address whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Even accepted as true, Garcia Rodriguez’s assertions fail to demonstrate prejudice for the foregoing reasons. See Rodriguez, 49 F.4th at 1214–16; see also Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 791–92.