United States v. Galbreth

908 F. Supp. 877, 43 Fed. R. Serv. 585, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20642, 1995 WL 693968
District Court, D. New Mexico·Decided October 4, 1995·No. Crim. 94-197 MV·Published·Cited by 23 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VAZQUEZ, District Judge.

The subject of this Memorandum Opinion and Order is Defendant’s Motion for Admission of Expert Opinion Evidence Regarding Polygraph Results, filed December 23, 1994. Plaintiff United States of America filed a Response, January 3, 1995, and Defendant filed a Reply, January 13, 1995. A Daubert hearing was held March 9-10,1995, to determine the admissibility of Defendant’s expert opinion evidence regarding polygraph results. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench and held that in this case the expert opinion evidence regarding polygraph results was admissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and 403. The purpose of this Memorandum Opinion and Order is to further explicate the Court’s oral ruling. 1

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 8, 1994, the Grand Jury indicted Defendant William Galbreth, on three counts of willful tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, for intentionally filing returns which under reported his income. It is undisputed that Defendant failed to include on his income tax' returns certain items of income which should have been reported. At trial, the sole issue is whether the willful mens rea existed, i.e., whether Defendant knew that his income tax returns omitted taxable income which should have been set forth on the forms.

At defense counsel’s request, Dr. David Raskin, a professor of psychology at the University of Utah, administered a polygraph test to Defendant to determine his knowledge and intent regarding the items which should have been reported. The examination was conducted on August 10,1994. Dr. Ras-kin concluded that Defendant was truthful in his statements that he did not realize his returns under reported his taxable income. At trial, Defendant intends to call Dr. Raskin as an expert witness to testify about the testing procedures, to explain how the test was evaluated and to explain his interpretation of the results. Dr. Raskin is expected to testify that the results are indicative of.a truthful polygraph test outcome with regard to the relevant questions. 2 Dr. Raskin will not testify as to his personal opinion that Defendant was in fact telling the truth.

II. DAUBERT STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

The Court must determine whether Dr. Raskin’s testimony is admissible pursuant to the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., — U.S. —, 113 *879 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Although the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly upheld the exclusion of polygraph evidence to prove the correctness of the results under the Frye “general acceptance” test, it has not addressed whether polygraph results are admissible pursuant to Daubert. 3 Thus, the issue before the Court is an issue of first impression.

In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standard for the admission of expert scientific evidence in federal courts. The Court held that the Frye test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically by Rule 702, which provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The Frye test required the proponent of the scientific evidence to establish as a foundation that the evidence was of a type generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. In rejecting the “austere,” id. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2794, Frye test, the Daubert Court did not dispense entirely with the general acceptance inquiry. General acceptance continues to be a factor that trial courts should consider along with other factors in determining admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. However, standing alone it is not dispositive.

Although the Daubert Court found that the “rigid,” Frye test was incompatible with the “liberal thrust,” of the Federal Rules of Evidence and their general approach to relaxing the traditional barriers of “opinion,” id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169, 109 S.Ct. 439, —, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988)), testimony, the Court nonetheless recognized that the rules place limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Trial judges maintain a vital “gatek-eeping,” id. — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2798, or screening function. In performing this function, trial judges must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.

Applying a plain meaning approach to Fed. R.Evid. 702, the Court held that in assessing the admissibility of scientific testimony, trial courts must determine that the testimony is based on scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. First, the Court offered general .guidance to trial courts in determining whether the proposed testimony constitutes “scientific knowledge.” It explained that the adjective scientific implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science and that the word knowledge connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Id. The Court repudiated the notion that scientific knowledge is a static body of propositions that are “immutably true.” Id. Rather, it recognized science as “a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement,” and it explained that “in order to qualify as scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Id. According to the Court, that method is a validation technique consisting of the formulation of hypotheses and observation or ex *880 perimentation to test the hypotheses.

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United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 43 Fed. R. Serv. 585, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20642, 1995 WL 693968 (D.N.M. 1995).

908 F. Supp. 877 (United States v. Galbreth) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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