JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Gail Knapp appeals her sentence of 87 months imposed upon her guilty plea to conspiring to cultivate and distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), and 846 (1988). Knapp argues that: (1) the district court erred by not supporting her sentence with an individualized statement of reasons; (2) the district court erred by not considering required statutory factors when imposing her sentence; (3) these errors violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection; and (4) the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. We affirm the judgment of the district court.1
On September 10, 1990, federal and state law enforcement officers arrested Knapp and four others while executing a series of simultaneous search warrants at various locations throughout eastern Missouri where marijuana was being grown. Officers seized approximately 48,000 marijuana [568]*568plants and 400 pounds of processed marijuana.
On November 26, 1990, Knapp pled guilty to a one count indictment alleging that she and her four co-defendants conspired to cultivate and distribute marijuana.
Co-defendant William M. Davis, who launched the conspiracy in 1986, owned all of the properties, except one, where the marijuana was grown. Three of the co-defendants — Knapp, Willard J. Rhodes and James Dixon — resided at various of Davis’ properties. In exchange for paying no rent, they served as the “caretaker” of the property at which they resided and were responsible for irrigating and fertilizing the marijuana and controlling the weeds. They also were to receive a percentage of the profits from the crop harvested on their property. Davis directed the enterprise through co-defendant Richard L. Samuelson, who supervised the caretakers’ activities.
Rhodes and Dixon joined the conspiracy in March 1990 and Knapp joined three months later in June. Of the approximately 48,000 marijuana plants seized, 794 were confiscated from the property in Montgomery County, Missouri, where Knapp resided.
The presentence report identified Knapp as the least culpable of the five co-defendants. Based on the total amount of marijuana seized at all of the properties searched on September 10, the PSR set Knapp’s base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines at 38. Subtracting two levels for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR recommended a total offense level of 36.
At the sentencing hearing for the five co-defendants, the government filed five motions for downward departure under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5K1.1 (Nov.1990). The district court acted on the government’s motions and reduced the offense level for all five. The court explained:
In any event, I do believe there has been substantial assistance in the investigation of this matter and other matters rendered by all of the defendants here.
And that justifies considering a sentence below the guidelines, and if need be, below the statutory required minimum sentence.
And I do give substantial weight to the Government’s evaluation ... of the extent of the defendants’ assistance.
After reducing Knapp’s offense level from 36 to 29, the court sentenced her to 87 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The court acknowledged that Knapp joined the conspiracy later than the others and participated for only three months, but found that she and the other two caretakers “knew enough about what was going on to be chargeable with the entirety.”
I.
Knapp first argues that her sentence is unlawful because the district court did not support it with an individualized statement of reasons. She alleges that the court made only a “general, conclusory, cursory” statement that applied to the defendants as a group.
The government contends that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Knapp is simply arguing that the extent of the downward departure was not sufficient. We have held that a defendant’s challenge to the extent of the district court’s downward departure from the guidelines is unreviewable. United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir.1990). We read Knapp’s argument differently, however. Knapp is not directly challenging the extent of the downward departure; rather, she asserts that the district court imposed the sentence “in violation of the law” by failing to state the reasons for the sentence as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
In United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420 (D.C.Cir.1991), the defendant similarly argued that the district court did not adequately state its reasons for imposing sentence, which included a downward departure. Id. at 422. The District of Columbia Circuit held that just as the appeals court generally could not review a defendant’s [569]*569challenge to a district court’s decision not to depart downward in the first instance, it also lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s “methodology or reasoning” in choosing to make a downward departure. Id. at 424.
Hazel is persuasive and this could end our inquiry. We have reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing, however, and conclude that district court did in fact give an adequate statement of reasons as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). While the district court did not address each defendant individually, the court stated at length its reasons for granting downward departures to all five co-defendants.
The district court acknowledged the substantial assistance all five defendants gave the government and their lack of a prior criminal record. Balancing those mitigating factors, the court observed that the defendants had cultivated 48,000 marijuana plants with the intent to distribute and that each had knowledge of the extent of the conspiracy. Nonetheless, in justifying the lesser sentences given to the three caretakers, the court stated that while they may have been legally chargeable with knowledge of the extent of the conspiracy; the “enormity” of the enterprise may not have been fully known to them. The court also stated that each sentence addressed the objectives of punishment, general deterrence, and incapacitation.
Knapp cites to no case requiring the court to give an individualized statement of reasons when the same reasons may apply to two or more co-defendants. Moreover, we see nothing in section 3553(c) that suggests such a requirement. We thus conclude that the district court supported Knapp’s sentence with an adequate statement of reasons.
II.
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JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Gail Knapp appeals her sentence of 87 months imposed upon her guilty plea to conspiring to cultivate and distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), and 846 (1988). Knapp argues that: (1) the district court erred by not supporting her sentence with an individualized statement of reasons; (2) the district court erred by not considering required statutory factors when imposing her sentence; (3) these errors violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection; and (4) the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. We affirm the judgment of the district court.1
On September 10, 1990, federal and state law enforcement officers arrested Knapp and four others while executing a series of simultaneous search warrants at various locations throughout eastern Missouri where marijuana was being grown. Officers seized approximately 48,000 marijuana [568]*568plants and 400 pounds of processed marijuana.
On November 26, 1990, Knapp pled guilty to a one count indictment alleging that she and her four co-defendants conspired to cultivate and distribute marijuana.
Co-defendant William M. Davis, who launched the conspiracy in 1986, owned all of the properties, except one, where the marijuana was grown. Three of the co-defendants — Knapp, Willard J. Rhodes and James Dixon — resided at various of Davis’ properties. In exchange for paying no rent, they served as the “caretaker” of the property at which they resided and were responsible for irrigating and fertilizing the marijuana and controlling the weeds. They also were to receive a percentage of the profits from the crop harvested on their property. Davis directed the enterprise through co-defendant Richard L. Samuelson, who supervised the caretakers’ activities.
Rhodes and Dixon joined the conspiracy in March 1990 and Knapp joined three months later in June. Of the approximately 48,000 marijuana plants seized, 794 were confiscated from the property in Montgomery County, Missouri, where Knapp resided.
The presentence report identified Knapp as the least culpable of the five co-defendants. Based on the total amount of marijuana seized at all of the properties searched on September 10, the PSR set Knapp’s base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines at 38. Subtracting two levels for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR recommended a total offense level of 36.
At the sentencing hearing for the five co-defendants, the government filed five motions for downward departure under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5K1.1 (Nov.1990). The district court acted on the government’s motions and reduced the offense level for all five. The court explained:
In any event, I do believe there has been substantial assistance in the investigation of this matter and other matters rendered by all of the defendants here.
And that justifies considering a sentence below the guidelines, and if need be, below the statutory required minimum sentence.
And I do give substantial weight to the Government’s evaluation ... of the extent of the defendants’ assistance.
After reducing Knapp’s offense level from 36 to 29, the court sentenced her to 87 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The court acknowledged that Knapp joined the conspiracy later than the others and participated for only three months, but found that she and the other two caretakers “knew enough about what was going on to be chargeable with the entirety.”
I.
Knapp first argues that her sentence is unlawful because the district court did not support it with an individualized statement of reasons. She alleges that the court made only a “general, conclusory, cursory” statement that applied to the defendants as a group.
The government contends that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Knapp is simply arguing that the extent of the downward departure was not sufficient. We have held that a defendant’s challenge to the extent of the district court’s downward departure from the guidelines is unreviewable. United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir.1990). We read Knapp’s argument differently, however. Knapp is not directly challenging the extent of the downward departure; rather, she asserts that the district court imposed the sentence “in violation of the law” by failing to state the reasons for the sentence as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
In United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420 (D.C.Cir.1991), the defendant similarly argued that the district court did not adequately state its reasons for imposing sentence, which included a downward departure. Id. at 422. The District of Columbia Circuit held that just as the appeals court generally could not review a defendant’s [569]*569challenge to a district court’s decision not to depart downward in the first instance, it also lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s “methodology or reasoning” in choosing to make a downward departure. Id. at 424.
Hazel is persuasive and this could end our inquiry. We have reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing, however, and conclude that district court did in fact give an adequate statement of reasons as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). While the district court did not address each defendant individually, the court stated at length its reasons for granting downward departures to all five co-defendants.
The district court acknowledged the substantial assistance all five defendants gave the government and their lack of a prior criminal record. Balancing those mitigating factors, the court observed that the defendants had cultivated 48,000 marijuana plants with the intent to distribute and that each had knowledge of the extent of the conspiracy. Nonetheless, in justifying the lesser sentences given to the three caretakers, the court stated that while they may have been legally chargeable with knowledge of the extent of the conspiracy; the “enormity” of the enterprise may not have been fully known to them. The court also stated that each sentence addressed the objectives of punishment, general deterrence, and incapacitation.
Knapp cites to no case requiring the court to give an individualized statement of reasons when the same reasons may apply to two or more co-defendants. Moreover, we see nothing in section 3553(c) that suggests such a requirement. We thus conclude that the district court supported Knapp’s sentence with an adequate statement of reasons.
II.
Knapp next argues that because the court did not adequately state its reasons for imposing sentence, it never properly considered the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988). In applying the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court must consider such factors as the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the purposes of punishment, general deterrence, and incapacitation of the defendant; correctional objectives; the applicable sentencing range under the guidelines; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants who are guilty of similar conduct and have similar records; and the need to provide restitution. Id.
Knapp primarily relies on United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1005, 112 L.Ed.2d 1088 (1991), which states that a sentencing court should be “mindful” of the section 3553(a) factors when explaining the reasons for imposing sentence, id. at 1573, and should “tailor its comments to show that the sentence imposed is appropriate” in light of the statutory factors. Id. at 1572. Parrado also states, however, that a sentencing court need not “ ‘incant the specific language used in the guidelines’ ” nor state “that a particular factor is not applicable in a particular case.” Id.
The sentencing transcript demonstrates that the district court adequately addressed the factors listed in section 3553(a). The district court discussed the scope and objectives of the conspiracy; the defendants’ lack of prior criminal records; the objectives of punishment, general deterrence and incapacitation; the applicable guideline ranges and the justification for downward departures; the lesser culpability of the three caretakers; and the inability of four of the defendants to pay a fine.
In short, we see nothing in the transcript that would cause us to conclude that the district court did not fully consider the factors of section 3553(a).
III.
Knapp next argues that because the district court failed to give an individualized statement of reasons for imposing her sentence and failed to properly consider the statutory factors, the sentence violates her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
In light of our holdings on the first two issues raised by Knapp, we need not address this argument.
[570]*570IV.
Finally, Knapp argues that her 87-month sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment because it is disproportionate to her offense conduct and background, and because the other caretakers who had a longer involvement with the conspiracy received the same sentence. In light of the substantial downward departure the district court granted, we conclude that this argument simply lacks merit. See United States v. Murphy, 899 F.2d 714, 719 (8th Cir.1990) (a sentence within statutory limits is generally not subject to review under the eighth amendment); Harmelin v. Michigan, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2701, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for first-time offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine did not violate eighth amendment).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.