United States v. Frazer

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided September 7, 1993·No. 93-1110·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


September 7, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 93-1110

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JAMES E. FRAZER,

Defendant, Appellant.

__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
______________

___________________

Robert P. Woodward on brief for appellant.
__________________
Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, on brief for
________________
appellee.

__________________

__________________

Per Curiam. Appellant, James Frazer, pled guilty to a
__________

fourteen count indictment charging conspiracy to commit and

the commission of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371

& 1344. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty

months. In imposing this sentence, the court applied a two

level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. The court also denied Frazer's request

for a two level downward adjustment in his sentence, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b), on the ground that he had been a minor

participant. Frazer appeals both the upward adjustment and

the denial of the downward adjustment in his sentence.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. According to

the Pre-Sentence Report, Frazer was a participant with ten to

fifteen other individuals in a scheme to defraud banks. The

scheme involved the illegal acquisition of business checks

and check writing machines, the acquisition of information on

actual account holders, and the manufacturing of false

identification. A stolen check was made payable to the

actual account holder who was identified on the check as an

employee of the business from which the check had been

obtained. A conspirator then would go to each branch of the

actual account holder's bank and, using false identification,

either cash the check or split deposit it, i.e., the

conspirator would deposit part and receive part in cash. The

-2-

scheme defrauded banks throughout New England of tens of

thousands of dollars. Frazer was one of the "runners" or

check cashers in this scheme. From July to September 1991,

Frazer cashed checks which defrauded banks of over eight

thousand dollars. He received one third of the total take

from his role in the scheme.

After pleading guilty, Frazer was released on bail and

scheduled to be sentenced on December 2, 1992. This was

later continued by the court until December 7, 1992. Frazer

did not appear on December 7. A bench warrant was issued and

Frazer was arrested on January 5, 1993. On January 13, 1993,

he appeared before the court and was sentenced. Due to his

previous failure to appear for sentencing, the court found

Frazer willfully to have obstructed justice and increased his

sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3C1.1.1

Frazer contends that the court erred when it increased

his offense level two levels for obstructing justice by

willfully failing to appear at his sentencing hearing on

December 7, 1992. Frazer argues first that the court erred

when it allowed the government to recall a witness to correct

earlier testimony as to the date of his failure to appear.

He also contends that the government failed to meet its

____________________

1. Subsequently, Frazer was indicted and pled guilty to a
violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) for his failure to appear
at sentencing.

-3-

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his

failure to appear was "willful." We find merit in neither

argument.

On the afternoon of the sentencing hearing on January

13, 1993, the court allowed the government to recall Deputy

Marshall Shurtleff. The government had previously rested its

case after the morning recess. Shurtleff had testified on

that morning that he had been in court on December 2, 1992,

and that Frazer had failed to appear for sentencing on that

date. When the court returned for its afternoon session, it

became apparent that there was confusion as to whether the

sentencing hearing at which Frazer had not appeared had been

on December 2 or on December 7. Over Frazer's objection, the

court allowed the government to recall Shurtleff who

testified that he had been mistaken in his morning testimony

and that in fact the date of the hearing had been December 7.

We find no merit in appellant's objection to the

admission of this evidence. To be sure, the defendant enjoys

a due process right to be sentenced only upon information the

court has determined to be neither false nor materially

incorrect. United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 63 (1st
______________ ______

Cir. 1991). In this case, however, there is no claim that

the amended testimony was inaccurate nor that the error in

the morning testimony was due to anything other than

confusion caused by the change in sentencing dates. We find

-4-

the sentencing court to have been well within its discretion

in allowing the government to recall Shurtleff and in

permitting him to amend his previous testimony. See Id. at
___ __

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

United States v. Frazer, (1st Cir. 1993).

United States v. Frazer (United States v. Frazer) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

United States v. Andrew Stroud
893 F.2d 504 (Second Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Larnel Webb Lofton
905 F.2d 1315 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Luis Cepeda
907 F.2d 11 (First Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Charles Perry
908 F.2d 56 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Walter F. Curran
926 F.2d 59 (First Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Kaya Aymelek
926 F.2d 64 (First Circuit, 1991)
United States v. William Gregorio
956 F.2d 341 (First Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Jose Daniel
962 F.2d 100 (First Circuit, 1992)
United States v. John L. St. Cyr
977 F.2d 698 (First Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Richard Ocasio-Rivera
991 F.2d 1 (First Circuit, 1993)