United States v. Fletcher

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 25-6020
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6020 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 10, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-6020 (D.C. No. 5:09-CR-00021-R-1) JOHN CHARLES FLETCHER, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, McHUGH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Defendant–Appellant John Charles Fletcher appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and

the dismissal of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 404(b) of the First

Step Act of 2018 based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Exercising jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-6020 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2025 Page: 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Mr. Fletcher’s Sentence

On August 4, 2009, Mr. Fletcher was charged with thirty-nine counts alleging

various crimes related to a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine. The

alleged crimes included one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and

cocaine powder; one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises; two counts of

being a felon in possession of a firearm; and thirty-five counts of various cocaine-

related crimes, including manufacturing, distributing, and possessing with the intent

to distribute or manufacture cocaine. Each of Mr. Fletcher’s crimes occurred between

May 2003 and September 2008. The Government also filed an information to

establish prior drug convictions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, which enhanced the

mandatory minimum penalties for several of Mr. Fletcher’s charges. Mr. Fletcher

proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty of all thirty-nine counts.

Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence

investigation report (“PSR”), which recommended a total offense level of 46. This

included a base offense level of 38, a two-level enhancement for possession of a

firearm during the commission of the offense, a four-level enhancement based on his

role as the organizer and leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more

participants, and another two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. As to

obstruction, the Government presented evidence at sentencing that Mr. Fletcher had

harassed, threatened, and assaulted a Government witness during trial preparation,

attempting to prevent him from cooperating. The PSR recommended placing

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Mr. Fletcher in criminal history category VI based on six criminal history points and

Mr. Fletcher’s status as a career offender. This resulted in a recommended sentence

of lifetime imprisonment under the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines.

The district court adopted the PSR without change. On October 24, 2011, the

court imposed the statutory maximum penalty for each count, resulting in the

following sentences, all to be served concurrently:

• Life imprisonment as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39; • 360 months as to Counts 4, 15, 18, 20, 23, 26, 29, 30, and 33; • 240 months as to Count 14; and • 120 months as to Counts 7 and 19. We affirmed Mr. Fletcher’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.

In 2010—prior to Mr. Fletcher’s sentencing but after the relevant offenses

were committed—Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act. See Pub L. No. 111-

220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). The Fair Sentencing Act sought to reduce disparities

between offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder cocaine by

increasing the quantities of crack cocaine required to trigger a mandatory minimum

sentence and eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for simple possession. Id.

§§ 2–3; United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1148–49 (10th Cir. 2020). At the

time Mr. Fletcher was sentenced, we had said the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply if

the relevant conduct occurred before the act’s passage. See United States v. Reed, 410

F. App’x 107, 111 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). Thus, the district court applied

pre–Fair Sentencing Act ranges to Mr. Fletcher’s conduct in calculating his sentence.

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However, the Supreme Court has since overruled our then-existing approach and held

that the Fair Sentencing Act applies to offenders whose conduct occurred before

enactment but who were sentenced after enactment. Dorsey v. United States, 567

U.S. 260, 281 (2012).

B. Mr. Fletcher’s First Step Act and Compassionate Release Motions

On January 28, 2022, Mr. Fletcher filed a motion for a sentence reduction

pursuant to § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018 and for compassionate release

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018

made the modifications to cocaine-related offenses from the Fair Sentencing Act of

2010 retroactive, allowing pre–Fair Sentencing Act defendants to have their

sentences reduced for certain covered offenses. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L.

115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. And the compassionate release statute,

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), allows a court to reduce a sentence in “extraordinary and

compelling” circumstances if such a reduction is consistent with Sentencing

Commission policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

Mr. Fletcher requested that the district court reduce his sentence to 240 months—

under § 404(b) for his covered offenses and under the compassionate release statute

for his non-covered offenses.

With respect to his non-covered offenses, Mr. Fletcher argued that a

combination of factors—including intervening changes made by the First Step Act,

the fact that he should have never been sentenced under pre–Fair Sentencing Act

penalties, and consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors—amounted to an

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extraordinary and compelling reason justifying a reduction of his sentence.

Expounding on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, Mr. Fletcher asserted that facts such

as his rehabilitation efforts, the non-violent nature of his offenses, and sentencing

disparities between himself and similarly situated defendants as well as his

codefendants justified a reduction in his sentence.

The district court denied Mr. Fletcher’s motion for compassionate release and

then dismissed his § 404(b) motion for lack of standing. The court concluded

Mr. Fletcher’s argument that his sentences were illegal because they were imposed

under pre–Fair Sentencing Act ranges must be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion,

not a motion for compassionate release. Notwithstanding, the court found that the

length of his sentence was not an extraordinary or compelling circumstance because,

even under the Fair Sentencing Act ranges, Mr. Fletcher’s Guidelines range remained

life imprisonment. The district court rejected Mr. Fletcher’s suggestion that a

Guidelines sentence was extraordinary or compelling. Lastly, the court concluded

that any disparities between Mr. Fletcher’s sentence and the sentences received by

his codefendants were justified based on the additional sentencing enhancements

Mr. Fletcher received and the fact that his codefendants each pleaded guilty to a

single count where Mr. Fletcher was tried and convicted of thirty-nine counts.

Turning to the requirement that compassionate release be supported by the

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court concluded that these factors would not support

a sentence reduction even if extraordinary and compelling reasons were found. The

court pointed to Mr. Fletcher’s leadership role in a major drug conspiracy, his

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harassment and intimidation of witnesses, and the fact that past incarceration had not

deterred him from engaging in these offenses. While commending Mr. Fletcher’s

efforts at rehabilitation, the court concluded that these did not “outweigh the

numerous other considerations that bear on an appropriate sentence.” Appellant’s

App’x Vol. III at 172. The court determined that a reduced sentence was therefore

not appropriate under the § 3553(a) factors.

Having denied Mr. Fletcher’s motion for compassionate release, the court

turned to his crack cocaine offenses covered by § 404(b) of the First Step Act.

Importantly, the parties agree that Count 9 of the Superseding Indictment is a non-

covered offense for which Mr. Fletcher is serving a concurrent life sentence. Because

Mr. Fletcher is serving a concurrent life sentence for an offense that is not eligible for

a reduction under § 404(b), the court concluded that it could not remedy the length of

his incarceration. Accordingly, the court held that Mr. Fletcher’s injury was not

redressable and that he lacked standing to bring his § 404(b) claim. The court

therefore dismissed Mr. Fletcher’s § 404(b) motion. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Fletcher raises two arguments. First, he asserts that the district

court abused its discretion in denying his motion for compassionate release by

misapplying the compassionate release framework and by failing to properly consider his

arguments. Second, Mr. Fletcher argues that the district court erred in dismissing his

§ 404(b) motion for lack of standing because the court could redress his injury by

granting both his motion for compassionate release and his § 404(b) motion.

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A. Compassionate Release

Courts may not ordinarily modify a term of imprisonment once imposed. See

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides for an exception—

otherwise known as compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United

States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 826 (10th Cir. 2021). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows

a court “upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the

defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights” to reduce

an incarcerated individual’s term of imprisonment “after considering the factors set

forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds

that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Any reduction in sentence must be “consistent with applicable

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. We review a district

court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). However, we

review de novo arguments concerning the interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the

scope of the district court’s authority thereunder. Maumau, 993 F.3d at 830.

A district court must conduct a three-step test before granting a motion for

compassionate release in which it addresses (1) “whether extraordinary and

compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction”; (2) whether a reduction is

consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements; and (3) whether, in the

court’s discretion, the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors warrant the reduction

authorized by steps one and two. United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042–43

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(10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones,

980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020)). “[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-

release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is

lacking and do not need to address the others.” Id. at 1043 (quotation marks omitted)

(quoting United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021)). A district court

seeking to grant such a motion, however, must address each of the three steps. Id.

The weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the discretion of the

district court both at the time of sentencing and when ruling on a compassionate

release motion, and we will not reverse based on the weighing of those factors

“unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error

of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”

United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 949 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). A

court need not discuss every factor, nor must it mention every mitigating fact a

defendant raises to support a compassionate release motion. See id. at 948. Rather,

the court must set forth only enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties’

arguments and had a reasoned basis for its decision. See id. Because we do not

require a specific discussion of the § 3553(a) factors to impose a Guidelines sentence,

we have said that we do not require anything more detailed “to justify imposing or

maintaining under either paragraph of § 3582(c) a sentence within the recommended

range of the applicable guidelines.” See id.

Mr. Fletcher argues that the district court erred by failing to properly apply the

three-step test for compassionate release. He contends that the district court

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improperly conflated the first and second steps and erred by considering the

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors at step three despite finding that the first and second

requirements were not met. In this way, Mr. Fletcher maintains that the district court

misapplied the steps in the compassionate release framework.

As to the court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, Mr. Fletcher

argues the district court abused its discretion in determining that these factors did not

support a sentence reduction. He states that the court should have considered the

discrepancy between his sentence and the sentences received by his codefendants, as

well as other similarly situated defendants. And he contends that the court failed to

consider whether a lesser sentence would be appropriate under the § 3553(a) factors.

The district court did not err in denying Mr. Fletcher’s motion for

compassionate release. First, Mr. Fletcher’s arguments regarding proper application

of the three-step test are foreclosed by Tenth Circuit case law. We have held that

“district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three

prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the

others.” McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elias, 984 F.3d

at 519). Indeed, we have explicitly rejected the argument that a district court must

proceed through steps one and two before considering the § 3553(a) sentencing

factors. In United States v. Hald, we held that a district court could deny

compassionate release based solely on the § 3553(a) factors so long as the facts put

forward in support of finding extraordinary and compelling reasons are part of that

analysis. See 8 F.4th at 936–37, 947. In so holding, we emphasized that courts

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regularly articulate the analysis of certain issues in a certain order yet permit the

district court’s analysis to proceed in a different order if more convenient. Id. at 945.

As applied to § 3582(c)(1)(A), we found no reason to mandate a particular order. Id.

at 942–43. The district court therefore committed no error in stating that the

§ 3553(a) factors would not support a sentence reduction even if Mr. Fletcher’s

arguments had established extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying

relief.

Second, the record forecloses Mr. Fletcher’s contention that the district court

failed to adequately consider his arguments in support of the § 3553(a) factors. The

court considered Mr. Fletcher’s arguments regarding extraordinary and compelling

reasons as part of the § 3553(a) analysis, addressing each argument and then

concluding that the factors did not support a sentence reduction “even if the

circumstances identified by Mr. Fletcher could be described as extraordinary and

compelling.” See Appellant’s App’x Vol. III at 171.

We are likewise not persuaded that the district court failed to properly consider

Mr. Fletcher’s sentencing disparity arguments. To be sure, the court considered these

arguments when discussing extraordinary and compelling circumstances instead of

the sentencing factors. But this was not error. Indeed, the court specifically

concluded that no unwarranted sentencing disparity existed, finding that disparities

between Mr. Fletcher and his codefendants were justified because each of the

codefendants pleaded guilty to a single count whereas Mr. Fletcher was convicted of

thirty-nine charges after a jury trial. Furthermore, the district court concluded that

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Mr. Fletcher’s Guidelines range remained life imprisonment—a fact Mr. Fletcher

conceded before the district court. Because we have said that we do not require a

specific discussion of the § 3553(a) factors to justify maintaining a Guidelines

sentence on a motion for compassionate release, any failure by the court to

specifically rebut each of Mr. Fletcher’s arguments addressing those factors was not

error. See Hald, 8 F.4th at 948.

Lastly, we reject Mr. Fletcher’s contention that the district court erred by

failing to specifically state that a lesser sentence would not serve the purposes of the

§ 3553(a) factors. In the context of original sentencing, we have stated that a district

court does not commit plain error when it fails to specifically state that a sentence is

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)

so long as the court gives reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence.

United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d 990, 996–97 (10th Cir. 2008). No more is required

when considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors as part of a motion for

compassionate release. The district court met that standard here, detailing its reasons

why Mr. Fletcher’s life sentence remained appropriate and concluding that “the

§ 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction.” See Appellant’s App’x

Vol. III at 171.

Because the § 3553(a) factors are an independent basis to deny compassionate

release, we decline to address Mr. Fletcher’s arguments with respect to the other

compassionate release requirements.

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B. The § 404(b) Motion

Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to decide only “Cases” or

“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To establish Article III standing, a party

seeking relief must establish that (1) “it has suffered an injury in fact;” (2) “the injury

is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;” and (3) “it is likely . . .

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” People for Ethical

Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 996–97

(10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Standing is determined as of the

time the action is brought.” Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th

Cir. 2005). We review a district court’s determination of standing de novo. Id.

In addition to the requirement that the parties possess standing at the time an

action is filed, constitutional mootness requires the controversy to “remain alive at

the trial and appellate stages of the litigation.” See Fletcher v. United States, 116

F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 1997). Constitutional mootness is “the doctrine of

standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the

commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence

(mootness).” S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1997)

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520

U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). “A case becomes constitutionally moot if it ceases to

present a real and substantial controversy with respect to which specific relief may be

fashioned.” Bacote v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 119 F.4th 808, 812 (10th Cir. 2024)

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(internal quotation marks omitted). Constitutional mootness, like standing, is thus a

threshold issue which we review de novo. See Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321.

In summary, “[s]tanding concerns whether a plaintiff’s action qualifies as a

case or controversy when it is filed; mootness ensures it remains one at the time a

court renders its decision.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2016).

“Failure to satisfy the requirements of either doctrine places a dispute outside the

reach of the federal courts.” Id. at 1164.

Addressing standing in the context of motions brought under the First Step

Act, we held in United States v. Mannie that the only cognizable injury in a First Step

Act motion is the defendant’s ongoing incarceration. 971 F.3d at 1153. Accordingly,

the defendant has standing to bring a First Step Act motion only if the court can

redress the length of the defendant’s ongoing incarceration. Id. In Mannie, the

defendant had concurrent sentences for non-covered offenses, which would remain in

effect even if the defendant succeeded on his First Step Act arguments. Id. Because

the length of the defendant’s sentence could not be redressed, we held that the

defendant lacked standing to bring his motion. Id. at 1154.

Mr. Fletcher argues that the district court erred in concluding that he lacked

standing to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. While not all of

his concurrent sentences were for covered offenses under § 404(b), Mr. Fletcher

maintains that the district court could redress the injury of the non-covered offenses

using compassionate release and that standing was therefore present at the time he

filed his motion.

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Unlike the defendant in Mannie, Mr. Fletcher brought his § 404(b) motion

alongside a motion for compassionate release, making the length of his sentence

redressable for both his covered and non-covered offenses. Measuring standing at the

time his motion was filed, Mr. Fletcher had a redressable injury sufficient to confer

standing.

However, Mr. Fletcher effectively lost his live case or controversy after the

court denied his motion for compassionate release. That is, Mr. Fletcher’s § 404(b)

motion became moot because the court could no longer redress his ongoing

incarceration. While the district court used a misnomer in holding that Mr. Fletcher

lacked standing, the court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction based on the absence of a live case or controversy. Indeed, mootness is

often described as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.” See S. Utah

Wilderness All., 110 F.3d at 727 (quoting Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S.

at 68 n.22) (quotation marks omitted). Because constitutional mootness—like

standing—is a threshold jurisdictional issue, the district court properly dismissed

Mr. Fletcher’s § 404(b) motion.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of

Mr. Fletcher’s motion for compassionate release and AFFIRM the dismissal of his

§ 404(b) motion.

Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge