United States v. Fitzpatrick

96 F. Supp. 491, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2478
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided April 3, 1951·No. Cr. 1743-50·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

MORRIS, District Judge.

This defendant was charged in an indictment of seven counts with violation of Title 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, in that, having appeared before a duly created sub-committee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, he was asked certain questions pertinent to the question then under inquiry before said Sub-Committee and did refuse to answer said questions. An attack was made upon the indictment upon several grounds which are not necessary here to discuss, as they were disposed of adversely to the defendant by this Court acting through Judge Kirkland. Thereupon, upon plea of not guilty, and jury having been waived, a trial was had upon the merits.

That the Sub-Committee was legally constituted and the questions asked were pertinent to the inquiry sufficiently appear. With respect to count 7, the Government concedes that the answer of the defendant, to the effect that he did not know, removes the necessity for a consideration of that count. It is conceded by the Government that the remaining counts relate to ques *493 tions which are criminatory, but it is insisted that the defendant did not sufficiently claim the privilege, accorded to him under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, to decline to answer such questions on the ground that they might tend to incriminate him. The defendant insists that he did claim such privilege and, therefore, his failure to answer such questions could not properly subject him to a conviction of contempt for failure to make answer.

The transcript of the proceedings before the Committee particularly with reference to the examination of this defendant shows that the defendant claimed the right to refuse to answer these questions upon the ground that he was protected in so doing “by the First Amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the Fifth Amendment.” It is certainly true, as the Government asserts, that the defendant before the Committee insisted that the Committee had no right to inquire of him concerning the matters to which the questions related. He did so persistently and insolently, and he did not in any of such discussions use the term “that he refused to answer any of such questions on the ground that they would tend to incriminate him.” Now, whatever may have been thought to have been the effect of the First Amendment upon the right of a congressional committee to make inquiries relating to the activities, affiliations, and associations of a witness, in the light of the Josephson case, 1 in the Second Circuit, and the Barsky case, 2 in our own Circuit, there can be no possible question in these two jurisdictions, if indeed there can be in any other, that the First Amendment does not preclude the Committee from asking the questions here involved, nor does it justify the defendant in refusing to answer them. But this misapprehension on the part of the defendant in no way vitiates his right to the protection under the Fifth Amendment, if he sufficiently made such claim.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides, among other things, that “No person * * * shall .be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * *.” The other provisions of that Amendment obviously have no relation to this controversy, and the provision mentioned is the one that has been construed to justify a witness in any proceeding in declining to answer any question that would tend to incriminate him, or expose him to prosecution for crime. There can be no doubt that this protection extends to a witness testifying before any judicial, congressional or administrative body of the United States Government, although, apparently, there has been misapprehension on the part of some that it does not. The use, therefore, by the defendant of the term “Fifth Amendment” could only have reference to this provision therein, and, unless by some explicit statement that he was not claiming the protection of that provision of the Constitution, it would seem sufficient to put the Committee on notice that he was asserting such claim.

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United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2478 (D.D.C. 1951).

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