United States v. Eugene James Allegrucci

299 F.2d 811
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedMarch 22, 1962
Docket13684_1
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 299 F.2d 811 (United States v. Eugene James Allegrucci) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Eugene James Allegrucci, 299 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1962).

Opinion

GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 659 for possession of goods stolen from interstate commerce, knowing them to be stolen. The goods in question were a Bell & Howell motion picture projector and two Rolleicord cameras. 1 The case has been here before and was sent back for a new trial because of what the Court found to be erroneous instructions to the jury. United States v. Allegrucci, 3 Cir., 258 F.2d 70 (1958).

The appellant first argues that the evidence in the case is insufficient to sustain the conviction. The statute is a technical one and requires the Government to prove the allegation that the goods were stolen from one of various enumerated places. 2 Here, the indictment charged that the goods had been stolen from Railway Express Agency platforms, to which they had been delivered by employees of the express company. This Court, upon the prior consideration of the case, said: ■.,

“There was ample evidence from which the jury could have found in this case that the goods involved in the indictment * * * were stolen from the platforms on which they had been placed in the course of movement in interstate commerce * -x- -x- »

The goods were shipped from New York City to points in West Virginia, Texas and Florida. They were not received by the consignees and the Government’s theory is that they were stolen from the platforms of the Express Agency in the Long Island City Terminal and the Eleventh Avenue Terminal, respectively. The defense claims that at the second trial there was evidence which showed conclusively that the goods were not stolen from either platform of the Express Agency but were regularly forwarded into the channels of interstate commerce. If this testimony — by two *813 drivers of the Express Agency — thus showed that the goods were not stolen from the platforms and the jury accepted the testimony, then the specific crime for which the defendant was indicted has not been committed. Each driver concerned told of his delivery of the article in question to the platform. Neither got a receipt upon the delivery of the package. We do not see from the testimony that the “sorting room” which the drivers talked about under skillful examination by defendant’s counsel is any separate and distinct room on either of the station platforms. The photographs introduced —so far as they show anything — seem to show that the “sorting area” is just a part of the general loading and unloading platform. Because the argument is pressed with some vigor, we set out in Appendix I to this opinion the full testimony concerning this point as it was given to us by the defendant. Our conclusion from the testimony is that, taken most favorably to the defendant, it is inconclusive and certainly nothing upon which a court should take the question of theft from the platform away from the jury.

The appellant stresses vigorously and we have considered carefully the attack upon the trial court’s handling of memoranda under the so-called Jencks statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. There are two of these memoranda. We shall consider first the one having to do with the witness Zippittelli. She is a young woman who was in and about the Allegrucci household because she assisted in the care of the defendant’s ill mother. After an F.B.I. agent talked with her he wrote down what was described as a summary of his conversation. She did not see or adopt the memorandum nor did it purport to be a full, substantially verbatim account of what she said. We could stop discussion of this point forthwith because the memorandum is not the type described by the statute in subsection (e) (2). 3 The trial judge, however, after examining the memorandum in camera,, read it to counsel for the defense. Miss Zippittelli’s testimony in court was completely consistent with the agent’s report of the interview. A comparison of Miss Zippittelli’s statement and her testimony is set out in Appendix II. Furthermore, it was highly favorable to the defendant because *814 the young lady said that the cameras exhibited as the stolen goods were not the cameras which she saw in defendant’s home. We see no error in the conduct of the trial judge in giving counsel more than he was entitled to.

The second objection refers to a memorandum made by Government Agent Roberts after an interview with the defendant himself. The point urged is that, after Agent Roberts testified to the substance of an interview with the defendant on July 15, 1955, the trial court should have ordered the production of a memorandum which the agent made of the meeting. He bases this on subsection (e) (1) of the Jencks Act, cited above.

The facts of this case on this point are almost indistinguishable from those of United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961), with which we agree. While Annunziato concerned the production of a statement requested under subsection (e) (2), its holding is equally applicable here where the basis of the request was subsection (e) (1) of the statute. In reaching its conclusion that the failure to order production of the statement was harmless error, the Second Circuit, through Judge Friendly, said:

“Careful scrutiny of the Interview Report convinces us that on no basis could it have assisted the defense. Both the majority and the minority opinions in Rosenberg v. United States, 1959, 360 U.S. 367, 371, 375, 79 S.Ct. 1231, 1236, 3 L.Ed.2d 1304, spurn the extreme view ‘that the harmless error doctrine can never apply as to statements producible under the statute * * *.’ Even taking as our test the presumably more rigid standard laid down by the minority in Rosenberg * * * that we must remand ‘unless the circumstances justify the conclusion that a finding that such a denial [of a statement producible under § 3500] was harmful error would be clearly erroneous,’ we answer that here it would be, fully recognizing, as we say this, the caution that ‘appellate courts should be hesitant to take it upon themselves to decide that the defense could not have effectually utilized a producible statement.’ The Interview Report checks fully with Haas’ trial testimony. Had we been defense counsel, we would have bitterly regretted receiving it, since its production would have presented the dilemma, which trial lawyers strive desperately to avoid, that examination on the. report would only reinforce the witness’ testimony whereas failure to use it would do the same.”

In this case, the contents of the report prepared by Agent Roberts as to his interview with the defendant are nearly identical with Roberts’ testimony on direct examination as to the substance of the interview. A comparison of the memorandum with Roberts’ testimony is set forth in Appendix III.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hartford Fire Insurance v. Lewis (In re Lewis)
478 B.R. 645 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2012)
United States v. Adams
Third Circuit, 2001
United States v. Michael Anthony Adams
252 F.3d 276 (Third Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Charles David Parker A/K/A Ramp Parker
749 F.2d 628 (Eleventh Circuit, 1984)
Wells v. People
592 P.2d 1321 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1979)
United States v. Thomas Robert Wilson
523 F.2d 828 (Eighth Circuit, 1975)
In Re SWB
321 A.2d 564 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1974)
In re S. W. B.
321 A.2d 564 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1974)
United States v. Whitfield
378 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1974)
United States v. Reese
351 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1972)
United States v. Frank Gordon Mello
469 F.2d 356 (First Circuit, 1972)
United States v. Weinberg
345 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1972)
United States v. Louis Anthony Zambrano
452 F.2d 416 (Third Circuit, 1972)
Merkle C. Altom v. United States
454 F.2d 289 (Seventh Circuit, 1972)
State v. Mayhew
183 N.W.2d 723 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971)
Donald Lee Hale v. United States
410 F.2d 147 (Fifth Circuit, 1969)
United States v. Joseph A. Riso
405 F.2d 134 (Seventh Circuit, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
299 F.2d 811, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-eugene-james-allegrucci-ca3-1962.