United States v. Estrada

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 25-2004
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-2004 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 06/11/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 11, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-2004 (D.C. No. 5:23-CR-01389-MIS-2) KARYN L. ESTRADA (D. N.M.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Karyn Estrada pleaded guilty to an information charging her with trafficking in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2

for knowingly recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, and obtaining Jane Doe

for services in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which resulted in aggravated sexual

abuse or attempted aggravated sexual abuse of Jane Doe. The district court

sentenced Estrada to life in prison. She filed a notice of appeal. Estrada’s plea

agreement contained an appeal waiver, which the government has now moved to

enforce under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-2004 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 06/11/2025 Page: 2

Estrada filed a response in opposition, and the government filed a reply in support of

its motion. We grant the government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.

Under Hahn, we consider the following three factors in determining whether to

enforce an appeal waiver in a plea agreement: (1) does the disputed appeal fall

within the scope of the waiver; (2) was the waiver knowing and voluntary; and

(3) would enforcing the waiver result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 1325.

Estrada argues only that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.

Because she does not assert that her appeal is outside the scope of her appeal waiver

or that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, we need not address those factors.

See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005).

In Hahn, we held that enforcement of an appeal waiver does not result in a

miscarriage of justice unless it would result in one of four enumerated situations.

359 F.3d at 1327. Those four situations are: “[1] where the district court relied on

an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in

connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where

the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise

unlawful.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Estrada contends that enforcing

her appeal waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice because her counsel was

ineffective in the negotiation of the appeal waiver and in advising her about the

waiver.

Estrada’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, cannot be raised

on direct appeal. In Hahn, we explained that “[g]enerally, we only consider

2 Appellate Case: 25-2004 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 06/11/2025 Page: 3

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on collateral review.” Id. at 1327 n.13. And

we expressly stated that Hahn’s miscarriage-of-justice holding “does not disturb this

longstanding rule.” Id. We later reiterated that “[t]his rule applies even where a

defendant seeks to invalidate an appellate waiver based on ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144.

Despite our general rule, Estrada urges us to consider her claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal, arguing that “the record is sufficiently

developed as to trial counsel’s deficiencies.”1 Resp. at 10. We decline to do so.

We have “considered ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal

in limited circumstances, but only where the issue was raised before and ruled upon

by the district court and a sufficient factual record exists.” United States v. Flood,

635 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2011). “[E]ven if the record appears to need no

further development, the claim [for ineffective assistance of counsel] should still be

presented first to the district court in collateral proceedings . . . so the reviewing

court can have the benefit of the district court’s views.” United States v. Galloway,

56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995).

Estrada discusses two cases where this court did review claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal, see Resp. at 9, but she concedes that “[t]he

distinguishing feature between [those two cases] and [her] case is that there was no

1 She acknowledges, however, that “[t]he weight of authority in this circuit suggests that this situation must result in the enforcement of the plea waiver.” Resp. at 10. 3 Appellate Case: 25-2004 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 06/11/2025 Page: 4

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised at the trial court level and the district

court has not ruled on such a claim,” id. at 9-10. We conclude the circumstances

here do not fall within the narrow exception to our general rule because—as Estrada

recognizes—her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has not been raised and

ruled on in district court.

Estrada has failed to show that enforcing her appeal waiver would result in a

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we grant the government’s motion and dismiss

this appeal. This dismissal is without prejudice to Estrada filing a collateral

proceeding to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.2

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam

2 This is consistent with the waiver language in Estrada’s plea agreement, which includes an exception for collateral challenges based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Mot. to Enforce, Ex. 1 at 10 ¶ 26 (“[T]he defendant agrees to waive any collateral attack to the defendant’s conviction(s) and any sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2255, or any other extraordinary writ, except on the issue of defense counsel’s ineffective assistance.” (emphasis added)).