United States v. Erick Pollard

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: 25-4362
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4362

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERICK LEMAR POLLARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:24-cr-00352-CCE-6)

Submitted: February 19, 2026 Decided: February 23, 2026

Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Eugene Ernest Lester III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Erick Lemar Pollard pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy

to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and a

quantity of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846. The

district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Pollard’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning

whether Pollard’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and whether his

sentence is reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Pollard has not filed a pro

se supplemental brief. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by

Pollard’s waiver of the right to appeal included in the plea agreement. We dismiss in part,

affirm in part, and remand with instructions to amend the written judgment.

Initially, Pollard’s appeal waiver does not prevent him from raising a colorable

challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364

(4th Cir. 2018) (analyzing validity of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing despite waiver). Before

accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a colloquy in which it informs the

defendant of, and determines that he understands, the nature of the charges to which he is

pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum penalty he faces, and the

rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v.

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the

defendant’s plea is voluntary and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(b)(2), (3). Because Pollard did not move to withdraw his plea or otherwise object

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during the plea hearing, we review the validity of his plea for plain error. United States v.

Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). Based on our review of the record, we conclude

that Pollard’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an adequate factual

basis. We therefore conclude that Pollard’s guilty plea is valid.

Next, “we review an appellate waiver de novo to determine its enforceability” and

“will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within its scope.”

United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “An

appellate waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it.” Id. at

224 (citation modified). To determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, “we

look to the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s experience, conduct,

educational background and knowledge of his plea agreement and its terms.” Id. “When

a district court questions a defendant during a Rule 11 hearing regarding an appeal waiver

and the record shows that the defendant understood the import of his concessions, we

generally will hold that the waiver is valid.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608

(4th Cir. 2021). Our review of the record confirms that Pollard knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, with limited exceptions not

applicable here.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case. The

sentencing challenges raised by Anders counsel fall squarely within the valid waiver’s

scope, and we have found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside the waiver’s scope.

We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as

to all issues covered by the waiver. We otherwise affirm. However, we remand with

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instructions to amend the written judgment to reflect that Pollard pled guilty to conspiring

to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and a

quantity of cocaine hydrochloride. *

This court requires that counsel inform Pollard, in writing, of the right to petition

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Pollard requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Pollard. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED

* Presently, the written judgment lists only two of the three charged objects of the conspiracy, fentanyl and methamphetamine.