United States v. Eric Hayes

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 13, 2025
• Docket: 25-1043
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

BLD-132 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-1043 ___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ERIC HAYES a/k/a International Ross a/k/a Ross, Appellant ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:05-cr-00443-009) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________________________________

Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 24, 2025

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 13, 2025) _________

OPINION * _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Eric Hayes appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of his motion for

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Government has filed a

motion for summary affirmance. We will grant the motion.

In 2007, following a federal jury trial, Hayes was convicted of conspiracy to

commit various sex trafficking offenses. The following year he was sentenced to 420

months in prison. We later affirmed his conviction and sentence. He subsequently filed a

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court denied the petition and we later

denied his request for a certificate of appealability.

In 2024, Hayes filed a pro se motion for compassionate release and reduction of

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The District Court appointed counsel, who

then filed a supporting brief. The motion requests a reduction in Hayes’ sentence due to

“(1) his unusually long sentence resulting in sentencing disparity because of the changes

in the law; (2) his exigent family circumstances; (3) his post sentencing rehabilitation;

and (4) the harsh conditions he has endured because of the COVID-19 pandemic.” ECF

No. 2411 at 5. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that Hayes failed to

establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release and, even if he

had, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against granting the

motion. Hayes timely appealed, and the Government has moved for summary affirmance.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of

discretion a district court’s order denying a motion for compassionate release, including

2 its determination that the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of

granting compassionate release. United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir.

2020). “[W]e will not disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and

firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached

upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Id. (cleaned up). We may summarily affirm a

district court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir.

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011)

(per curiam).

The compassionate-release provision states that a district court may reduce a

defendant’s term of imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such

a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a

district court must consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent

that they are applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include the nature and

circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the

need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the

law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from

future crimes by the defendant. See id. § 3553(a). Compassionate release is discretionary,

not mandatory. Therefore, even if a defendant is eligible, a district court may deny

compassionate release upon determining that a sentence reduction would be inconsistent

with the § 3553(a) factors. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330.

3 We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the

§ 3553(a) factors weighed against a grant of compassionate release. 1 In doing so, the

District Court appropriately considered that Hayes’ sentence was “based on his

leadership role in an extensive criminal network that employed threats and extreme

violence to force vulnerable young victims to prostitute themselves for the benefit of

Hayes and his partners.” ECF No. 2418 at 3. It further determined that Hayes’ sentence

“is necessary to protect the public, promote respect for the law, and provide appropriate

punishment.” Id.

Hayes argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider

his low risk of recidivism and the significant evidence of his rehabilitation during his 18

years of incarceration. But the District Court did consider his rehabilitative efforts, albeit

more explicitly as part of its analysis regarding Hayes’ proffered “extraordinary and

compelling reasons.” And even considering both points, we do not have “a definite and

firm conviction that [the District Court] committed a clear error of judgment in the

conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at

330 (citation omitted).

Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the

Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

1 Based on this conclusion, we need not decide whether Hayes demonstrated “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release.