United States v. Enrique Martinez, Also Known as Henry Martinez

78 F.3d 399

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: April 19, 1996
• Docket: 95-1868
• Status: Published

Opinions

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Enrique Martinez, also known as Henry Martinez, appeals from the district court’s¹ denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his car. We affirm.

I.

Acting on the basis of information supplied to South Dakota law enforcement authorities by a confidential informant, members of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigations and the Cass County, North Dakota, Sheriff’s Department made contact with Adam Romero concerning marijuana purchases. Romero cooperated with authorities to set up a controlled purchase of marijuana from his source, whom he knew as “Emanuel.” Romero also informed authorities that the main drug dealer was “Henry,” who was related to Emanuel. Emanuel telephoned Romero to meet him for the drug purchase at 3505 F Village Green Drive, Moorhead, Minnesota. Authorities verified that Henry and Rosemary Martinez resided at that address. The Moorhead Police Department had previously received information that Henry Martinez, living at the same address, was involved in drug trafficking.

On February 8, 1994, Romero purchased approximately five pounds of marijuana from Emanuel at Martinez’s residence. Emanuel left the vicinity of the residence in a vehicle registered to Rosemary Martinez. Authorities stopped the vehicle and seized approximately ten pounds of marijuana in plain view within the vehicle. Emanuel was identified as Joe Manuel Garcia, Rosemary Martinez’s brother. Members of the Clay County, Minnesota, Sheriffs Office obtained and executed a search warrant for the Martinez’s residence and seized “money, receipts, scales, and other papers” related to drug trafficking. Authorities “were advised that two vehicles parked in the lot near 3505 F Village Green Drive, Moorhead belonged to Henry Martinez of that address,” and they called Officer Griffin and his narcotic-sniffing dog, Radar, to the scene. Radar gave a “positive indication” that drugs were present in the two vehicles, which were identified as a Buick and a Chevrolet van.

A member of the Clay County Sheriffs Office then submitted an application and affidavit for search warrant to a judge of the Clay County District Court, who issued a warrant for a search of the vehicles. In addition to the same information previously included for the search warrant of the residence, the application stated: “A walk around of these two vehicles was conducted by K-9 officer Griffin and his partner RADAR. RADAR gave a positive indication on two vehicle [sic].”

No evidence of drug trafficking was found in the van. Among the items seized from the Buick were approximately 1.917 kilograms of marijuana, approximately 8.43 ounces of cocaine, and two firearms.

Martinez moved to suppress the drug evidence found in the Buick, arguing that the application for search warrant was insufficient because it did not indicate that Radar was trained to sniff drugs or that he had indicated that drugs were present and because it did not detail Radar’s track record. Martinez argued that even if all of the necessary information had been included, the warrant should still have not been issued because Radar’s track record was unreliable, in that eleven of his previous twelve indications had been erroneous.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the authorities had probable cause to search the automobile even without Radar’s positive alert. Martinez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute drugs and money laundering, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ '841(a)(1) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1956(a)(1). He conditionally pled guilty to carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He was sentenced to 102 months in prison and four years of supervised release.

II.

Martinez argues that because the application for the search warrant did not support a finding of probable cause, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusion as to whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment de novo. See United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir.1994).

The Buick may very well have been subject to being searched under the warrant issued for the residence. See United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 963 (8th Cir.1986). Passing that question, we find that probable cause existed for the search notwithstanding any deficiencies regarding Radar’s reliability as a drug dog. Once probable cause has been established, authorities may search a car without a warrant under the automobile exception, although the better practice is to obtain a warrant. United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 814, 133 L.Ed.2d 759 (1996); United States v. Perry, 925 F.2d 1077, 1080-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991).

Probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and exists when the facts are sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched, United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir.1995). Here, two sources had identified Martinez as involved in drug trafficking, and authorities found evidence of drug trafficking during their search of Martinez’s residence. Martinez owned the Buick, which was parked near his residence, and a vehicle registered to his wife had been used to transport drugs.

In a case with somewhat similar facts, we determined that the seizure of a vehicle was invalid for lack of probable cause because all of the evidence indicated that drugs would be found in the defendant’s home or in a different vehicle, and none of the evidence indicated that drugs would be found in the particular vehicle that was seized. United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d at 693. In Hogan, however, the seizure occurred at a point on a public highway some three to five miles from the defendant’s home, id. at 692, whereas Martinez’s car was parked near his residence.

Because probable cause existed for the search and the warrant was unnecessary, the search was valid. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied Martinez’s motion to suppress.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 . The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.