United States v. Enis Dauti

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 27, 2025
• Docket: 23-4758
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4758

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ENIS DAUTI,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:22-cr-00311-CCE-1)

Submitted: January 23, 2025 Decided: January 27, 2025

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Aaron B. Wellman, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, SIEGMUND, BRUMBAUGH & MCDONOUGH, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lindsey Ann Freeman, Assistant United States Attorney, Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Enis Dauti pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. The district court

sentenced Dauti to 360 months’ imprisonment, a term below the advisory Sentencing

Guidelines range. Dauti’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning

whether the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. In particular, counsel

questions whether the court erred by (1) applying a four-level leadership role enhancement

to Dauti’s offense level pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (2023),

and (2) declining to apply an acceptance of responsibility reduction under USSG § 3E1.1.

Although advised of his right to do so, Dauti has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The

Government has declined to file a response brief. We affirm.

We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.

Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “First,

we ‘ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing

to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the [18

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing

to adequately explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668

(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “In assessing

whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, we review the court’s

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factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Mitchell,

78 F.4th 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2023).

“If the sentence ‘is procedurally sound, [we] . . . then consider the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence,’ taking into account the totality of the circumstances.”

United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).

We afford a presumption of reasonableness to any sentence within or below a properly

calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir. 2022).

A defendant can rebut this presumption only “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable

when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d

295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that Dauti’s sentence is reasonable. We

turn first to counsel’s question regarding the district court’s application of USSG

§ 3B1.1(a), which provides for a four-level enhancement to a defendant’s base offense

level where “the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved

five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” The district court applied the

enhancement based on the undisputed reports of Dauti’s coconspirators, who explained

that he arranged and supervised the delivery of large shipments of drugs to several dealers.

We discern no error in the district court’s application of the enhancement. See United

States v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179, 184-86 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing when leadership role

enhancement is appropriate).

We next consider the district court’s denial of a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility. Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines provides for an offense level reduction

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where the defendant “prove[s] to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he has

clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal

conduct.” United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 914 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, the district court denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction

after finding that Dauti helped another inmate escape custody. Based upon our review of

the record, we discern no clear error in the district court’s denial of the reduction. See

United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 487-88 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting standard of review);

United States v. Cooper, 998 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that “even

unrelated criminal conduct may make an acceptance of responsibility reduction

inappropriate” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. United States v.

Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 240-42 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding no clear error in denial of

acceptance of responsibility reduction based on criminal conduct that was not part of

underlying offense’s relevant conduct).

We further conclude that Dauti’s sentence is otherwise procedurally and

substantively reasonable. In addition to correctly calculating the Guidelines range, the

district court provided Dauti an opportunity to allocute, considered the parties’ arguments

and the § 3553(a) factors, and meaningfully explained the chosen sentence. And nothing

in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded to Dauti’s

downward-variant, 360-month sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Dauti, in writing, of the right to petition the

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Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Dauti requests that a petition be

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that

a copy thereof was served on Dauti.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED