United States v. Elwood Staudinger, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 13, 2024
• Docket: 22-10298
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-10298

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00608-LEK-1 v.

ELWOOD STAUDINGER, Jr., MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 12, 2024** Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Elwood Staudinger, Jr., (“Staudinger”) appeals the district court’s denial of

his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the parties are familiar with the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our

ruling. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion for compassionate

release.

A compassionate release decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021). “A district court may

abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a

clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dunn, 728

F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013)). When a defendant moves for compassionate

release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court must determine, inter alia, “whether

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.” United States

v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that

Staudinger did not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant relief.

Staudinger argues that non-retroactive changes in the law would reduce his offense

level from 34 to 31 if he were sentenced today. At his original sentencing, the

district court varied downward significantly from the advisory Sentencing

Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months to arrive at a sentence of 200 months.

According to Staudinger, the applicable Guidelines range today would be 168 to

210 months. Staudinger thus argues that applying the same downward variance

today would result in a sentence significantly below his 200-month sentence.

2 We have recognized that although non-retroactive changes in sentencing law

may be proffered “as an argument for extraordinary and compelling reasons under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A),” a defendant must demonstrate that those changes “rise to the

level of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ in his individualized circumstances.”

United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the district court

did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that changes in the Guidelines did

not “rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling” in Staudinger’s

“individualized circumstances” because the court would impose the same sentence

today. Id.

The record supports the district court’s determination that it would sentence

Staudinger to 200 months’ imprisonment even under today’s more lenient

Guidelines range based on the facts of the offense and Staudinger’s personal

characteristics, such as his 25 prior adult convictions, including 14 crimes of

violence. Moreover, if he were sentenced today, Staudinger’s Guidelines range

would be 168 to 210 months. Staudinger’s 200 month sentence is well within that

range. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Staudinger’s motion for release.

AFFIRMED.