United States v. Eli Lilly & Co.

24 F.R.D. 285, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4201
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJuly 8, 1959
DocketCr. No. 173-58
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 24 F.R.D. 285 (United States v. Eli Lilly & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., 24 F.R.D. 285, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4201 (D.N.J. 1959).

Opinion

FOEMAN, Chief Judge.

In this prosecution for violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1952 ed.), Eli Lilly and Company, Allied Laboratories, Inc., American Home Products Corporation, Merck & Co., Inc., and Parke, Davis & Company, are charged with conspiring to fix the prices at which poliomyelitis vaccine, commonly known and referred to herein as Salk vaccine, was sold to public authorities within the United States. The Government now moves under Federal Eule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)1 for the issuance of subpoenae duces tecum to compel the defendants to produce before trial certain documents having to do with the pricing of Salk vaccine to public authorities in the United States from January 1, 1955 to December 31, 1957.

There is also before the court a proffer of proof by the Government of foreign sales of Salk vaccine by the defendants. The motion under Eule 17(c) will be considered first.

Although raised by but one defendant, 2 Allied Laboratories, and only indirectly by it, attention must first be given to the question of whether or not the Government may employ Eule 17(c) against these defendants. As pointed out by Allied, “The history of judicial construction of the provisions of the last sentence of Eule 17 (c), under which this motion is made, is mainly a history of applications by defendants to compel production of documents by the Government.” Indeed research yields not a single case in which the Government utilized this rule directly against a defendant. But the lack of its employment by the Government does not mean that it is not available. In United States v. Carter, D.C.1954, 15 F.R.D. 367, 369, Judge Holtzoff quoted the following excerpt from the “Committee notes to the Second Preliminary Draft of the Buies”:

“The last sentence provides for a method by which the court may permit either side to inspect subpoenaed documents or objects under the supervision of the court. It is inserted in the interests of fairness and for the purpose of preventing delay during the trial, particularly in cases where numerous documents may have been subpoenaed.”

Judge Holtzoff also found, however, that in the case of an individual defendant “no reciprocal right of discovery [ex[288]*288ists] in favor of the Government, since such discovery would probably be a violation of defendant’s constitutional rights.” Corporations, however, enjoy no such privilege against self-incrimination and there is therefore, no reason to deny the Government the opportunity to employ the Rule in this case.

On its face the Rule permits the court to require production of “the books, papers, documents or other objects designated [in the subpoena duces tecum]”, reserving to the court discretion to quash or modify the subpoena “if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” As Judge Holtzoff held in Carter, supra, at page 371:

“Rule 17(c) is applicable only to such documents or objects as would be admissible in evidence at the trial, or which may be used for impeachment purposes.”

Considering both the plain language of the Rule itself and the Carter case, supra, I conclude that Rule 17 (c) is available in a proper case to the Government as well as the defendant.

In Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 1950, 341 U.S. 214, at page 220, 71 S.Ct. 675, at page 679, 95 L.Ed. 879, the Court held:

“It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of discovery, and then by Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in the broadest terms. Rule 17 provided for the usual subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum, which may be issued by the clerk, with the provision that the court may direct the materials designated in the subpoena duces tecum to be produced at a specified time and place for inspection by the defendant. * * * ”

Having quoted this very language, Judge Weinfeld, in United States v. Iozia, S.D.N.Y.1952, 13 F.R.D. 335, at page 338, said:

“Good cause, in my opinion, requires a showing by the defendant,
“(1) That the documents are evidentiary and relevant:
“(2) That they are not otherwise procurable by the defendant reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence;
“(3) That the defendant cannot properly prepare for trial' without such production and inspection in advance of trial and the failure to obtain such inspection may tend un-. reasonably to delay the trial;
“(4) That the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedition.”

Originally the Government’s motion was very broad and sweeping.3 How[289]*289ever, at oral argument the Government agreed that it was seeking only those “documents that were prepared for the purpose of aiding in the pricing of the vaccine * * * whether or not [they were] used.” The affidavit filed in support of the motion reads in part, “Accordingly, the materials sought by the subpoena are for the purpose of evidencing (1) that costs were disparate, and (2) that profit margins for poliomyelitis vaccine were higher than such margins for other similar products marketed by the defendants.” At oral argument the Government disavowed the second of these purposes, as noted hereinafter [24 F.R.D. 293].

Applying the Iozia test, the Government’s first hurdle is relevancy. To meet it the Government contends that “when disparate costs are evidenced in addition to numerous other circumstances, especially if those costs were accompanied by unusually high profit margins it may be inferred that the uniformity of price was the result of an illegal agreement and nothing else.” And further that “if it should turn out that the cost levels of all defendants for the manufacture, sale and distribution of polio vaccine were well below the uniform prices set by defendants, a jury might well conclude that this, coupled with the Government’s other evidence, indicates the existence of an illegal agreement to tamper with the price structure.”

Lastly, the Government avers that since its case will be one of circumstantial evidence it must show disparate costs in order to eliminate the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that uniform prices were the result of uniform costs.

In reply the defendants contend that cost is not the determinant in establishing price and to that extent the Government’s argument rests on a false premise ; and that profit margins are irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of this case.

To support the economic theory that cost is not the determinant in the setting of a price the defendants have submitted the affidavits of corporate officers and economists who depose that such factors as homogeneity of product, estimated [290]*290period of obsolescence, knowledge of competitors’ prices, number of producers, desired rate of return on capital investment and the law of supply and demand all play important roles in the pricing of any product. Moreover, say the deponents, in the case of Salk vaccine other considerations in addition to the foregoing were present, e.

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Bluebook (online)
24 F.R.D. 285, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4201, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-eli-lilly-co-njd-1959.