United States v. Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar

32 U.S. 453, 8 L. Ed. 745, 7 Pet. 453, 1833 U.S. LEXIS 357
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 20, 1833
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 32 U.S. 453 (United States v. Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar, 32 U.S. 453, 8 L. Ed. 745, 7 Pet. 453, 1833 U.S. LEXIS 357 (1833).

Opinion

Mr Justice M’Lean

delivered the opinion of the Courts

This case is brought before the court, by an application for a mandamus to be directed to the judge of the court of the. United States for the district of Louisiana, requiring him to allow an appeal from the judgment of that court..

*459 In their petition the claimants state, that the eighty-four boxes of sugar wore consigned to them at New Orleans, and that on their arrival, they were libelled by the United States for an alleged breach of the revenue laws ; that the sugars were valued by the two custom house appraisers at two thousand six hundred and two dollars fifty-one cents; that they were afterwards condemned and sold by the marshal at public sale, for two thousand three hundred and thirty-eight dollars forty-eight cents, leaving two thousand one hundred and fifty dollars six cents, after deducting the costs and charges of the sale.

From the judgment of condemnation the claimants prayed an appeal to the -supreme court; which was refused, on the ground that the value of the sugars, exclusive of duties, is less than two thousand dollars.

By consent of parties, if the claimants shall, in the judgment of this court, be entitled to an appeal, the merits of the case shall be considered as regularly before the court, for a final decision.

Whether the claimants were entitled to an appeal, is the first point to be considered.

The decision of this question depends on the amount in controversy. If it be less than two thousand dollars, the judgment of the district court was final, and cannot be revised by an appeal.

The judgment of condemnation was entered on the 9th of April 1831, and on the 38th of the same month, under the order of the court, the marshal sold the property.

On the 19 th of April an' appeal was prayed, and an ordei was made, that the district attorney should show cause on the 33d of the same month, why an appeal should not be granted.

In his opinion against the right of the claimants to an appeal, the district judge says, that “ the supreme court has lately, in the case of Gordon v. Ogden, decided, that the defendant cannot support an appeal, from a judgment obtained against him in the court below for a less sum than two thousand dollars, because that'judgment is the only matter in dispute " “In this case,” the judge says,' “the thing demanded on one side was the forfeiture of a specific quantity of sugar, and *460 on the other the restoration of the same article, the value of which did not amount to two thousand dollars.” “ There was no demand of duties, nor could such demand have been taken into consideration in. the case then before the court. There was no contest about the duties.”

It will be observed that at the time the judgment of condemnation was entered, and also when the appeal was prayed, the sugars remained in the hands of the proper officer. Suppose the judgment had been given for the restoration of the property, in what form should it have been entered 1 Could any part of the property have been detained for the payment of the duties % The duties were not then due, and could the court have directed them to be paid, by the sale of a part of the property 1

A judgment in favour of the complainants in the district court should have directed the property to be restored to them, on the payment of the duties or securing them to be'paid, according to law. This would have given to the claimants the whole amount of their property, as though no seizure of l£ had been made. Under the law, they were entitled to a credit for the payment of the duties, on the condition of giving bond and security.

Does it not thus appear, that the whole-of the property was 'the amount in dispute] and would have gone into the possession of the claimants had the judgment of the court been in their favour 1 How then could it be said in the court below, that the duties must be deducted from the valúe of the sugars] as forming no part of the controversy ; and that by such deduction the value.of the property was reduced below the amount which entitles the claimants to an uppeal 1

If the claimants had given bond for the payment of . the duties, and a judgment of restoration had been entered by the court, before any part of the duties became payable, should the court have directed them to be paid 1 Such an order, under such circumstances, would be oppressive and unjust.

The duties having been secured to the government, as the law requires, no wrongful act on the part of the officers of the government, could lessen ithe term of credit fixed by the law and stated in the bond. And if no bond had been given, be *461 cause of the seizure of. the property or its restoration, the. claimants would fyave been at least entitled to a credit for the unexpired time allowed by law for the payment of the duties, on their giving the requisite bond and security.

The case must stand before this court on the appeal, as it stood before the district court, at the time the appeal was prayed. No subsequent action of the court in the sale of the property can afféct the question. Before this court, therefore, the case must stand, on the judgment of condemnation ; and this, before the duties were payable by law. Was not the entire property, and consequently, its full value, ip dispute between the'parties at the time judgment was entered?

On the one side a condemnation of the property is claimed, on the ground that the revenue law has been violated; and on the other a restoration of the property is.demanded. In this view, this court think the right of appeal from the judgment of the district codrt, was clear, as the value of the property in controversy exceeded two thousand dollars.

The next inquiry is, whether the sugars were entered for the payment of duties, under a false denomination, with a view to defraud the revenue.

The sugars were entered as brown, on which a duty of three cents per pound is paid; and. the libellants contend, that they should have been entered as white, on which a duty of four cents per pound is paid. The quality of the sugars can only be ascertained by a reference to the proof in the cáse.

The witnesses differ in their opinion as to the quality of these sugars. Bertrand and Smelser, two of the custom house officers, say the sugars were white; and their testimony is corroborated by five other witnesses. But a still greater number of witnesses, embracing the largest importers of sugars at New Orleans, are of the opinion that the sugars were properly denominated brown, by-the importers.. Some of the boxes, appeared tobe whiter than others, but by far the greater number, as it would seem from a majority of the witnesses* were brown.

J. W. Zacharie says that he .is engaged in the importation of Havana sugars, and that hád he been ,ordered to purchase white sugar, he would not have purchased the sugars in question. That if he had entered these sugars as brown, for the *462

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Bluebook (online)
32 U.S. 453, 8 L. Ed. 745, 7 Pet. 453, 1833 U.S. LEXIS 357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-eighty-four-boxes-of-sugar-scotus-1833.