Parish of Orleans v. Burglass

3 Pelt. 356
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 15, 1920
DocketNo. 7746
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Pelt. 356 (Parish of Orleans v. Burglass) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parish of Orleans v. Burglass, 3 Pelt. 356 (La. Ct. App. 1920).

Opinion

[362]*362OPINION.

By Ms HOnor'John St. Peral.

This Is an notion to abate an alleged nuisance under the provisions of Aot 47 of 1918, which provides, in suhstanoe, as follows;

I. That buildings or other places in whioh "assignation (slo) or prostitution is carried on, oonduoted, continued, permitted or exists . are deolared to be nuisances," and the owners, agents, leasees and occupants thereof guilty of "maintaining a nuisance."

2. That the District Attorney fand others) may maintain an aotion to abate said nuisance and enjoin the owners, lessees and occupants from maintaining the same or permitting the continuance thereof.

3. That a violation os such injunotion shall be a contempt of court, but of a Itind peculiar to itself, in this; that infliction of penalties vel non is not discretionary with the court, nor is the power of the court for to punish thereof merely limited (Const Art. 177); but, as in criminal statutes, a minimum as well as a maximum penalty for suoh contempt is fixed, whioh minimum fat least) 3hall be imposed.

[363]*3634.That if the existence of such nuisance he established, the judgment shall inolude an order of abatement closing the building or other place against its use for any pumose whatever for one. year thereafter, unless sooner released as mentioned below; and the use of said premises during said time bjr any person in ¿ny manner is likewise made a contempt of court punishable as aforesaid.

5.That upon furnishing bond with surity for the full value of the property, conditioned that he will not permit the property to be used for prostitution for one year thereafter, and upon satisfying the judge that he is "in good faith," the owner may have the property released for other purposes; subject however to a forfeiture of $100 under said bond (in addition to the liability of the owner to punishment fo-r contempt as aforesaid) for each day the property may be used for the prohibited ^purpose; the same being revoverable summarily in the one original proceeding.

6. That the net amount of the fines (and forfeiture?) collected shall be paid over to the school fund.

7. That the general reputation of the premises, or of the defendants (owner and tenant), or of the occupents and habitual visitors, shall be admissable in evidence and judgment may be based thereon.

[364]*364And the aot Is entitled, "An Act, to declare houses of assignation and prostitution.a- nuisance, K o."

I.

Neither the act Itself as a whole, nor any feature thereof, is challenged on constitutional grounds, and hence re are not now concerned with any such consideration. Nevertheless, in order to interpret and applg this law, we are hound to notice the nature and extent of certain features which find themselves therein.

It will therefore he observed^ I. '¿'hat the statute is of a highly penal character, i’or instance; what the ligis-lature is pleased to terra a contempt, has in effect been made an offense, to which a fixed minuraum penalty has been attached which the court must inflict; not in its-discretion or for thepurpose of securing compliance with its mwids.te, hut as. of course and as a punishment applicable not to parties only hut even to "any person do."

2. That the penality of closure for one year, which follows as of course, is incurred by the mere fact tbrt the premises aro being used for prostitution, regardless of any faotual! knowledge thereof on the part of the owner; which closure is of course nothing else than a forfeiture of the uso or revenues of the property for one year.

5. And lastly,that these two features constitute the [365]*365essence of the ststute being the only nev; matter therein, and. therefore the whole ststute; which otherwise makes no change in the law, since admittedly the purwer of the courts to abate tbr nuisance by injunction or otherwise, and punish in the usual way any violation of its mandate, exists independently of the statute. 29 Cyc 1218-1222

II.

Oonsidoring, therefore, that the statute is in its nature highly penal, these consequences flow; that the ststute itself must be strictly construed in applying these penalties, and that the facts necessary to sustain a eomplui it h r"'fU.der must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; U. S. vs. 84 Boxes of Sugar, 7 Peters 453.

III.

How the statute (section I) does not denounce a house as u nuisance and inflict the penalties merely because an act of immorality has been committed therein, hut only if "prostitution- 3.3 curried on, conducted, if continued, permitted or exists"’ therein.

Rut the term prostitution, legally and otherwise, means something more than simple immorality; it implies promiscuous / or ia.discrirAiiUr.te commerce between the seres, Z2 Oyc 731. A single immoral act, or even a series of immoral acts ■between tbc name persons does not constitute prosti-1 ntion. [366]*366or tirand the house wherein they are committed a house of prostitution; State vs Irwin, 91 N. W. Rep 960 (Iowa); also 91 N. W. 760 (8 Iowa 447); Tenement Dep't vs Mc Devitt, 215 N. Y. 160. Henoe to constitute a house of prostitution, the premises must have been maintained, even if only for a brief period, for the purpose of promiscuous commerce between the sexes.

And since in the very nature of things a house oannot be maintained for such purposes without some degree of publicity, both sought and tnaought, it follow» that suoh a house and its "reputation" are inseparable.

And it is just these very features thereof (promiscuous commerce therein between the sexes, and more or less widespread knowledge of .where it may be practiced without restraint) which constitutes the real raenaoe to publio health and public morals and henoe the "nuisanoe" whioh the statute intends to repress.

llore than that; it is also ##$# this very feature (more pr less publicity) whioh breathes life into these otherwise drastic laws by fixing the owner oonstruotive, if not actual, knowledge of the use which is being made of hi3 property; thereby saving them against the speoious charge or punishing the innocent instead of the guilty and thus taking property without due prooess of law. Tenement Dep't vs Mc Devitt, 215 N. Y. 160 (Ann Cases, Am. & Eng, 1917 A 455)

[367]*367IT.

Our statute Indeed seems to recognize this whole situation fully; it denounces only houses "where assignation (sic) or prostitution is oarried on, conducted, permitted or exists," and this irresistably compels the idea of a place or resort for lewd persons and promiscuous commerce between the sexes; that is to say (since the aot cannot he broader than its title, Const. Art 31), a house of assignation,pr house of prostitution, purely and simply.

And as suoh places cannot exist; without at once (or soon) acquiring a reputation for being what they are, the statute provides that the reputation of the building, its owners, tenants, occupants and habitual visitors, may suffice as to the basis for suppressing the place.

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Related

United States v. Eighty-Four Boxes of Sugar
32 U.S. 453 (Supreme Court, 1833)
Tenement House Department v. . McDevitt
109 N.E. 88 (New York Court of Appeals, 1915)
State v. Ruhl
8 Iowa 447 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1859)
State v. Irvin
91 N.W. 760 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1902)

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Bluebook (online)
3 Pelt. 356, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parish-of-orleans-v-burglass-lactapp-1920.