USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 1 of 6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11901 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
EDSON GELIN, a.k.a. Bo, Defendant- Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00131-CEM-LHP-3 ____________________
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 2 of 6
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11901
Edson Gelin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, was sen- tenced to a total of 600 months’ imprisonment (the statutory min- imum sentence) following his convictions on various narcotics and firearm charges. He now appeals the denial of his motion for com- passionate release pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For the rea- sons which follow, we affirm. I Mr. Gelin argues that that the district court abused its discre- tion by denying his motion because it disregarded intervening changes of law and fact, including amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. He contends that he established “extraordinary and com- pelling reasons” for release based on a combination of factors under § 1B1.13(b)(5), including his diminishing health conditions, inter- vening changes in the statutory penalties for his offenses, and gov- ernment misconduct. He maintains that the court did not properly consider the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the need to avoid disproportionate sentences. He also submits that the court erred in finding that he posed a danger to the community because it relied on outdated circumstances. We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen- tence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The same plenary standard applies to a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope of its legal authority under the statute. See United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 3 of 6
24-11901 Opinion of the Court 3
1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Maiello, 805 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 2015). 1 After eligibility is established, we review a district court’s de- nial of an eligible defendant’s request for compassionate release un- der § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its determi- nation, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345. The abuse of discretion standard is not “simply a rubber stamp.” United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1183 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017)). A district court must explain its sentencing decisions, in- cluding its decision to grant or deny a motion for compassionate release, adequately enough to allow us to meaningfully review the decision on appeal. Id. In general, a court may not modify a sentence once it has been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2021). Either the Bureau of Prisons, or a defendant who has fully ex- hausted administrative remedies, may move the court to reduce
1 Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys and are liberally construed. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 4 of 6
4 Opinion of the Court 24-11901
the term of imprisonment based on compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing so; (2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so; and (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the com- munity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and a reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy state- ments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). District courts need not address these three conditions in a specific sequence, as the lack of even one forecloses a sentence reduction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237- 38. If the district court finds against the movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not analyze the other requirements. See id. II In order to qualify for compassionate release, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2) provides that the court must find that the defendant is not a danger to any other person or to the community under § 3142(g). To determine whether a defendant is a danger to the community under § 3142(g), the district court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether it is a crime of violence, a terrorism crime, involved a mi- nor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destruc- tive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 5 of 6
24-11901 Opinion of the Court 5
(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the na- ture and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release. See § 3142(g). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny- ing Mr. Gelin’s motion for a sentence reduction because it did not clearly err in finding that he posed a danger to the community un- der § 3142(g). In its order, the court incorporated the findings it had made in 2020 when it denied an earlier similar motion by Mr. Gelin. See D.E. 662 (incorporating D.E. 448). In the 2020 order, the court found that Mr. Gelin was a danger to the community: At trial the evidence revealed that Defendant Gelin participated as a member in a drug trafficking organi- zation that transported cocaine from Miami, Florida to be sold from multiple residences in the Orlando, Florida area. Defendant Gelin was responsible for the distribution of over five kilograms of cocaine and would personally travel to Miami in order to transport cocaine to Orlando. During their investiga- tion, law enforcement officers conducted a traffic stop where they seized two kilograms of cocaine be- ing transported by Defendant Gelin from Miami to the drug trafficking organization in Orlando. Further exacerbating the danger these offenses posed to the community at large was the fact that Defendant Gelin possessed multiple firearms in furtherance of these drug offenses. In consideration thereof, the Court cannot in good conscience grant the relief requested. D.E. 448 at 3-4.
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USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 1 of 6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-11901 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
EDSON GELIN, a.k.a. Bo, Defendant- Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cr-00131-CEM-LHP-3 ____________________
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 2 of 6
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11901
Edson Gelin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, was sen- tenced to a total of 600 months’ imprisonment (the statutory min- imum sentence) following his convictions on various narcotics and firearm charges. He now appeals the denial of his motion for com- passionate release pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For the rea- sons which follow, we affirm. I Mr. Gelin argues that that the district court abused its discre- tion by denying his motion because it disregarded intervening changes of law and fact, including amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. He contends that he established “extraordinary and com- pelling reasons” for release based on a combination of factors under § 1B1.13(b)(5), including his diminishing health conditions, inter- vening changes in the statutory penalties for his offenses, and gov- ernment misconduct. He maintains that the court did not properly consider the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the need to avoid disproportionate sentences. He also submits that the court erred in finding that he posed a danger to the community because it relied on outdated circumstances. We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen- tence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The same plenary standard applies to a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope of its legal authority under the statute. See United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 3 of 6
24-11901 Opinion of the Court 3
1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Maiello, 805 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 2015). 1 After eligibility is established, we review a district court’s de- nial of an eligible defendant’s request for compassionate release un- der § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its determi- nation, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345. The abuse of discretion standard is not “simply a rubber stamp.” United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1183 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017)). A district court must explain its sentencing decisions, in- cluding its decision to grant or deny a motion for compassionate release, adequately enough to allow us to meaningfully review the decision on appeal. Id. In general, a court may not modify a sentence once it has been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2021). Either the Bureau of Prisons, or a defendant who has fully ex- hausted administrative remedies, may move the court to reduce
1 Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys and are liberally construed. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 4 of 6
4 Opinion of the Court 24-11901
the term of imprisonment based on compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing so; (2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so; and (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the com- munity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and a reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy state- ments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). District courts need not address these three conditions in a specific sequence, as the lack of even one forecloses a sentence reduction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237- 38. If the district court finds against the movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not analyze the other requirements. See id. II In order to qualify for compassionate release, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2) provides that the court must find that the defendant is not a danger to any other person or to the community under § 3142(g). To determine whether a defendant is a danger to the community under § 3142(g), the district court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether it is a crime of violence, a terrorism crime, involved a mi- nor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destruc- tive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 5 of 6
24-11901 Opinion of the Court 5
(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the na- ture and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release. See § 3142(g). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny- ing Mr. Gelin’s motion for a sentence reduction because it did not clearly err in finding that he posed a danger to the community un- der § 3142(g). In its order, the court incorporated the findings it had made in 2020 when it denied an earlier similar motion by Mr. Gelin. See D.E. 662 (incorporating D.E. 448). In the 2020 order, the court found that Mr. Gelin was a danger to the community: At trial the evidence revealed that Defendant Gelin participated as a member in a drug trafficking organi- zation that transported cocaine from Miami, Florida to be sold from multiple residences in the Orlando, Florida area. Defendant Gelin was responsible for the distribution of over five kilograms of cocaine and would personally travel to Miami in order to transport cocaine to Orlando. During their investiga- tion, law enforcement officers conducted a traffic stop where they seized two kilograms of cocaine be- ing transported by Defendant Gelin from Miami to the drug trafficking organization in Orlando. Further exacerbating the danger these offenses posed to the community at large was the fact that Defendant Gelin possessed multiple firearms in furtherance of these drug offenses. In consideration thereof, the Court cannot in good conscience grant the relief requested. D.E. 448 at 3-4. USCA11 Case: 24-11901 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 01/14/2026 Page: 6 of 6
6 Opinion of the Court 24-11901
Based on our review of the record, we see no clear error in this determination, particularly given Mr. Gelin’s role as a manager in the narcotics scheme. See PSI at ¶ 70. See also United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a dan- gerousness finding under § 3142(g) is a factual one that is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review). 2 III The district court’s denial of Mr. Gelin’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) mo- tion is affirmed. AFFIRMED.
2 Because we may affirm on this ground alone, we need not determine whether the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, nor whether it erred in finding that no extraordinary and compelling reasons for release existed under § 1B1.13.