United States v. Eddy Olguin
This text of United States v. Eddy Olguin (United States v. Eddy Olguin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 14 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10293
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:07-cr-00615-SOM-3
v. MEMORANDUM* EDDY OLGUIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Susan Oki Mollway, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2020**
Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Eddy Olguin appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, see United States v.
Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Olguin contends that the district court erred by adopting the generic drug
quantity finding from his presentence investigation report (“PSR”) to determine his
eligibility for a sentence reduction under Amendment 782. He argues that, rather
than relying on that generic finding, the district court was required to make
supplemental factual findings concerning the quantity of drugs involved in his
offense. Contrary to Olguin’s contention, the record reflects that the sentencing
court made a specific drug quantity finding, rather than simply generically
adopting the PSR. Thus, United States v. Rodriguez, 921 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.
2019), upon which Olguin relies, has no application here. Furthermore, the district
court could not make supplemental drug quantity findings in these proceedings
because it was bound by the specific drug quantity determination made at
sentencing. See United States v. Mercado-Moreno, 869 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir.
2017) (supplemental drug quantity findings to determine defendant’s eligibility for
a sentence reduction are authorized only where the original quantity determination
was “ambiguous or incomplete,” not where “the sentencing court found the precise
total quantity of drugs . . . attributable to defendant”). Because Amendment 782
did not lower the base offense level associated with that high drug quantity, the
district court correctly concluded that Olguin is ineligible for a sentence reduction.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); Leniear, 574 F.3d at 674.
To the extent Olguin argues that the district court’s drug quantity determination
2 19-10293 was incorrect, that claim is not cognizable in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826, 831 (2010) (alleged sentencing errors
unrelated to an amendment to the Guidelines are outside the scope of a
§ 3582(c)(2) proceeding).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-10293
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