United States v. Dupree

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided June 6, 2024·No. Criminal No. 2022-0275·Published

Opinion

unless an exception applies.”) That is exactly the kind of the statements the Defendant is attempting to introduce.

As an initial matter, the Defendant faults the Government for removing the radio run from its exhibit list. But as the Court pointed out, in the lead-up to trial, the anticipated presentation of evidence and witnesses is fluid and likely to change. The radio run exhibit was included on the Government’s initial exhibit list because the Government sought to be over- inclusive and provide notice to Defendant of any potential exhibits it might introduce at trial. The Government never contemplated, and certainly never agreed, that exhibits listed on its exhibit list would be admitted by the Defendant.

Turning to the last of the Defendant’s statements he seeks to admit—the “prior conviction” notification by dispatch—that statement would only be admissible if the Defendant were to testify. With respect to the other three statements, the Defendant argues that they constitute present sense impressions and are therefore not hearsay. Although the first two statements— that the Defendant notified dispatch that he had initiated a traffic stop and that he needed backup—are closer calls with respect to the present sense impression exception, the third statement that the Defendant notified dispatch of “OC deployment and need for fireboard” do not fall within the exception. In order for the present sense impression exception to apply, , the statement must describe or explain an event or condition, which the declarant perceived firsthand, which was made contemporaneously – either during or immediately thereafter the event or condition.” United States v. Wills, Case No. 18-0117 (PLF), 2018 WL 6716096, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2018). The statement that EMS was needed because there had been an OC deployment was not made contemporaneously with the pepper spray. Nor does the statement describe anything about the pepper spray incident at all. Unlike the statement in Wills, in which the declarant stated that “he threw it in the bushes, . . he threw it to the right,” a call for EMS because there had been an OC deployment does not describe the event or condition that is the subject of the statement. In other words, if the statement in question had described any aspect of the pepper spray incident, the statement might fall within the exception. It does not, and thus, the statement is not admissible.

Furthermore, there is no indication from the Defendant about the amount of time that passed between the pepper spray incident and the Defendant’s call to dispatch. At a minimum, the statement to dispatch about OC deployment was not made contemporaneously. The amount of time that has elapsed between the statement and the qualifying event is an important factor, as the passage of time is “the effective proxy for the reliability of the substance of the declaration.” . Wills, 2018 WL 6716096, at *4. In the D.C. Circuit, it is clear that fifteen minutes is too long to satisfy the contemporaneity requirement, but beyond that, there is very little guidance. Compare Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422, 426 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (explaining that an “out-of- court statement made at least fifteen minutes after the event it describes is not admissible”), with Flythe v. District of Columbia, 4 F. Supp. 3d 222, 234 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding a statement admissible when the statement was made within moments or seconds of the event).

For these reasons, the statements on the radio run should not be admitted.

Christopher Howland and Sanjay Patel U.S. Department of Justice

3 From: Christopher Macchiaroli < > Sent: Tuesday, June 4, 2024 7:29 PM To: Kollar-Kotelly Chambers < > Cc: Howland, Christopher (USADC) < >; Patel, Sanjay (CRT) < >; Emma Mulford < > Subject: [EXTERNAL] United States v. Dupree: June 4, 2024

Chambers:

The Government intends to seek admission of the following statements from the radio run: (i) Officer Dupree’s immediate notification that he initiated a traffic stop on Mr. Sinclair and the providing of his license plate to Dispatch; (ii) Officer’s Dupree’s notification that he needed backup; (iii) Officer’s Dupree’s notification of OC deployment and need for “fireboard” (EMS); and (iv) Dispatch’s notification of Mr. Sinclair’s “prior” in PG County. The attached chronology of the radio run from the Report of Investigation (as excerpted) that was produced by the Government in discovery was in the attachment submitted earlier today and is also attached to this submission. It provides the chronology of the radio run at issue in this case based on a certified copy of the radio run provided by PG County. A copy of the radio run was produced by the Government to Chambers as part of its May 16 and May 23 Exhibit Productions and identified as Government Exhibit 200.

Subparts (i)-(iii) are all present sense impressions in that they are “statement[s] describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” FED. R. EVID. 803(1); see, e.g., Flythe v. District of Columbia, 4 F. Supp. 3d 222, 233-34 (D.D.C. 2014) (admitting officer’s radio run statements as present sense impressions: “was on the “[f]our hundred block of Kenyon,” “[t]ried to stab me, ma’’m. My gun jammed. Get official on this location”). Subparts (i)-(iii) were made in real time while the events were occurring. See United States v. Wills, No. 18-0117 (PLF), 2018 WL 6716096, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2018) (satisfying necessary factors).

During Officer Dupree’s notification of OC deployment, Mr. Sinclair is yelling/screaming in the background in response to the OC deployment. The words are not decipherable on the radio run. The entire episode, including, Officer Dupree making the radio run communication and Torrence Sinclair and his sister yelling are in the BWC video that the Government is seeking to admit into evidence without objection as GX 101. The audio on the video depicts dispatch communicating with Officer Dupree, but Officer Dupree’s words cannot be heard given the yelling/screaming in the background.

As it pertains to the radio run, the Defense is not seeking to identify the yelling in the background, but rather, Officer Dupree’s notification of the deployment. There will be zero prejudice as to the yelling in the background, when the jury will have the full audio of the BWC camera video to listen to the various yelling made during the identical period of time. In some instances, Mr. Sinclair is yelling, I cannot breathe, in other instances, he is yelling, get my lawyer. Even if not a present sense impression, which it is, the statement can also be admitted for the non-hearsay purpose of Officer Dupree providing notification to Dispatch, not for the truth of the matter asserted, that OC was deployed, which is undisputed in this case. This purpose is essential given that the Government as recently as in its Trial Memorandum (at 6) (D.E. 73) claimed that even though Officer Dupree was the officer in charge, Corporal Buie summoned EMS. Moreover, even if not otherwise admissible, which it is, if the Government through witnesses or arguments, contends that Officer Dupree did not seek medical attention, the radio run could be used as impeachment evidence.

Finally, the defense never argued that Dispatch’s notification was admissible as a present sense impressi on. The defense is not arguing the truth of the matter asserted and accordingly, the information is not hearsay. The Government has conceded authenticity of the radio run.

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