United States v. Dunlap

577 F.2d 867
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 1, 1978
DocketNo. 77-1263
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 577 F.2d 867 (United States v. Dunlap) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978).

Opinion

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Herman K. Petry appeals from an order of the district court affirming a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that he was not entitled to “black lung” benefits sought pursuant to Part B of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, (the Act) 30 U.S.C. § 901, et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Our scope of review is confined to ascertaining whether the Secretary’s denial was supported by “substantial evidence.” If such support exists, we must affirm. If not, we must reverse. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b), incorporating by reference § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1968). In the instant case we conclude that there was not substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision, reverse the district court’s order and direct it to remand the case to the Secretary to enter an award for the claimant.

I.

BASIC ENTITLEMENT

Entitlement of black lung benefits under the Act is conditioned on the proof of three basic elements:

1. That claimant is or was a miner; and

2. That claimant is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis; and

3. That his pneumoconiosis arose out of his coal mine employment.

See 30 U.S.C. § 901; 20 C.F.R. § 410.410.

From an analysis of those elements, there is no question in this case (1) that claimant is or was a miner and (3) that if he is found to have contracted pneumoconiosis, that it arose out of his employment in the mines.1 The second element is in dispute — whether the claimant is totally disabled due to pneu-moconiosis — and we focus on this element.

Although this is a not a case in which the claimant has shown conclusively that he has pneumoconiosis, nevertheless, “if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a total[862]*862ly disabling2 chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment,” and the claimant “was employed 15 or more years in one or more of the Nation’s underground coal mines,” he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the disability is due to pneumoconiosis.3 In this case, there is no dispute that Petry has met the fifteen year requirement,4 and from our review of the record we hold also that he presented other evidence demonstrating the existence of a totally disabling chronic respiratory impairment and that the Secretary’s findings to the contrary were not supported by substantial evidence.

II.

THE § 410.414(b) PRESUMPTION [1] The question of when the presumption in 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b) is created is the crucial issue here, for the Secretary found that the claimant did not provide “other evidence” sufficient to raise the presumption.5 Although several other cases have found the presumption met on their own facts, none have specified exactly why the presumption was met and why the Secretary was wrong in saying that the claimant had not carried his burden. See e. g., Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Henson v. Weinberger, 548 F.2d 695, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1977). Any analysis of the facts of this case hinges upon a clear understanding of the presumption created in § 410.414(b), especially in light of the relevant congressional intent surrounding 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4),6 the parent statute of § 410.414.

[863]*863A.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

After passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, statistics revealed that in the following three years, almost fifty percent of disability claims were denied. S.Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 2305, 2307. Although negative or inconclusive X-ray evidence was the greatest single reason for the large percentage of denials, Id. at 2313, research showed that in twenty-five percent of the cases where X-ray evidence was negative, autopsies performed after the miners’ deaths demonstrated the presence of pneu-moconiosis. Id. at 2314, 2316.' Additionally, other evidence presented to Congress revealed that miners suffered from other respiratory impairments at rates greater than those of the general public. Id. at 2314.

To aid the miner in pursuing black lung benefits,7 Congress enacted the 1972 amendments to the Act, which, among other things, created the presumption found in 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) and implemented in 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). The Secretary also was required to consider all relevant evidence of disability, and not just one or two objective tests. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b). Finally, Congress indicated the liberality with which it intended the amended Act to be construed when it said:

The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 is intended to be a remedial law — to improve upon the 1969 provisions so that the cases which should be compensated, will be compensated. In the absence of definitive medical conclusions there is a clear need to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled miner or his survivors.

S.Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News p. 2315. See generally Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 478-79 (8th Cir. 1977). This latter principle was given effect in Henson v. Weinberger, supra, where the court stated:

The Committee made clear the desire that evidence submitted by a miner’s physician be considered, . . . and the claimants, particularly after 15 years or more of work in a coal mine, be given the benefit of the doubt .

548 F.2d at 699. A close reading of the cases from other circuits indicates that there are several stages in the claims procedure wherein the benefit of doubt could be resolved in favor of the claimant.

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577 F.2d 867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-dunlap-ca4-1978.