United States v. Donald Williams

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4345 Doc: 47 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4345

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DONALD MCDUFFIN WILLIAMS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:24-cr-00024-GMG-RWT-1)

Submitted: May 20, 2026 Decided: July 23, 2026

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Charles T. Berry, Kingmont, West Virginia, for Appellant. Matthew L. Harvey, United States Attorney, Lara K. Omps-Botteicher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Donald McDuffin Williams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(C), and was sentenced to 104 months’ imprisonment. Williams appeals the district

court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, challenges his indictment under

the Speedy Trial Act, and argues that the district court did not have authority to order his

sentence to run consecutively to his anticipated revocation sentence in another federal

district court. We affirm.

First, Williams argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty

plea based on his counsel’s alleged conflict of interest during plea negotiations.

We review the district court’s denial of Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mayberry, 125 F.4th 132, 140–41 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2722 (2025). To withdraw his guilty plea, a defendant must “show

a fair and just reason,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B), one of which may be that the defendant

did not have “close assistance of competent counsel,” United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d

245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).

We assess a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from an actual conflict

of interest based on the standard articulated in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).

Under Sullivan, a defendant must show that (1) “an actual conflict of interest” (2)

“adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. at 348. An actual conflict exists when a

lawyer “fails to take action on behalf of one client because it would adversely affect

another.” United States v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 241, 249 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

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To show an adverse effect, the defendant must (1) “identify a plausible alternative defense

strategy or tactic that his defense counsel might have pursued,” (2) “show that the

alternative strategy or tactic was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case known

to the attorney at the time of the attorney’s tactical decision,” meaning that it was “clearly

suggested by the circumstances,” and (3) “establish that the defense counsel’s failure to

pursue that strategy or tactic was linked to the actual conflict.” Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d

348, 361 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).

Here, Williams has shown neither an actual conflict nor an adverse effect. Williams

alleges that a conflict arose through his attorney’s representation of both Williams and

Mario Crawley, who had communicated with Williams on the day Williams was arrested,

and that the conflict caused his attorney to not obtain the cell phone of a government

witness who had cooperated in the investigation. Williams does not explain how any

information on the cell phone would have adversely affected Crawley. But even assuming

a conflict, he does not show that seeking to obtain the information contained on the cell

phone was “clearly suggested by the circumstances.” Id. As his subsequent counsel

explained to the district court, it was unclear if the information on the cell phone would be

inculpatory or exculpatory. It was thus not at all clear that counsel should seek that evidence

instead of pursuing a favorable plea agreement. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial

of Williams’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Second, Williams argues that his indictment should be dismissed under the Speedy

Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. But a defendant “waives his or her speedy trial claim by

entering a guilty plea.” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 780 (4th Cir. 2020).

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Finally, Williams argues that the district court erred by ordering his sentence to run

consecutively to his anticipated revocation sentence in the District of Maryland.

Because Williams did not object below, we review for plain error. United States v.

Obey, 790 F.3d 545, 547 (4th Cir. 2015). Thus, Williams “must show that an error occurred,

that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.” Id. Even then, “we will correct

the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up).

As the government concedes, the district court plainly erred. A district court does

not have authority to order “that its sentence run consecutively to an anticipated federal

sentence.” Id. at 549. Nevertheless, the government argues that the error did not affect

Williams’s substantial rights. *

We agree. A few months after this sentencing, a district court in Maryland ordered

Williams to serve his revocation sentence consecutively to his earlier federal sentence. That

outcome conforms with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), which states that a revocation sentence “shall

be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant

is serving.”

* Williams contends that unauthorized sentences automatically fulfill this requirement. But there is only a “very limited class” of errors that “automatically satisfy” the substantial-rights prong, and Williams has not pointed to any authority suggesting that this error falls within it. United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215–16 (4th Cir. 2014); cf. United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 93 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 391 (2025) (holding that Apprendi errors “are not structural errors but discrete defects that can be reviewed on appeal for their effect on the outcome of the proceeding”).

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED