United States v. Don Meeker

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: September 14, 2023
• Docket: 20-641
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

20-641 United States v. Don Meeker

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of September, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, MYRNA PÉREZ, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v. No. 20-641

Don Meeker,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: MICHAEL R. HASSE, New London, CT.

FOR APPELLEE: KENNETH L. GRESHAM (Elena Lalli Coronado, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Vanessa Roberts Avery, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

(Bryant, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Don Meeker appeals from a judgment of conviction of the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut entered on January 13, 2020. After a jury trial,

Meeker was convicted of aiding and abetting a carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and

2. The district court sentenced Meeker principally to 73 months’ imprisonment and four years’

supervised release. On appeal, Meeker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial

to convict him. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history,

and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the early morning of January 1, 2016, Meeker and his accomplices, Elbert Llorrens and

Kyle Valentine, went searching for a victim to rob. Before they set out, Llorrens told Valentine

that they were planning to “get somebody,” i.e., rob someone, and Meeker pulled out a gun. After

a first attempt at tailing a potential victim ended in failure when Meeker’s car ran low on gas, the

trio pulled into a gas station. While Meeker pumped gas, two intoxicated out-of-towners

approached Llorrens and Valentine and asked them for directions. Llorrens and Valentine offered

to lead the individuals to their destination and instructed them to follow the car being driven by

Meeker. Meeker then drove Llorrens and Valentine in the lead car and their targets followed in

theirs. Shortly thereafter, Meeker stopped in the middle of a dark, residential road, retrieved the

gun from under his seat, and handed it to Llorrens. Meeker waited in the car while Llorrens and

2 Valentine brandished the gun and a set of brass knuckles and robbed and carjacked the victims.

At trial, Valentine testified that he was prepared to hurt the victims if necessary.

Valentine and the victims testified that Meeker’s car remained stationary throughout the

entire carjacking incident and that Meeker’s car and the carjacked car left together. According to

Valentine, the two cars then stopped next to each other down the street and Meeker retrieved the

gun from Llorrens. Valentine testified that Meeker then met Llorrens and himself at Llorrens’s

apartment and the trio divided the money stolen from the victims. He also testified that Meeker

neither objected to nor expressed surprise at Llorrens’s and Valentine’s actions. Cell-site location

information was consistent with Meeker’s phone being in the vicinity of the carjacking and, after

the carjacking, in the vicinity of Llorrens’s apartment. 1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.

United States v. Calonge, 74 F.4th 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2023). Because Meeker “was convicted after a

jury trial, we ‘review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing

every reasonable inference in support of the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Tang

Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 71 (2d Cir. 2018)). Meeker “‘face[s] a heavy burden,’ because our framework

for evaluating such challenges ‘is exceedingly deferential.’” United States v. Ho, 984 F.3d 191,

199 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018)). We “may

enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged

is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

1 In police interviews, Meeker claimed that he begrudgingly intended to assist in the robbery of the victims, but not to assist a carjacking. Once he “knew what they were doing, [he] pulled off and . . . left.” Gov’t App’x at 103, Ex. 18- 8 at 3:06–55. But Meeker concedes on appeal that evidence showed that Llorrens and Valentine “drove away in the victims’ vehicle, following Mr. Meeker’s vehicle,” Appellant’s Br. at 8, and that they all reconvened to divide the proceeds of their crime.

3 United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d

118, 128 (2d Cir. 2020)).

DISCUSSION

The federal carjacking statute imposes criminal penalties upon “[w]hoever, with the intent

to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or

received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and

violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. “[T]he federal aiding and

abetting statute punishes, as a principal, an individual that ‘aids, abets, counsels, commands,

induces, or procures’ the commission of an underlying federal offense.” United States v. Robinson,

799 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2). “[A] person is liable under § 2 for

aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that

offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.” United States v. Delgado,

972 F.3d 63, 73 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)). Thus,

aiding and abetting a carjacking requires an affirmative act in furtherance of the carjacking, with

intent to facilitate the commission of the carjacking.

I. The Affirmative-Act Requirement of Aiding and Abetting a Carjacking

We reject Meeker’s argument that the government failed to prove by sufficient evidence

the “actus reus” for aiding and abetting. Appellant’s Br. at 28–31. “[T]he actus reus element . . .

of federal accomplice liability” is the “‘affirmative-act requirement.’” Delgado, 972 F.3d at 74

(quoting Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 74). “[T]he affirmative act requirement is met when the defendant

facilitates any element of the underlying offense,” Robinson, 799 F.3d at 200 (emphasis added),

so the defendant need not participate “in each and every element of the offense,” Rosemond, 572

4 U.S. at 73 (quoting United States v. Sigalow, 812 F.2d 783, 785 (2d Cir. 1987)). 2 Reviewing the

record evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing every reasonable

inference in support of the jury’s verdict, Meeker’s facilitation of an element of the carjacking

offense could be inferred from evidence that: he lured the victims to the location of the carjacking,

provided the gun used in the carjacking, waited idly while Llorrens and Valentine committed the

carjacking, and drove away together with the carjacked car.

II. The Intent Requirement of Aiding and Abetting a Carjacking

We also reject Meeker’s arguments that “[t]he government failed to prove by sufficient

evidence . . . that [he] possessed the requisite intent to commit the carjacking offense,” Appellant’s

Br. at 10, that he lacked requisite “advance knowledge,” id. at 11, and that “the carjacking crime

had been concluded before he . . . learned what [his confederates] had done,” id.

A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Meeker acted with the

requisite, overarching intent to facilitate the carjacking offense. “The intent requirement is stricter

than the facilitation requirement in that ‘the intent must go to the specific and entire crime

charged . . . .’” Robinson, 799 F.3d at 200 (quoting Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 76). “[F]or purposes

of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a criminal scheme knowing its

extent and character intends that scheme’s commission.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 77. Reviewing

the record evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing every reasonable

inference in support of the jury’s verdict, Meeker’s intent to facilitate the carjacking could be

inferred from evidence that: he lured the victims to the location of the offense, provided the gun

used in the carjacking, waited idly while Llorrens and Valentine committed the carjacking, drove

2 The affirmative-act requirement does not, as Meeker incorrectly asserts, necessitate that “the defendant participated in the entire offense, including the carrying out of the carjacking.” Appellant’s Br. at 30 (emphasis omitted).

5 away together with the carjacked car, took back the gun shortly after the carjacking, and met up

with Llorrens and Valentine after the carjacking to collect his share of their ill-gotten gains.

Meeker’s intent is measured “at the moment” that Llorrens and Valentine “demanded or

took control over the [victims’] automobile.” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999);

see also United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[T]emporality, not purpose, [i]s

the critical limiting factor tying the mens rea and actus reus elements of § 2119. . . . ‘[T]he

factfinder’s attention’ is properly drawn ‘to the defendant’s state of mind at the precise moment

he demanded or took control over the car by force and violence or by intimidation.’” (quoting

Holloway, 526 U.S. at 8)). That is, an aider and abettor must have sufficient “advance knowledge”

that will allow the person “to make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice” whether “to go

ahead with his role in the venture.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 78. But a jury may draw inferences

about a defendant’s advance knowledge or intent at the time of a crime’s commission based upon

the defendant’s actions before, during, and after it. See id. at 78 n.9 (“Of course, if a defendant

continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can

permissibly infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had such knowledge. In any case,

after all, the factfinder can draw inferences about a defendant’s intent based on all the facts and

circumstances of a crime’s commission.”); see also Robinson, 799 F.3d at 201 (finding a sufficient

factual basis to prove the defendant’s intent where he “joined the carjacking while [his confederate]

was still brandishing the gun” and, “[i]nstead of leaving then and there, he continued to participate”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the jury could permissibly infer that Meeker had the

requisite advance knowledge and intent at the time of the carjacking from the facts and

circumstances of the carjacking and Meeker’s “failure to object or withdraw.” Rosemond, 572

U.S. at 78 n.9.

6 * * *

We have considered Defendant-Appellant’s remaining arguments and found them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court