United States v. Dixon

Third Circuit

United States v. Dixon

33 F. App'x 38

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedApril 22, 2002

DocketNo. 01-3750

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 33 F. App'x 38 (United States v. Dixon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Dixon, 33 F. App'x 38 (3d Cir. 2002).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

Defendant argues that the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and that the enhancement that he received for a prior felony conviction should have been submitted to the jury under the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

As we write only for the parties, we need not reiterate the factual background and circumstances of this dispute. Rather, we need only state that the defendant’s Commerce Clause claim is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001), and his Apprendi argument is foreclosed by the language of Apprendi itself (excluding the situations, like the defendant’s, where enhancement results from a prior conviction), and the Supreme Court’s subsequent clarification of Apprendi in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction entered on October 1, 2001 will be affirmed.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

Defendant argues that the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and that the enhancement that he received for a prior felony conviction should have been submitted to the jury under the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

As we write only for the parties, we need not reiterate the factual background and circumstances of this dispute. Rather, we need only state that the defendant’s Commerce Clause claim is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001), and his Apprendi argument is foreclosed by the language of Apprendi itself (excluding the situations, like the defendant’s, where enhancement results from a prior conviction), and the Supreme Court’s subsequent clarification of Apprendi in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction entered on October 1, 2001 will be affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

33 F. App'x 38, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-dixon-ca3-2002.

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